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ABSTRACT
THE FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE SUCCESSFUL FUNDING OF
OTHER POST-EMPLOYMENT BENEFIT PLANS IN MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT:
DOES THE MUNICIPAL MANAGEMENT TEAM
MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
Brian W. Caputo, Ph.D.
Department of Political Science
Northern Illinois University, 2015
Dr. Kurt M. Thurmaier, Director
This dissertation examines the factors that contribute to the successful funding of
post-employment benefit plans, other than pension plans, sponsored by municipal
governments (OPEB plans). These plans primarily provide retiree healthcare benefits. The
study analyzes the degree to which the professional experience and training of chief financial
officers (CFOs), and the mayors or managers who serve as chief executive officers (CEOs)
affect the level of short-term and long-term funding of OPEB liabilities. Several
hypothesized models include other factors such as form of government, municipal financial
condition, plan actuarial parameters, and plan participant cost sharing. OPEB plan funding is
assessed from a cumulative and annual perspective.
The study has surprising and mixed findings. Contrary to hypothesis 1, only the total
years of government service of the CEO are found to impact cumulative OPEB plan funding;
as the CEO’s years of experience increase, OPEB plan funding declines. But from a shortterm perspective (hypothesis 2), as the CEO’s years of service in current position increase or
the CFO’s total years of government service increase, OPEB plan funding improves. These
results are tempered by the finding that, as the CFO’s years of service in position increase,
the funding of the OPEB plan declines. Theoretical contributions include comprehensive and

adaptable models for predicting OPEB funding behavior, a ratio for gauging cumulative plan
funding when the formal GASB Statement No. 45 funded ratio is not informative, and an
index for capturing the plan participant’s cost burden in plan funding. This research suggests
that training programs for municipal administrators should develop a better commitment to
funding long-term OPEB liabilities.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The principles of sound financial reporting by state and local governments specify
that “the current generation of citizens should not be able to shift the burden of paying for
current-year services to future-year taxpayers” (Concepts Statement No. 1, 1987, para. 60).
Personnel-related costs comprise a very large share of the budgets of most governments.
Among those costs are current salary, the employer’s Social Security contributions, pension
fund contributions, and contributions for other postemployment benefits (OPEB), such as
retiree healthcare. A share of pension and OPEB costs during each year of an employee’s
active service should be recognized as a current-year expense as they are, from an accrual
accounting perspective, part of compensation earned during the current period (Statement
No. 45, 2004, para. 7). While the cost of retiree healthcare is typically the most significant
OPEB cost, other potential OPEB costs include those associated with the provision of “life
insurance, disability, long-term care, and other benefits” (Statement No. 45, 2004, para. 7b).
The Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) is a not-for-profit
organization that establishes accounting and financial reporting standards for state and local
governments. In 2004, the GASB adopted its Statement No. 45 entitled Accounting and
Financial Reporting by Employers for Postemployment Benefits Other Than Pensions. In
general, GASB Statement No. 45 requires that state and local governments include in their
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annual financial statements information on the long-term costs and liabilities associated with
providing OPEB to their current and future retirees. The GASB decided to pursue the
establishment of accounting and financial reporting standards for OPEB “principally because
of growing concern about the potential magnitude of employer obligations to provide
postemployment benefits other than pensions and the need for clear accounting and financial
reporting regarding such benefits” (Statement No. 45, 2004, para. 42).
Prior to the adoption of Statement No. 45, the GASB issued its Statement No. 12
(1990), Disclosure of Information on Postemployment Benefits Other than Pension Benefits
by State and Local Governmental Employers, to provide interim guidance on how state and
local governments should report financial information pertaining to OPEB. Statement No. 12
did not require the reporting of long-term OPEB costs and liabilities. Rather, it only required
that governments report descriptive information about the OPEB provided and cost
information on whatever basis the government made contributions. Specifically, this interim
standard required that governments disclose:
(a) a description of the benefits provided, employee groups covered, and the
employer and participant obligations to contribute, (b) a description of the
statutory, contractual, or other authority under which benefit provisions and
obligations are established, (c) a description of the accounting and financing
or funding policies followed for those benefits, and (d) the
expenditures/expenses for those benefits recognized for the period and certain
related data. (Statement No. 12, 1990, para. 10)
The items outlined above were to be included in the notes to the financial statements. The
cost information that was presented was dependent upon how the government chose to fund
its OPEB. Governments choosing to only account for OPEB costs on a pay-as-you-go basis
could report expenditures/expenses of only the current reporting period. However,
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governments electing to advance fund their OPEB obligations would report actuarially
determined, long-term cost and liability information, such as required and actual
contributions, the actuarial accrued liability (AAL), the amount of net assets available for
OPEB, and the unfunded actuarial accrued liability (UAAL) (Statement No. 12, 1990, para.
10). Statement No. 12 did not provide for uniform reporting of OPEB information across
governments.
GASB Statement No. 45 was essentially a standard that trailed guidance on how state
and local governments should report the long-term costs and liabilities associated with
pensions. In its Statement No. 27 (1994), Accounting for Pensions by State and Local
Governmental Employers, the GASB provided extensive guidance that resulted in significant
transparency with respect to the obligations associated with pensions. The standard required
that pension expenditures/expenses reported by a governmental employer for an accounting
period be generally similar to the employer’s actuarially determined contribution for the
period (Statement No. 27, 1994, para. 1). The requirement for an actuarial determination of
current-year pension costs was a significant departure from the pay-as-you-go approach
employed by many governments previously. Actuarial determination of pension costs
involves spreading the cost of pensions over the service career of an employee so that
adequate resources are on hand at the time of retirement to pay pension benefits for the
expected remaining life of the employee. GASB Statement No. 27 requires that governments
recognize as the “annual pension cost” (APC) as an expense each year. The APC is
comprised of the actuarially determined annual required contribution (ARC), interest on the
net pension obligation (NPO), and an adjustment to the ARC (Statement No. 27, 1994, paras.
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11-13). The NPO is essentially the accumulation of the amounts of APCs from prior years
that were not paid. It appears on the entity-wide statement of net position (balance sheet) of a
government. Statement No. 27 also requires that a schedule of funding progress and certain
trend information be included in the financial statements of state and local governments. The
schedule of funding progress presents at least three years of information portraying how
much of the actuarial accrued liability associated with pension benefits has been funded with
assets (Statement No. 27, 1994, para. 22a). The required trend information describes how
much of the APC for each of the last three fiscal years has been funded (Statement No. 27,
1994, para. 21). Taken together, the requirements of Statement No. 27 shift the focus of
pension funding from a short-term to a long-term perspective.
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the private sector equivalent of
the GASB, issued guidance on reporting financial information on OPEB for businesses that
predated GASB Statement No. 45. In 1990, the FASB issued its Statement No. 106,
Employer’s Accounting for Post Retirement Benefits Other Than Pensions, which required
that “OPEB liability be placed on the accounting entity’s books either as a one-time entry or
amortized over a period no more than 20 years” (Voorhees, 2005, pp. 60-61). The impact of
this financial reporting pronouncement on the private sector was extremely significant. After
previously accounting for the costs and liabilities of OPEB on a pay-as-you-go basis, the
private sector could no longer ignore the enormous obligations that they had incurred. For
example, General Motors, General Electric, and IBM added liabilities of $20.8, $2.7, and
$2.26 billion to their balance sheets, respectively, to comply with FASB Statement No. 106
(Voorhees, 2005, p. 61).
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FASB Statement No. 106 had a distinct impact upon OPEB benefits offered in the
private sector. Prior to the issuance of FASB Statement No. 106, private sector businesses
reported spending of about 1% of payroll costs on OPEB. However, under the new standard,
the reported costs rose to 5 to 10% of payroll (Kramer and Casciari, 2005, p. 431). As a
result, many private sector employers eliminated their OPEB (primarily retiree healthcare)
programs. The percentage of employers offering retiree healthcare plans dropped from 66%
in 1988 to 46% in 1991. By 2004, all but 36% of private sector employers dropped their
retiree healthcare programs (Kramer and Casciari, 2005, p. 431).

The Magnitude and Effects of the
Governmental OPEB Problem
The total unfunded OPEB liabilities among state and local governments is nothing
short of staggering. One estimate of the combined obligation of state and local governments
in the United States is between $600 billion and $1.6 trillion (Mattoon, 2008, p. 1). A recent
estimate for the unfunded obligations of state governments alone was $450.7 billion (Franzel
and Brown, 2012, p. 61). A primary reason why OPEB obligations are so large is that the
provision of OPEB is common in the public sector. Berman and Keating reported that, in
2002, 92% of state governments offered healthcare benefits to their retirees under the age of
65 (2006, pp. 8-9). Also, the public sector generally offers retiree healthcare benefits that are
significantly more generous than those provided in the private sector in terms of coverage
parameters and cost (p. 9).
There are at least three effects of OPEB obligations for state and local governments.
First, they represent real financial commitments that will eventually come due. As long as a
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government can cover its current retiree healthcare claims, the crisis is held at bay. However,
as a greater number of public sector employees reach retirement age, governments may not
have the resources to pay healthcare claims if they have not set aside adequate money during
the employees’ active careers. Second, because OPEB obligations are a form of debt, they
are of interest to bond rating agencies. The extent to which a UAAL impacts upon a rating
agency’s assessment of creditworthiness may depend upon the size of the government’s
UAAL and its overall fiscal capacity (Coe and Rivenbark, 2010, p. 78). If a government is
taking steps to financially address its UAAL, the government’s bond rating may not be
immediately threatened. However, if a government does not seem to be making progress in
addressing its UAAL, either by contributing a substantial portion of the ARC, taking steps to
reduce its retiree healthcare costs, or both, its bond rating agency will have a cause for
concern.
Finally, OPEB obligations may be a source of conflict between governments and the
labor unions that represent their employees. Normally, public sector labor unions do not pay
a great deal of attention to proposed governmental accounting standards. However, GASB
Statement No. 45 was an exception to the rule. Representatives of some labor unions
encouraged the GASB to abandon its endeavor to establish standards that would require
governments to report the costs and liabilities associated with OPEB on an accrual basis
because such standards could have an adverse impact on the policy decisions of governments
concerning the “continuation, level, design, and method of financing” of OPEB (GASB
Statement No. 45, 2004, para. 80). Governments have limited resources. In the past,
governments were largely able to ignore the true cost of OPEB. Because GASB Statement
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No. 45 now makes the costs of OPEB impossible to ignore, governments may need to choose
between paying salary increases and paying for OPEB plans. Yet, labor unions may desire to
see a continuation of pre-GASB Statement No. 45 salary increases notwithstanding the now
known costs of OPEB. As they cling to the pay-as-you-go perspective, labor unions may
argue that OPEB costs need not be addressed until the distant future. The differing
perspectives of governments and labor unions (i.e., long term vs. short term) could be a
potential source of conflict.

The Fundamentals of GASB Statement No. 45
There are two general types of retirement plans: defined contribution and defined
benefit. In both types of plans, the resources for benefits generally come from employee
contributions, employer contributions, and investment income. The primary difference
between the two plans is whether benefits are guaranteed at a particular level and whether the
employer is responsible for ensuring that assets are on hand to pay benefits at any guaranteed
level. With a defined contribution plan, the benefits that a participant receives are based upon
the resources that are available in the plan. The employee and the employer make
contributions to the plan. The contributions are invested in hopes of generating investment
income. When the plan participant retires, he receives benefits based upon the amount of
assets that are available at the time of retirement (Petersen, 2004, p. 505). If investments
perform poorly and assets are diminished, the plan participant receives less. Conversely, if
investments perform well, the plan participant receives more in retirement. In short, the plan
participant shoulders the risk of unfavorable investment results.
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With a defined benefit plan, the plan sponsor (i.e., the employer) bears the risk of
unfavorable investment results. The employee and the employer make contributions to the
fund. Those contributions are invested. However, benefits are based upon a formula. The
formula may consider the plan participant’s years of active service and/or salary for some
period near the end of employment (Petersen, 2004, p. 505). In other words, the benefits are
defined. When participating in a defined benefit pension plan, the contributions of the
employees are typically a fixed percentage of salary. If investments perform poorly, the
employer must contribute more to ensure that adequate assets are available to pay benefits in
accordance with the benefit formula.
Unlike a defined contribution plan, employer contributions to a defined benefit plan
are determined in accordance with an actuarial valuation. The actuarial valuation seeks to
determine the value of benefits earned by participants up to the point of the valuation date
and what the employer’s contribution should be in the future to ensure that adequate assets
are on hand to pay benefits when necessary. The actuarial valuation is based upon certain
parameters. For a defined benefit pension plan, these parameters include the actuarial cost
method, the amortization method, asset valuation method, the investment return, and
projected salary increases (Statement No. 27, 1994, para. 10). For state and local government
pension plans, actuarial cost methods may include entry age, frozen entry age, attained age,
frozen attained age, projected unit credit, or the aggregate actuarial cost method (Statement
No. 27, 1994, para. 10d).
The parameters applicable to a defined benefit OPEB plan are similar. Those
parameters are the actuarial cost method, the amortization method, the asset valuation
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method, the investment return, and the healthcare inflation rate (Statement No. 45, 2004,
para. 13). Permissible alternative actuarial costs methods include entry age, frozen entry age,
attained age, frozen attained age, projected unit credit, and the aggregate cost method
(Statement No. 45, 2004, para. 13d).
The underlying principles and basic requirements of GASB Statement No. 45 are
similar to those included in FASB Statement No. 106 and GASB Statement No. 27. With
respect to FASB Statement No. 106, GASB Statement No 45 is similar in the sense that it
addresses OPEB. GASB Statement Nos. 27 and 45 share a common focus in that they
provide guidance on financial reporting for defined benefit plans. (GASB Statement No. 45
also provides guidance on financial reporting for defined contribution plans. However, the
potential financial obligations imposed by defined contribution plans are likely to be much
less burdensome than those inherent in defined benefit plans.) GASB Statement No. 45
moves away from the pay-as-you-go reporting approach underlying GASB Statement No. 12.
As alluded to earlier, GASB Statement No. 45 requires an accrual approach to
reporting. That is, the costs of a government’s OPEB “must be measured and reported …
over an employee’s working lifetime” (Kramer and Casciari, 2005, p. 429). Governments
may no longer simply report the current OPEB costs of retirees in the period when they are
incurred (i.e., the cost of claims of the current period). For a government sponsoring a
defined benefit OPEB plan, the previous practice of reporting only current OPEB costs (i.e.,
pay as you go) dramatically understated the government’s future financial obligation.
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GASB Statement No. 45 generally requires:
1. Reporting of a Comprehensive Array of Costs: As discussed above, OPEB
costs include not only healthcare costs, but also dental, vision, life
insurance, disability, and long-term care.
2. Accrual Standards: The OPEB liability represents the UAAL computed
using accrual methods. The OPEB liability is increased by normal
employee costs and decreased by contributions to the plan and investment
income. However, the liability is not required to be fully recognized
upfront; rather it allows for deferred recognition in a government’s
financial statements (i.e., statements of position).
3. ARC Disclosure: The entity must disclose an actuarially required
contribution (ARC). The ARC includes the normal cost for the year plus
an amortized portion of the total unfunded actuarial accrued liability (or
funding excess).
4. Limited Amortization: The total amortization period cannot exceed 30
years.
5. Periodic Valuation: Valuations of any assets in the plan must be estimated
annually. The valuation of the actuarial accrued liability must be made at
least every two years, except for the smallest plans, whose liabilities must
be valued triennially.
6. Investment Assumptions: The standard requires that the valuation varies
based upon whether the government operates the OPEB plan through an
irrevocable trust with substantial funding. If such a trust is in place, a
long-term investment return (e.g., 8%) can be used. If not, a short-term
rate of return (e.g., 2%) must be used.
7. Pension-Like Disclosure Requirements: Financial report disclosures are
similar to government pension disclosures. GASB Statement No. 45 calls
for estimating the UAAL and disclosing it, but the government is only
required to recognize the liability on the balance sheet incrementally over
the amortization period and only to the extent that it has failed to fund the
current and prior years’ ARC.
8. Disclosure of Rate Subsidies: Any implicit rate subsidy paid by current
employees to retirees and survivors must also be disclosed. (An implicit
rate subsidy arises when a government assigns the same coverage
premium rate to active and retired employees even though retired
employees are typically much more expensive to cover. By establishing
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the same premium rate to active and retired employees, the rate of the
active employees effectively subsidizes the premium rate of the retired
employees.) (Keating and Berman, 2007, pp. 247-248)
The key disclosures required for defined benefit OPEB plans by GASB Statement
No. 45 must be presented in the notes to the financial statements and in the financial report’s
required supplementary information (RSI). The information that must be disclosed in the
notes includes:
1. Plan description.
a. Name of the plan, identification of the public employee retirement
system (PERS) or other entity that administers the plan, the
identification of the plan as a single-employer, agent multipleemployer, or cost-sharing multiple-employer defined benefit OPEB
plan.
b. Brief description of the types of benefits and the authority under which
benefit provisions are established or may be amended.
c. Whether the OPEB plan issues a stand-alone financial report or is
included in the report of a PERS or another entity and, if so, how to
obtain the report.
2. Funding policy.
a. Authority under which the obligations of plan members, employer(s),
and other contributing entities … to contribute to the plan are
established or may be amended.
b. Required contribution rate(s) of plan members. The required
contribution rate(s) could be expressed as a rate (amount) per member
or as a percentage of covered payroll.
c. Required contribution rate(s) of the employer in accordance with the
funding policy, in dollars or as a percentage of current-year covered
payroll, and if applicable, legal or contractual maximum contribution
rates. (GASB Statement No. 45, 2004, para. 24)
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Aforementioned requirements apply to public sector employers sponsoring any type of
defined benefit OPEB plan (i.e., single-employer, agent multiple-employer, or cost-sharing
multiple-employer plan).
Employers sponsoring single-employer and agent multiple-employer plans are subject
to additional disclosure requirements with respect to the financial statement notes. Those
additional disclosure requirements are:
1. For the current year, annual OPEB cost and the dollar amount of
contributions made. If the employer has a net OPEB obligation, also
disclose the components of the annual OPEB cost, . . . the increase or
decrease in the net OPEB obligation, and the net OPEB obligation at the
end of the year.
2. For the current and two preceding years, the annual OPEB cost,
percentage of the annual OPEB cost contributed that year, and net OPEB
obligation at the end of the year.
3. Information about the funded status of the plan as of the most recent
valuation date, including the actuarial valuation date, the actuarial value of
assets, the actuarial accrued liability (or funding excess), the actuarial
value of assets as a percentage of the actuarial accrued liability (funded
ratio), the annual covered payroll, and the ratio of the unfunded actuarial
liability (or funding excess) to annual covered payroll.
4. Disclosure of information about actuarial methods and assumptions used
in valuations on which reported information about the ARC, annual OPEB
cost, and the funded status and funding progress of OPEB plans is based,
including the following:
a. Disclosure that actuarial valuations involve estimates of the value of
reported amounts and assumptions about the probability of events far
into the future, and that actuarially determined amounts are subject to
continual revision as actual results are compared to past expectations
and new estimates are made about the future.
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b. Disclosure that the required schedule of funding progress immediately
following the notes to the financial statements presents multiyear trend
information about whether the actuarial value of plan assets is
increasing or decreasing over time relative to the actuarial accrued
liability for benefits.
c. Disclosure that calculations are based on the types of benefits provided
under the terms of the substantive plan at the time of each valuation
and on the pattern of sharing of costs between the employer and plan
members to that point.
d. Disclosure that actuarial calculations reflect a long-term perspective.
In addition, if applicable, disclosure that consistent with that
perspective, actuarial methods and assumptions used include
techniques that are designed to reduce short-term volatility in actuarial
accrued liabilities and the actuarial value of assets.
e. Identification of the actuarial methods and significant assumptions
used to determine the ARC for the current year. The disclosures should
include:
1) The actuarial cost method.
2) The method(s) used to determine the actuarial value of assets.
3) The assumptions with respect to the inflation rate, investment
return (including the method used to determine the blended rate for
a partially funded plan, if applicable), post-retirement benefit
increases if applicable, projected salary increases if relevant to
determination of the level of benefits, and for post-employment
healthcare plans, the healthcare cost trend rate.
4) The amortization method (level dollar or level percentage of
projected payroll) and the amortization period . . . for the most
recent actuarial valuation and whether the period is closed or open.
(Statement No. 45, 2005, para. 25)
Included in Appendix A is an example note disclosure from the 2013 CAFR of the City of
Aurora, Illinois.
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As much as the required note disclosures advance transparency in the reporting of
OPEB obligations, the information provided in RSI is arguably more useful. The RSI
disclosures required by GASB Statement No. 45 generally include tables that report:
1. Information about the funded status of the plan as of the most recent
valuation date, including the actuarial valuation date, the actuarial
value of assets, the actuarial accrued liability (or funding excess), the
actuarial value of assets as a percentage of the actuarial accrued
liability (funded ratio), the annual covered payroll, and the ratio of the
unfunded actuarial liability (or funding excess) to annual covered
payroll. (Statement No. 45, 2004, paras. 25 and 26)
2. Information on the dollar amount of the ARC applicable to the (fiscal)
year … and the percentage of the ARC that was recognized in the
plan’s statement of net assets (position) for that year as contributions
from the employer(s). (Statement No. 43, 2004, para. 36 and Statement
No. 45, 2004, para. 206, Illustration 1, Note 1)
The RSI is presented in two tables that following the notes to the financial statements of state
and local governments. The two tables are titled “Schedule of Funding Progress” and
“Schedule of Employer Contributions.” Information must be presented for the most recent
and the two preceding valuations (Statement No. 45, 2004, para. 26). Appendix B provides
examples of these two schedules. The high-level, multi-year view provided by these
schedules makes OPEB RSI highly informative. A financial statement reader can quickly and
easily gain an understanding of the overall status of an OPEB plan by reviewing the RSI.
The implementation of GASB Statement No. 45 was phased based upon the size of
the government’s total annual revenues. The phasing tiers mirrored the implementation
requirements of GASB Statement No. 34, The New Financial Reporting Model. Specifically,
the implementation requirements of GASB Statement No. 45 are shown in Figure 1.

15
Total Annual Revenues

Implementation Date

$100 million or more
At least $10 million, but less than $100 million
Less than $10 million

After December 15, 2006
After December 15, 2007
After December 15, 2008

Figure 1: Implementation requirements for GASB Statement No. 45.

For the purpose of implementing GASB Statement No. 45, the fiscal year for the
measurement of total annual revenues was the government’s first fiscal year ending after
June 15, 1999 (Statement No. 45, 2004, para. 36). A government could have opted to
implement the standard before the required implementation date.
It is important to note the GASB Statement No. 45 only requires the reporting of a
government’s long-term OPEB costs and liabilities. The standard does not require that those
costs and liabilities be funded. Funding remains a matter to be decided by a government’s
policymakers. However, to the extent that an ARC is not funded in a given year, the shortage
is added to actuarial accrued liability of the government. Interest accrues on the liability
(GASB Statement No. 45, 2004, para. 15). Thus, if a government chooses not to fund
substantial ARCs for several years, a UAAL can arise and grow significantly.
At the outset, the role of an actuary in the valuing of OPEB obligations must be
recognized. In all but the most limited circumstances, an actuary is required to value OPEB
obligations and project the ARC for the upcoming fiscal year. Even in the singular situation
when an actuary is not required under GASB Statement No. 45 to value a governmental
OPEB obligation, procedures must be undertaken that essentially simulate an actuarial
valuation (i.e., alternative measurement method) (Statement No. 45, 2004, paras. 33-34). In
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consultation with the OPEB plan administrator, the actuary selects the actuarial parameters
(actuarial assumptions and cost method) to be used in a valuation. The results of the actuary’s
work are communicated through an actuarial valuation report. An actuarial valuation may be
produced for an OPEB plan once each year. However, depending upon the number of
participants in an OPEB plan, a valuation may be undertaken biennially or triennially (GASB
Statement No. 45, 2004, para.12). Key information included in the actuarial valuation report
is incorporated into the financial statements of a state or local government to satisfy the
requirements of GASB Statement No. 45.

What Makes a Difference?
The problem of unfunded OPEB obligations is a looming financial problem for state
and local governments. But what factors contribute to the successful funding of those
obligations? As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters 2 and 3, choices of actuarial
assumptions and a cost method will impact upon the valuation of an OPEB obligation. With
respect to actuarial assumptions, the discount (investment) rate and healthcare cost inflation
rate chosen for an OPEB valuation will be foremost in importance. Also, the establishment of
an irrevocable trust fund will impact the funded ratio and ARC contribution ratio of an OPEB
plan. Furthermore, the generosity of the plan itself will have an effect on its funding. That is,
to the extent that the plan sponsor requires its participants (i.e., retirees) to pay a larger share
of the coverage premium, a larger deductible, and a larger office visit co-pay amount, the
funded OPEB obligation will be reduced.
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The economic wherewithal of a constituency and the financial condition of its
government will make a difference as well. Presumably, governments with a more substantial
tax base will be in a better position to contribute to their OPEB plans. Additionally, those that
have greater financial capacity for any number of reasons, including a relatively light bonded
debt burden, should be able to better fund their OPEB plans.
Is OPEB funding solely a function of “mechanical” factors such as actuarial
assumptions, participant contribution requirements, and financial condition of the sponsoring
government? Or does the management of the government matter? The key financial decision
makers in a government are typically its CEO and CFO. Do the professional experience and
training of these members of senior management affect OPEB funding? One might expect
that the CEOs and CFOs with greater professional experience and training would steer their
governments toward better OPEB funding. More experienced and better trained CEOs and
CFOs should have a deeper understanding of the nature of OPEB. Armed with this
understanding, these executives should be encouraging their governments to avoid the pitfalls
of underfunding of their OPEB plans. If so, governments would be well served by employing
more experienced CEOs and CFOs and/or hiring those with greater professional training.
Failing that, professional training could be provided after hiring that includes instruction on
the nature and impact of long-term financial obligations, such as OPEB.
This study explores these important issues and questions. In particular, the study
examines a variety of factors that potentially could be impacting the successful funding of
OPEB plans. The “substantive variables” included in the study capture the professional
experience and training of CEOs and CFOs working in municipal governments in Illinois,
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Iowa, and Wisconsin. Depending upon the model, 37 or 38 municipalities are included in the
analysis. Other factors, such as actuarial parameters, participant contributions, and financial
condition of the sponsoring government, are considered in the analysis as “control variables.”
To the extent available, data are for the municipalities for fiscal years ending in 2006 through
2011.
The impact of the Patent Protection and Affordable Care Act is not reflected in this
study. This act, also known more simply as the Affordable Care Act (ACA), became law on
March 23, 2010. The key provisions of this law were effective on January 1, 2014,
subsequent to the period that was the focus of the study. Generally, the ACA seeks to
expand access to insurance coverage, increase consumer protections, promote prevention and
wellness, improve health quality and healthcare delivery system performance, and curb rising
healthcare costs in the United States. Among many other things, the ACA required the
creation of insurance exchanges through which individuals may purchase health insurance at
relatively low cost (Affordable Care Act, 2011, p. 1). Some municipal employees will
migrate from their employer’s medical insurance plans to the exchanges authorized by the
ACA, particularly if the retiree contribution required for participation in their employer’s
OPEB plan is relatively high. The effect of the ACA upon the funding of municipal OPEB
plans is a matter for future research (i.e., after the trends of migration to the exchanges are
more apparent).
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The Chapters That Follow
Four chapters and several related appendices follow. Chapter 2 reviews the literature
that pertains to OPEB. Previous research on OPEB provided by state and local governments
is relatively thin. This is primarily because OPEB has only recently been a subject of interest
to scholars and practitioners. The recent interest has been spawned by the accrual-basis
financial information made available due to the promulgation of GASB Statement No. 45 in
2004. Even now though, it is government pension obligations that seem to attract greater
research and general public interest. Yet, depending upon the government concerned, an
OPEB obligation can be just as daunting.
Chapter 3 outlines the methodology and general models of the study. The study
employs iterations of generalized least squares (GLS) panel regressions and ordinary least
squares (OLS) cross-sectional regressions to estimate the impact of the substantive variables
and the control variables on a proxy for the funded ratio of a plan (i.e., the UAAL ratio) and
the ARC contribution ratio. The data for the study were gathered through two surveys (one
primary and one limited distribution follow-up survey) and from the comprehensive financial
reports (CAFRs) of the case municipalities. Background information and descriptive
statistics on the dependent and independent variables are also provided in this chapter.
Chapter 4 reports findings, including the iterative processes to arrive at the best
models and the diagnostic procedures used to evaluate the regression assumptions underlying
the models. Also, the initial and best models for each dependent variable (UAAL ratio and
ARC ratio) and regression method (GLS and OLS) are interpreted.
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Chapter 5 presents conclusions. The chapter compares and contrasts the best GLS
and OLS estimations for each dependent variable and offers potential explanations for the
results. The study’s larger contributions to OPEB research are discussed. Finally, the
chapter explains what the study results may mean for public administration practitioners and
suggests opportunities for future research.

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY

The previous chapter discussed the technical particulars of financial reporting in
accordance with GASB Statement No. 45. Yet, the OPEB problem is far more than a
challenge of financial reporting. Responsible management of OPEB requires calculating,
reporting, and funding the obligations. A municipality’s management team makes key
decisions with respect to how the municipality will fund its OPEB obligation. Municipal
management teams approach the issue of OPEB funding from different perspectives. The
actuarial parameters employed from municipality to municipality can vary widely. The legal
obligation to maintain OPEB benefits is unclear from state to state. The actions of numerous
stakeholders in the OPEB environment may influence the municipal management team’s
OPEB-related decisions. The literature on OPEB reveals the scope and dynamics of the
OPEB problem.
The bulk of OPEB obligations relate to medical benefits of retirees (as opposed to
dental benefits, life insurance, and other benefits). Consequently, understanding the actors in
the medical benefits environment would be helpful. Mittelstaedt (2004) provides an
overview of the medical care environment. He identifies the sources of financing, providers,
and consumers of medical care. He diagrams the relationships between the stakeholders as
indicated in Figure 2 below.
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Figure 2.

Medical benefits environment in the United States. Source: Mittelstaedt
(2004), Figure 1, p. 155 (adapted).

In the OPEB environment, the primary sources of funding are employer insurance
(i.e., the OPEB plan) and personal savings or resources. All of the providers reflected in
Figure 1 could be direct or indirect deliverers of services to retirees and their dependents.
The medical care consumers in the OPEB environment are generally in the upper portion of
the age range. However, public safety employees oftentimes are permitted to retire earlier
than other governmental employees. In some jurisdictions, public safety employees can
retire as early as age 50. Also, retirees may have children in their households who are in the
lower portion of the age range.
Mittelstaedt (2004) explains why research in the area of retiree medical benefits can
be important. He offers two major roles for such research. First, Mittelstaedt suggests that
retiree healthcare research should “try to identify all of the potential stakeholders and
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consider the possible effects of decisions” (p. 156). Retirees are certainly not the only
stakeholders in the environment. The public, public employers, and medical providers are
among the stakeholders. The public typically wants high-quality governmental services.
This requires the recruitment of high-quality government employees. Public employers are
charged with recruiting those employees. Medical providers are responsible for providing
medical care to those employees during their active services careers and subsequent
retirement. Mittelstaedt also asserts that research should quantify the wealth effects of
healthcare-related decisions in the environment (p. 156). He argues that research should
endeavor to understand what socioeconomic groups of people benefit or are harmed by
governmental or healthcare industry decisions. It may be appropriate for scholars to be the
watchdog or mouthpiece for disadvantaged groups.
Hurley and his associates (2006) report the 2005 results of the biennial Community
Tracking Study (CTS). This study examines healthcare in general, not just retiree healthcare.
Hurley states that the CTS study, conducted since 1996, “documents multiyear trends in the
public sector and puts them in the broader context to contrast with developments in private
sector benefits” (195). The study involves interviews of more than 1,000 individuals
associated with the provision of healthcare to public employees in 12 metropolitan markets.
Hurley reports that budget pressures have threatened healthcare benefits for public
employees. However, public employers have been working to maintain the financial
viability of healthcare programs by increasing employee premium contributions, increasing
required copayments, and redesigning plans (e.g., reducing prescription drug benefits and
offering lower cost products such as HMOs) (pp. 197-198). Hurley notes that GASB
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Statement No. 45 has “cast a bright light on retiree health benefits offered by public sector
employees” (p. 199). However, as with employee healthcare benefits, governments have
generally tried to maintain retiree healthcare programs by “budget maneuvering” (p. 200).
Governments have stretched their budgets to accommodate retiree healthcare benefits due to
pressure from unions to maintain the benefits and the lack of pressure from other political
interests to reduce them. Furthermore, healthcare benefits for active and retirees are “a major
factor in attracting and retaining public-sector employees (p. 200).
Voorhees (2005) offers one of the first descriptive articles on GASB Statement No.
45. In his article, Voorhees has four objectives: outline the history of financial reporting for
OPEB, explain how to calculate OPEB obligations in accordance with GASB Statement No.
45, discuss the reporting requirements of GASB Statement No. 45, and outline three issues
that the then-newly released pronouncement raised. The history of financial reporting and
the reporting requirements of the pronouncement are discussed in Chapter 1. With respect to
calculating OPEB obligations, Voorhees sees five steps:
1. Calculate the Total Projected Benefits. This first step reflects the major
fundamental objective of GASB Statement No. 45. The total projected cost of
benefits is the amount that the local government is expected to pay over the
course of the employee/future retiree’s retirement years. This figure seeks to
estimate future obligations based upon various actuarial assumptions. These
assumptions include healthcare inflation, life expectancy of employee and
spouse, and the number of employees who are expected to work long enough
to earn OPEB benefits under the plan.
2. Calculate the Normal Cost. Normal cost is essentially a slice of the total
projected benefits that are assigned to a fiscal year for potential funding. The
normal cost is calculated on present value basis. Six actuarial cost methods
are permitted by GASB Statement No. 45: entry age, frozen entry age,
attained age, frozen attained age, projected unit credit, or the aggregate cost
method.
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3. Calculate the Actuarial Accrued Liability (AAL). This figure is “the total of
normal cost for all prior service period prior to the current period.”
4. Calculate the Unfunded Actuarial Accrued Liability (UAAL). The UAAL is
calculated by subtracting the AAL from the actuarial value of plan assets.
Generally, the actuarial value of plan assets is their market value. A substep
included in step 4 is the determining the amortization of the UAAL that is
applicable to the next plan year. GASB Statement No. 45 permits local
governments to amortize the UAAL over a period of not less than 10 years nor
more than 30 years.
5. Calculate the Annual Required Contribution (ARC). The ARC for a plan year
is calculated by adding together the normal cost (step 2) and the amortization
of the UAAL. (step 4). (pp. 63-64)
If a local government does not fund the ARC in any years, the shortage is accumulated and
reported as a liability on the government’s entity wide statement of net assets/position.
The first issue that Voorhees identifies pertains to the burden that GASB Statement
No. 45 places on small governments. He suggests that the pronouncement may be
disproportionately costly for small governments to implement, given the need for actuarially
developed information. Small governments may be challenged to pay for the costs of
obtaining needed actuarial valuations and the associated auditing costs. Voorhees notes that
the GASB attempts to mitigate the burden of paying for actuarial valuations by allowing
governments sponsoring plans with less than 200 members to obtain an actuarial valuation
only once every three years (pp. 65-66).
The second issue that Voorhees raises is that GASB Statement No. 45 illuminates the
cost of retiree healthcare in the public sector in an unprecedented way. As the public and
government decision makers take note of the cost of OPEB, political pressure may be applied
to reducing or eliminating benefits (pp. 67-68).
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Finally, Voorhees posits that the new governmental OPEB pronouncement creates
certain winners and losers. He placed citizens and investors in government bonds among the
winners because they now have better information on OPEB obligations. Investors can more
fully assess the risks associated with a government’s bonds. Interestingly, Voorhees believes
that governing boards are both winners and losers. They are winners in the sense that they
have better information about their true OPEB costs and liabilities. However, Voorhees also
believes that governing boards are losers insofar that GASB Statement No. 45 effectively
places a constraint on budgetary flexibility (pp. 68-69).
Kramer and Casciari (2005) begin their article by summarizing some of the basic
requirements of GASB Statement No. 45. They then discuss the lessons that the private
sector learned from FASB Statement No. 106 (i.e., the pronouncement that required private
sector businesses to disclose their OPEB obligations), theorize whether governments will
react to GASB Statement No. 45 in a manner similar to how the private sector reacted to
FASB Statement No. 106, and address the legal implications of modifying or eliminating
OPEB benefits for public sector employees. Kramer and Casciari note that, if the FASB
Statement No. 106 experience is any indication of what the public sector can expect with
GASB Statement No. 45, “a difficult and painful adjustment to the new accounting standard
(GASB Statement No. 45) combined with a serious reconsideration of whether and how to
provide retiree health insurance is in the offing” (p. 431) (parenthetical reference to GASB
Statement No. 45 added). FASB Statement No. 106 was issued in 1990. Between 1988 and
2004, the percentage of employers (private and public) with 200 or more employees offering
retiree healthcare benefits dropped from 66% to 36% (p. 431). The illumination of retiree
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healthcare costs provided by FASB Statement No. 106 prompted many businesses to modify,
reduce, or eliminate healthcare coverage provided to their retirees. Many of the private
sector employers who have chosen to continue to provide retiree healthcare benefits have
redesigned their plans. The redesign steps have included:
(I)ncreasing retiree share of costs (e.g., deductibles, coinsurance, premiums),
indexing cost sharing provisions to inflation or cost trend rates, establishing
annual/lifetime maximums or caps on employer contributions to the costs of
health insurance, changing the formula for coordinating benefits with
Medicare, tying benefit levels to length of service, providing reduced benefits
to employees who retire early, changing from a defined benefit to a defined
contribution plan, implementing managed care provisions (e.g., medical case
management and pre-admission review), and eliminating early retirement or
spousal/dependent coverage. (p. 433)
Kramer and Casciari’s research suggests FASB Statement No. 106 prompted private sector
businesses to reassess the generosity of their retiree healthcare plans.
It is unlikely that public sector employers will be able to ignore the OPEB financial
information that GASB Statement No. 45 requires those governments to disclose. Kramer
and Casciari assert that the question is not whether public sector employers will make
changes to their OPEB plans, but when. Even if public sector employers retain their OPEB
plans, they will almost certainly seek to reduce their cost. Kramer and Casciari suggest that a
number of containment options are available to public sector employers:
1. Shift a greater portion of the cost ratio onto retirees (premium costs,
spousal coverage, deductibles, larger physician visit co-payments, increased
out-of-pocket limits);
2. Reconsider eligibility rules (e.g., do away with early retirement options
and/or raise the retirement age, if not barred by statute);
3. Review coordination between 65-and-over retiree health benefits and
Medicare (e.g., shift a greater portion of unpaid medical expenses to retirees);
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4. Determine whether participation in Medicare’s prescription drug program
(which goes into effect in 2006) would be less costly than continuing to
provide a prescription drug plan to 65-and-over retirees;
5. Reintroduce some of the more successful managed care features (e.g., prior
authorization for costly procedures or questionable procedures, prior
notification of impending medical procedures, reduce provider choice to
“discount” networks, limit number of plan choices);
6. For smaller government employers, participate in statewide prescription
drug buying coalitions to keep vendor fees and margin as low as possible; and
7. Consider setting a cap on annual contributions to retiree health benefits.
(pp. 434-435)
However, public sector employers are generally not able to act unilaterally to reduce
their OPEB obligations. Kramer and Casciari explore the legal implications if a public sector
employer attempts to curtail OPEB benefits. At the outset, they generally assert that “an
employer has no duty to bargain with a union over retiree health benefits provided to an
employee who has already retired” (p. 436). They then explore the legal theories on whether
retirees have any vested right to receive OPEB. They noted that, in the private sector,
employers can generally “adopt, modify, or terminate welfare plans” at any time (p. 437).
With respect to the public sector, Kramer and Casciari maintain that courts are divided over
the question of whether governmental ordinances, resolutions, or collective bargaining
agreements create a vested right in OPEB (439-440). Just as unclear is whether state
constitutional or statutory provisions restrict the diminution of benefits (pp. 443-446).
Whether retirees have a vested right in the OPEB that their governments gave them at the
time of their retirement appears to be a matter that will be decided on a state-by-state basis.
The impact of FASB Statement No. 106, the private sector predecessor of GASB
Statement No. 45, was profound. At the time of its release, the statement generated a great
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deal of interest among finance professionals and scholars. FASB Statement No. 106 was
issued in December of 1990; it was effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15,
1992. Prior to the widespread issuance of financial statements with the disclosures required
by the then new pronouncement, Warshawsky, Mittelstaedt, and Cristes (1993) undertake an
ambitious study of the effect of FASB Statement No. 106. They gauge what the statement’s
effect could be on the typical financial performance indicators of private sector companies.
Warshawsky and his associates examine 2,003 companies across 42 industries. About 31%
of these companies sponsor OPEB plans for their retirees and 69% do not. The researchers
note that “in general, a large profitable firm with unionized workers who make lifelong
careers with the firm is most likely to offer a retiree health plan” (pp. 191-192). The attitude
toward the provision of OPEB to retirees in such firms in the early 1990s may have been
similar to that which currently exists in many state and local governments.
Prior to the issuance of FASB Statement No. 106, limited OPEB information was
included in private sector financial statements in accordance with FASB Statement No. 81,
Disclosure of Postretirement Health Care and Life Insurance Benefits (1984). Statement No.
81 essentially required only the disclosure of pay-as-you-go OPEB costs by private sector
companies. Warshawsky, Mittelstaedt, and Cristes use OPEB information in the pre-FASB
Statement No. 106 financial statements to project the effect of the financial results of their
sample companies after FASB Statement No. 106 was implemented. They do this using a
model developed by the American Academy of Actuaries Committee (AAAC) on Pension
Actuarial Principles and Practices. The AAAC developed the model to analyze the potential
impact of a new accounting pronouncement for the private sector related to pension
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obligations (p. 193). Warshawsky and his associates find that the after-tax earnings of the
mean private sector company would decrease between 35.1% and 313.5% with the
implementation of FASB Statement No. 106, depending upon whether the company chooses
to elect delayed or immediate recognition of its total accumulated postretirement healthcare
obligation, respectively, under the standard. For the median firm, the decline in after-tax
earnings would be 8.1% and 72.7%, respectively, depending upon the approach to
recognition of the obligation elected (p. 195). With an impact of this magnitude, it is no
surprise that FASB Statement No. 106 caused private sector companies to evaluate whether
they desired to continue to offer OPEB.
Clark (2009) offers descriptive information on the magnitude of OPEB obligations
facing state governments. He also examines key assumptions underlying the estimation of
OPEB liabilities and, as did Kramer and Casciari, Clark predicted how state and local
governments are likely to engage OPEB programs in the future. Clark noted that the total
unfunded actuarial accrued liability (UAAL) of state-level government OPEB plans in the
United States is approximately $500 billion (p. 534). However, he indicates that the
distribution of state OPEB obligations is bimodal. Some states have very large UAALs for
OPEB, while the OPEB UAALs of other states are relatively small. The State of Alaska has
the largest per capita UAAL at $8,723. On the other hand, at $97, South Dakota has the
smallest per capita UAAL (p. 534). The size of a state’s UAAL burden relates largely to
how much of the premium the state requires its retirees to pay. The states that agree to pay
100% or close to 100% of the premiums have large UAALs. If a state requires its employees
to pay all or most of the premium, the state tends to have a small UAAL. Even if a state
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requires its retirees to pay 100% of the applicable premium for OPEB coverage, it still may
have an UAAL because of the existence of an implicit rate subsidy (p. 534). The concept of
the implicit rate subsidy was presented in Chapter 1 and will be discussed further in Chapter
3.
As Clark notes, there are two actuarial assumptions that have a very significant
impact upon the magnitude of an OPEB obligation. These two assumptions concern the
discount rate and the healthcare inflation rate. The discount rate assumption is used to
discount the future OPEB costs into today’s dollars. Changing this rate changes the size of a
UAAL. A higher discount rate assumption decreases a UAAL. On the other hand, a lower
discount rate assumption results in a higher UAAL. Discount rate assumptions may vary
from 4% to 8% or more. Higher discount rates may parallel the discount rate assumptions
used by defined benefit pension plans. Lower discount rate assumptions tend to be used
when there are few assets in the OPEB plan and when the assets of the plan have not been
placed into an irrevocable trust fund (pp. 534-535). The healthcare inflation rate assumption
has a marked impact on the valuation of OPEB obligations as well. Clark indicates that
state-level OPEB plans typically begin their valuations with a 10% to 14% healthcare
inflation rate assumption and project that the rate will gradually decline over a period of
years to 5%. This may be reasonable given that American society would be unlikely to
shoulder ending annual increases in healthcare costs of 10% or more. However, the variance
in the assumption has dramatic effects on a UAAL. For example, a 1% increase in the
healthcare inflation rate assumption for an initial $9.7 billion liability increases the liability to
$11.6 billion (pp. 535-536).
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Also like Kramer and Casciari, Clark considers the mutability of OPEB
commitments. Clark asserts that OPEB commitments may not be as permanent as pension
commitments. He notes that many states have modified their OPEB plans in an effort to
reduce costs. Other states have increased the number of years that new employees must work
in order to earn OPEB benefits upon retirement. In the end, Clark predicts that, in order to
have the capacity to meet OPEB obligations, states will ultimately have to reduce benefits,
raise taxes, or forgo other service priorities (p. 537).
A case in Illinois illustrates perhaps the most conservative view on the question of the
immutability of OPEB benefits. Prior to July 1, 2013, retired employees of the State of
Illinois were provided with health insurance at very nominal cost to them (Illinois Supreme
Court Issues Ruling, 2014). The associated formula for providing retiree healthcare resulted
in an OPEB UAAL for the State of Illinois of more than $34.5 billion as of June 30, 2013
(State of Illinois CAFR, 2013, p 166). However, the State of Illinois sought to change the
formula and require that state retirees pay more for their coverage with the enactment of
Public Act 97-0695. State retirees filed suit in the Illinois courts. Ultimately, this case,
Kanerva v. Weems (2014), reached the Illinois Supreme Court. The Illinois Supreme Court
struck down the state’s attempt to require its retirees to pay for a larger portion of their
healthcare coverage. The court reasoned that the retirees’ healthcare coverage is associated
with their participation in the state’s retirement program (para. 40). Article XIII, Section 5,
of the Illinois State Constitution (1970) states, “Membership in any pension or retirement
system of the State, any unit of local government or school district, or any agency or
instrumentality thereof, shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which
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shall not be diminished or impaired.” Because retiree healthcare benefits are akin to pension
benefits and the diminishment of pension benefits is prohibited under the state constitution,
the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the State of Illinois could not diminish the retiree
healthcare benefits of its retirees by making the retirees pay more for those benefits (Kanerva
v. Weems, 2014, p. 57). The Kanerva v. Weems decision may have made it impossible for
the State of Illinois to escape its financial obligations associated with OPEB.
Wirtz (2011) gathers data on the OPEB obligations within the Ninth District of the
Federal Reserve Bank. This district includes the states of Minnesota, Montana, North
Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. Wirtz attempts to quantify the OPEB obligations of
governments within the Ninth District. He focuses on the district’s state and largest local
governments. His sample of 69 entities includes states, public universities, municipalities,
school districts, and other special districts. Wirtz finds that these governments had a
combined AAL of $6.2 billion, but only about $292.4 million in assets set aside for the
obligation. Thus, the aggregate funded ratio was 4.8%. He also finds that the governments
in the sample had only contributed an aggregate average of 40.4% of the ARC as reflected in
the governments’ most recent annual financial reports (para. 55).
Wirtz suggests that there are several reasons why governments have not funded their
OPEB obligations. He does not believe that the prospect of funding the obligations in the
future is promising. The first reason for governments not funding their OPEB obligations is
that the obligations were “out of sight” before GASB Statement No. 45 was released (para.
27). Without being compelled to quantify their obligations, governments were content to
ignore them. Another reason for the lack of funding commitment is that funding OPEB
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would crowd other programs and services out of governmental budgets that are more
important to constituencies (para. 36). Current governing boards are opting to fund OPEB
costs on a pay-as-you-go basis and leave the accrued cost of future benefits for future
governing boards to address OPEB obligations accrued in the past as they become payable.
Also, some governing boards believe that OPEB obligations are less than completely firm,
like pension obligations (para. 44). This position ignores the fact that few governing boards
have disavowed OPEB obligations and oftentimes OPEB benefits are promised through
collective bargaining agreements.
As part of their study, Coe and Rivenbark (2010) attempt to gauge the OPEB burdens
felt by North Carolina governments. They find that the mean UAAL of the counties was
$88.2 million, which was 102% of payroll and $246 per capita. Coe and Rivenbark note that
North Carolina cities had a mean UAAL of $73.9 million. This UAAL was 142% of payroll
and $542 per capita. Based upon a review of the largest UAALs, the researchers conclude
that five counties and one city may not be able to sustain their OPEB programs (p. 77).
Coe and Rivenbark maintain that an unfunded OPEB liability may affect a local
government’s credit rating. The size of the liability and the local government’s overall
financial condition are likely to determine whether the impact will be adverse (p. 78). A
lower liability combined with relatively good overall financial condition will likely mitigate
any negative credit impact. Conversely, a tenuous overall financial condition coupled with a
higher OPEB liability will generate concern at a bond rating agency. Coe and Rivenbark do
not believe that a failure to completely and quickly fund an OPEB liability will provoke an
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adverse reaction. However, little or no funding progress or no plan for funding the obligation
may lead to a rating downgrade (p. 78).
Other authors have raised the question about the permanence of OPEB commitments.
As an addendum to his description of GASB Statement No. 45’s features and OPEB funding
possibilities, Bond (2007) briefly discusses the case of OPEB offered by governments in
New York. He points out that “the enforceability of employee benefits after employment
ends is uncertain and subject to dispute and litigation” (p. 727). Because New Yorkers pay
the highest state and local taxes in the nation (p. 727), the matter of OPEB commitments has
become a subject of public debate. Some have argued that defined benefit OPEB plans
should be converted to defined contribution plans to contain the growth of OPEB obligations.
Berman and Keating (2006) chronicle some of the conflicts between stakeholders
over OPEB plans and controlling their costs. In their view, there are three options for
addressing OPEB costs:
1. Do nothing and continuing in whatever fashion the governments currently
manages OPEB, or
2. Partially or fully funding OPEB at a higher cost to taxpayers, or at a cut to
current programs and services (if alternative revenues cannot be raised),
using either current cash flow or bonding mechanisms, . . . or
3. Capping, curtailing, or eliminating benefits to current or future workers.
(p. 22)
They examine the attempts to implement the third option, which entails plan redesign.
As might be expected, attempts to reduce benefits have not been well received by
government employees and retirees. During the 2005 holiday season in New York City,
30,000 transit workers expressed their displeasure over being asked to contribute toward their
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OPEB for the first time by going on strike. The transit authority’s management requested
that employees contribute only 1.5% of the OPEB cost. Berman and Keating describe OPEB
costs as “the third rail of government” (p. 23).
Berman and Keating present a few additional case studies wherein the government
sponsoring an OPEB plan attempted plan redesign and experienced at least a measure of
success. In 2000, the State of Michigan increased copayments, deductibles, and out-ofpocket maximums in their OPEB plan. Various retiree groups filed suit on the grounds that
the state constitution “prohibits the enactment of a law that impairs an existing contractual
obligation” (p. 23). However, the Michigan Supreme Court ultimately ruled that OPEB
benefits do not constitute accrued financial benefits that are subject to the state constitutional
protection. The State of Ohio has had success in containing OPEB costs through plan
redesign as well. Ohio has limited eligibility for OPEB benefits to employees who have 30
years of service. Also, active employees contribute 4% of their salary for future OPEB
coverage (p. 24). As a basis for comparison, disregarding the changes sought by the legally
challenged Public Act 97-0695, employees of the State of Illinois pay nothing during their
active employment for retiree healthcare. Furthermore, the State of Illinois pays 100% of the
premium for the healthcare (medical, dental, and vision benefits) of state employees retiring
with at least 20 years of service (State of Illinois CAFR, 2013, p. 142).
Jacobson (2006) describes the likely impact of GASB Statement No. 45 on school
districts. She points out that, in the past, retiree healthcare benefits were seemingly easy
giveaways to teachers’ unions. Jacobson asserted that “districts have often agreed to more
health benefits in years when they could not afford to give pay raises, or could give only
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small raises” (p. 2). She notes that some unions thought that GASB Statement No. 45 would
not affect them significantly. However, the unions have found that they were wrong because
the administrators of school districts have not been able to ignore the reporting standard.
Administrators have been pressed by their bond rating agencies with respect to their plans to
address their OPEB obligations (p. 2). Jacobson predicts a public outcry as UAALs for
OPEB become more widely understood.
Moran (2010) explores the legal issues surrounding OPEB commitments in more
depth. Similar to Bond (2007), Moran finds that there is “no firm authority for resolving
public sector (OPEB) cases” (p. 701). Some employees have asserted that their entitlement
to OPEB is unalterable based upon a property right conveyed by the federal and some state
constitutions. With respect to the federal constitution, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
prohibit the taking of property without due process (p. 702). The entitlement to OPEB may
be construed as a property right. Also, the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution
prohibits states from passing laws that impair the obligation of contracts (p. 702). This raises
the question of whether a state or local government has impaired a contract if it seeks to
modify its OPEB obligations to its employees and/or retirees. Some state constitutions have
provided similar restrictions on denying property rights and interfering with contracts.
Statutes may also impact the entitlement to OPEB. Governments may be in a stronger
position to modify OPEB for non-union employees due to the lack of a contract (p. 705).
Moran asserts that there are two typical clauses in collective bargaining agreement that may
clarify whether the entitlement to OPEB is subject to modification. The first is the duration
clause of the contract and the second is the reservation of rights clause. While not
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universally accepted by courts, a reservation of rights clause may permit a government to
amend an agreement in the future at its unilateral discretion (p. 707). A fundamental
question underlying the evaluation of any contractual terms is whether a vested right to
OPEB has been conveyed (p. 709).
The majority of private sector litigation concerning the diminution of OPEB by an
employer has been brought by employee groups under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) of 1974. This act governs “employers’ compliance with the terms of
employee benefit plans” (p. 693). Where an employer has diminished OPEB, employee
groups have asserted a violation of the plan, estoppel, or breach of fiduciary duty (p. 693).
Moran emphasizes that ERISA is not applicable to public sector benefit plans. Therefore, the
act does not constrain public sector employers from modifying their OPEB plans. However,
as conflict intensifies over OPEB, public sector employee groups may look to legal theories
advanced in private sector litigation to thwart the attempts of governmental employers to
modify the terms of OPEB plans.
After describing the characteristics of GASB Statement No. 45, Keating and Berman
(2007) offer some metrics for gauging the relative magnitude of a government’s OPEB
obligation. Similar to Clark (2009), Keating and Berman discuss the impact of actuarial
assumptions on OPEB UAALs and ARCs. Additionally, like others, they predict some ways
that governments are likely to address their OPEB obligations. Keating and Berman indicate
that OPEB liabilities can be assessed in terms similar to the ways that other forms of
governmental debt are typically evaluated. For example, a government’s OPEB liability
could be compared to the population’s personal income or population. They calculated these
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ratios for many of the states and several larger U.S. cities. The largest state-level UAAL
noted by Keating and Berman is that of the State of New York at $47.0 billion, which is
6.09% of personal income and $2,440.97 per capita (p. 250). Among municipalities, they
report a UAAL of the City of New York as $50.4 billion – 5.92% of personal income and
$6,251 per capita (p. 251). Keating and Berman suggest metrics to measure current or annual
OPEB funding progress. The basic statistic is the percentage of the ARC actually
contributed during a fiscal year. However, comparing the ARC to total governmental
revenues and covered payroll can put the annual OPEB burden into perspective (p. 249).
Keating and Berman explore the impact of actuarial assumptions on the valuation of
OPEB obligations. They examine the sensitivity of the State of Massachusetts’ OPEB
liability and ARC to a 1% swing (higher and lower) in the healthcare cost inflation rate under
4.5% and 8.25% discount rate scenarios. In the 4.5% discount rate scenario, the UAAL is
$13.3 billion. With a 1% increase in the healthcare cost inflation assumption, the UAAL
rises to $15.9 billion. A 1% decrease in the healthcare cost inflation assumption pushes the
UAAL down to $11.3 billion. Under the 4.5% discount rate scenario, Massachusetts’ ARC is
$1.1 billion. The 1% swing in the healthcare cost inflation assumption results in ARCs of
$1.3 billion (1% higher) and $868 million (1% lower). Similar wide swings are found in the
8.25% discount rate scenario (p. 252).
Finally, Keating and Berman describe some of the options for funding OPEB
obligations. One of the options they note is the issuance of OPEB bonds. When OPEB
bonds are issued by a government, the proceeds of the bonds are typically deposited into an
OPEB trust fund. While the issuance of OPEB bonds may reflect the exchange of one form
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of debt (a UAAL) for another (bonded debt), the UAAL is extinguished. Keating and
Berman note that there are several disadvantages to the issuance of OPEB bonds. First, the
issuance of OPEB irrevocably commits the government to funding its OPEB liability and
reduces budgetary flexibility because the debt service on the OPEB bonds must be paid. In
the absence of OPEB bonds, a government may decide not to fully fund its OPEB obligation
or defer the commitment to fund it. Second, if the healthcare cost inflation assumption of an
OPEB plan proves to be too low, a UAAL will reappear at some point in the future. Third, if
an OPEB plan does not meet its discount (investment) rate assumption, there will ultimately
be a funding shortfall. Beyond the issuance of OPEB bonds, other steps that may be taken to
fund an OPEB UAAL include passing along the costs to taxpayers (i.e., raising taxes),
cutting programs or services, and capping, curtailing, or eliminating benefits for current or
future retirees (pp. 257-259).
Murphy and Zorn (2006) discuss the “substantive OPEB plan” and the methods of
setting aside resources for OPEB obligations. Murphy and Zorn emphasize that the
determination of the substantive plan is critical to the development of an accurate actuarial
valuation. The substantive plan may encompass more than the formal plan document
because the formal plan document may be out of date or other documents may exist that
convey an understanding the benefits that have been promised. In short, the substantive plan
is “the promise made by the plan sponsor to plan members for postemployment benefits” (p.
3). All documents and communications that describe the understanding concerning the
extent of benefits promised should be considered.
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Murphy and Zorn describe four alternatives funding vehicles for OPEB. These
alternatives include using a government’s general fund, a 401(h) account, a voluntary
employee benefit association (VEBA), or a governmental trust. There are certain advantages
and disadvantages with each option. A government’s first option is to use its general fund as
an OPEB funding vehicle. Implementing this option is administratively parsimonious. The
government simply accumulates any resources it wishes to apply toward its OPEB
obligations in the general fund and pays OPEB costs out of that fund as necessary. No
separate fund is established. However, when the general fund is used to fund OPEB
obligations, the government is essentially employing a pay-as-you go approach.
Consequently, any resources accumulated at the end of the fiscal period cannot be applied to
the AAL from a financial reporting standpoint. Thus, the funded ratio of the plan under
GASB Statement No. 45 is zero. Also, when the plan’s actuarial valuation is prepared, a
short-term rate of return (discount rate) (e.g., 4%) must be assumed. Investments are limited
to those that are allowed by the government’s corporate investment policy. The use of a
short-term rate of return will serve to significantly increase the AAL of the plan (p. 4).
The other three alternative funding vehicles are forms of an irrevocable trust. With
the recognition of an irrevocable trust under GASB No. 45, a long-term term discount rate
(e.g., 7% or 8%) may generally be used in preparing actuarial valuations for the plan and any
assets accumulated in the trust may be applied toward the AAL of the plan. Therefore, a
funded ratio of greater than 0% may be recognized for the plan. In the case of each of the
irrevocable trust funds, employer contributions and trust investment earnings are exempt
from federal income taxation.
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A 401(h) account involves operating the OPEB plan as part of a larger pension plan.
Assets of the pension plan may be commingled with the assets of the OPEB plan for
investment purposes. However, the plan must retain the capacity to separately account for
the assets of the OPEB plan. The potential for commingling of assets for investment may
expand the range of investment possibilities for the OPEB plan and may result in the
realization of economies of scale with respect to reducing investment expenses. Employee
contributions to an OPEB plan operated through a 401(h) account are permissible and may be
federally tax exempt if those contributions are mandatory and “picks them up” (i.e., the
government pays them on the employee’s behalf) (p. 4).
Unlike the 401(h) account, a VEBA trust is a standalone, independent entity. Like
the 401(h) account, however, wide investment discretion is allowed with a VEBA trust. Yet,
the establishment of a VEBA trust is more complex in the sense that the Internal Revenue
Service’s approval of the trust’s formation is required. After-tax employee contributions are
permitted, but the government employer may not pick up the contributions. The
establishment of a VEBA trust requires IRS approval (p. 4).
The last form of irrevocable trust is the governmental or Section 115 trust. A
government may establish this type of trust pursuant to Section 115 of the Internal Revenue
Code because the provision of healthcare benefits to retired government employees may be
considered to be an essential government function. IRS approval of a Section 115 trust is not
required, but recommended. A Section 115 trust can afford the same wide range of
investment options as the 401(h) account and the VEBA trust. After-tax employee
contributions to an OPEB plan operating under a Section 115 trust are permitted. It is
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unclear whether pre-tax treatment of employee contributions picked up by the government is
allowed (p. 4).
Stephen Gauthier (2008) offers a decision tree to facilitate consideration of many of
the key OPEB issues discussed above (see Figure 3).
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Gauthier’s decision tree is comprehensive in its coverage of OPEB issues. At the
outset, he recognizes that there is some form of governance structure in all OPEB plans. The
governance structure may include the governing board of the government itself, the
government’s management, a trust fund board, or a combination of these entities. Once a
governance structure is selected, a baseline of the OPEB plan’s obligations and general
financial status must be established. Understanding the “substantive plan,” as noted by
Murphy and Zorn (2006), is implied in this step.
Gauthier then distinguishes between two broad categories of OPEB decisions: those
related to healthcare policy (i.e., plan design) and those related to funding. The design of the
plan considers benefit levels with an eye toward cost containment. The governing authorities
must consider the extent to which there will be any implicit subsidy in the plan premiums.
With respect to funding strategies, the first question is whether the government would
like to prefund, partially prefund, or pay as you go. If prefunding or partial prefunding is
desired, the government will need to decide upon a funding mechanism. As substantially
described above, funding mechanisms include use of the government’s general fund (i.e.,
earmarking), a revocable trust, or an irrevocable trust. Irrevocable trust options include the
401(h) account, VEBA fund, or Section 115 governmental trust fund discussed previously.
Whatever funding mechanism is chosen, a government must also decide whether it will direct
current resources (i.e., cash on hand) toward its OPEB obligation or issue bonds to gain
resources to apply to the obligation (p. 11). All of the OPEB decisions are made while
considering the impact on the various stakeholders. The stakeholders include the public, the
government, any trust fund board, and the government’s retirees. The public is a key
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stakeholder as, depending on the division of funding responsibility, the public may pay for a
large measure of the OPEB benefits for the government’s retirees. (Ideally, investment
income will pay for as large a share of the cost as possible.)
Berman and Keating (2006) present a few specialty topics related to GASB Statement
No. 45. Among those topics were the impact of Medicare D subsidies received by
governments and the bond rating implications of policy decisions related to OPEB. If an
employer offers a prescription drug benefit for retirees who could otherwise receive benefits
under Medicare Part D, the employer is eligible to receive a subsidy from the federal
government for providing prescription benefits to those retirees. The required treatment of
those subsidies by governments under GASB Statement No. 45 is very different than the
treatment that the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) requires for the private
sector. The FASB allows private businesses to offset their OPEB liabilities by the present
value of expected future OPEB subsidies. However, GASB Statement No. 45’s requirements
are far less generous. State and local governments may only recognize the subsidies as
revenue when the subsidies are received (i.e., as current-year revenue) (pp. 18-19). Thus, the
actuarial benefit of Medicare Part D subsidies for governments is minimal.
In the view of Berman and Keating, bond rating agencies will make it nearly
impossible for governments to avoid examining their OPEB liabilities and considering how
to fund them. They note that “rating agency analysts (have) cautioned that they will look at
the OPEB liability of a government and how the government will manage it” (21). Bond
ratings directly impact borrowing costs. They can also affect the prestige of a community.
As governments come to recognize that ignoring their OPEB liabilities will have real-world
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repercussions, they will be compelled to develop meaningful action plans for funding or at
least managing the liabilities.
In 2008, after the largest governments began reporting their OPEB costs and
liabilities in accordance with GASB Statement No. 45, Mattoon (2008) reported some of the
views of participants in a conference convened by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and
the Civic Federation on initial experiences with the new reporting standard. Mattoon notes
the significant impact that the investment rate of return has on the UAAL (p. 1). He also
points out that dramatic increases in funding that governments will generally need to make if
they actually intend to fund their OPEB liabilities properly. Mattoon indicates that employer
contributions will need to rise from the current level of 2% of salaries to 5% (p. 2). He also
cites steps that some of the conferees were taking to contain their OPEB obligations. Those
steps included:
1. Providing health maintenance organizations and preferred provider
organizations.
2. Offering different levels of service, premiums, deductibles, and
copayments.
3. Increasing pharmaceutical copayments or implementing tiered
pharmaceutical copayments.
4. Emphasizing preventive services.
5. Adjusting benefit levels to reflect years of service worked.
6. Offering buyouts to deferred retirees in exchange for their renouncing any
claims for retiree healthcare;
7. Issuing competitive bids for pharmaceutical management services;
8. Closing the defined benefit health plan to new hires and creating health
savings accounts; and
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9. Increasing the vesting period for new employees, spouses, and dependents.
(pp. 2-3)
GASB Statement No. 45 has forced some governments to start to come to terms with their
OPEB obligations.
Thoen and Wade (2008) notes the reaction of the public sector to the OPEB costs and
liabilities that began to be reported as a result of GASB Statement No. 45. They offer six
strategies for containing OPEB costs. These include:


Reduce the cost of benefits provided. With respect to reducing the cost of
retiree healthcare, Thoen and Wade suggest that prevention is one method.
Disease management and wellness programs are other ways that costs can
be reduced. Disease management refers to “prevent(ing) chronic diseases
like asthma and congestive heart failure from degenerating and incurring
ever-higher costs” (p. 40).



Have retirees share in paying cost increases. This may be done by having
retirees pay a percentage of the total premium for coverage. Thus, as
premiums go up, retirees shoulder a proportional share of the increase and
pay more in absolute terms.



Eliminate or reduce subsidies for retirees for retiree healthcare. As
discussed above, retiree premium rates for healthcare are oftentimes the
same as those for active employees. However, the underlying cost of
covering retirees is higher because they generally have a larger number
and more costly healthcare claims than active employees. Reducing or
eliminating this implicit rate subsidy would permit premiums to more
accurately reflect their associated costs. Then, if retirees are paying a
percentage of the premium for their healthcare, they will pay a percentage
of a more accurate, albeit probably higher, premium.



Change eligibility requirements or implement service-related benefits.
This involves making the eligibility requirements for OPEB more
stringent. For example, a government could make early retirees ineligible
for OPEB. Another cost saving measure would be to have employees
work longer to get a larger percentage of their OPEB paid by the
government. To illustrate, retirees with 20 years of service might be
entitled to OPEB that is 50% paid by the government, but retirees with 30
years of service could be entitled to OPEB that is 75% employer-paid.
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Reduce the coverage of plans. This simply involves covering fewer
services and treatments or covering them at reduced levels.



Move from defined benefit to defined contribution plans. (pp. 39-44)

While asserting that the above strategies hold promise, Thoen and Wade acknowledge that
the problem of large unfunded OPEB obligations may still exist for many governments.
They lament that “many employers will need to cut costs (perhaps non-OPEB costs) or
increase taxes in order to meet the obligations brought to light by GASB 45 (p. 38).
The GASB is effectively a private governance structure (i.e., quasi-governmental
body) that has an impact upon public policy. Rudder (2008) notes that private governance
institutions such as the GASB, make decisions that bind not only their members, but the
wider public “who have no opportunity, no ability, and in many cases, no apparent
inclination to participate in choices that may have a significant impact on them” (p. 899).
Furthermore, these institutions can “determine what matters receive attention” (p. 904).
Private governance institutions are insulated from democratic politics. Yet, their decisions
impact the public at large because they can prompt governments and the private sector to act
on issues that affect the public. Rudder offers bond rating agencies as one class of private
governance institution (p. 901). These agencies issue opinions on the creditworthiness of
corporations and governments that affect very significant investment decisions by
organizations and private citizens throughout the world. Rudder offers the GASB as another
example of a private governance institution (p. 904). Indeed, GASB Statement No. 45 has
had wide-ranging public impacts. The reporting standard has caused state and local
governments with substantial OPEB obligations to reassess the compensation packages that

49
they offer their employees. New revenues may need to be raised or existing programs and
services may need to be cut to address the OPEB commitments that the GASB has
illuminated. Admittedly, the GASB adheres to a process calling for comments from those
interested in financial reporting by state and local government before an affirmative
pronouncement is issued. However, matters considered by the GASB are not widely
publicized. Even if those matters were more widely publicized, it is doubtful that much of
the general public would be interested in providing or able to offer meaningful input. There
is no simple answer to this problem. The accounting and financial reporting matters that the
GASB addresses are more complex than the layman is likely to have difficulty
understanding.
Rudder’s offers prescriptions for political science to equip the field to better
understand private governance institutions and, in turn, potentially enhance the capacity of
the public to hold them accountable. First, Rudder asserts that political science should more
widely acknowledge private governance institutions as actors in the field. Political scientists
should study private governance institutions and teach others about them (p. 906). Second, a
“language” should be developed to describe the elements and activities of these institutions
(p. 907). The conventional terminology of political science is arguably inadequate to
describe the nature of private governance organizations. For example, as mentioned above,
the GASB follows a protocol of receiving input and deliberating prior to issuing authoritative
pronouncements. This protocol is referred to as “due process” within the accounting
profession. However, the words “due process” typically mean something very different to
political scientists. Finally, Rudder believes that political science should “incorporate private
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governance within its domain” (p. 900). By this, she means that the field should explicitly
identify private governance institutions as important political actors. As a consequence, the
boundaries of political science will need to be modified. In short, Rudder seeks to motivate
us to purposefully study a quiet, yet powerful and poorly understood, actor on the political
landscape.
By 2010, state and larger local governments had been preparing their financial
statements in accordance with GASB Statement No. 45 for a few years. Coe and Rivenbark
(2010) report on some of the best practices in implementing GASB Statement No. 45 and the
magnitude of the OPEB costs and liabilities of 25 county and large municipal governments in
North Carolina. Coe and Rivenbark identified the best practices based upon a review of
publications, especially GFOA publications. Those preferred practices included:
1. Conduct a valuation at least one year ahead of the implementation date.
2. Issue a request for proposals for actuarial services.
3. Select an actuary with relevant experience.
4. Collect background information for the actuary.
5. Enter into a multiyear contract for actuarial services.
6. Set a discount rate consistent with investment returns.
7. Financially sustain the cost of OPEB.
8. Make progress toward funding the OPEB.
9. Avoid burdensome benefit reductions.
10. Create an irrevocable trust.
11. Allocate the ARC among all funds.
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At least 76% of the North Carolina governments surveyed had implemented all of the
practices listed above with one exception. The exception was the last preferred practice
listed (i.e., allocate the ARC among all funds) (p. 74). Only half of the survey respondents
had implemented a comprehensive allocation of their ARC.
In one early study, Wisniewski (2005) investigates the prevailing OPEB reporting
practices of state governments in an effort to understand what would need to change under
GASB Statement No. 45. Wisniewski uses state CAFRs as the source of data for his study.
He finds that 41 states reported a contribution to defray the cost of retiree healthcare. Of
these, 30 states covered their costs on a pay-as-you-go basis and 11 contributed in
accordance with a pre-funding arrangement (p. 108). Wisniewski notes that state
governments reported $4.4 million in OPEB costs during fiscal year 2001. Only about $600
million of these costs were calculated on an actuarial basis (p. 114). As most state
governments were only reporting the current costs of OPEB, the states were dramatically
understating their costs. The states reporting on a pay-as-you-go basis would need to move
to actuarially based reporting under GASB Statement No. 45.
After many years of pay-as-you-go funding and financial reporting of OPEB plans,
Wisniewski believes that GASB Statement No. 45 would prompt state governments to
consider scaling back their retiree healthcare plans with the aim of reducing costs. However,
he believes that factors other than the financial information required by GASB Statement No.
45 will motivate state governments to rein in the costs. Wisniewski cites two other factors
that will capture the attention of state governments: healthcare cost inflation and the
increasing longevity of retirees. While he believes that proliferation of managed healthcare

52
plans may mitigate healthcare cost inflation to a degree, the “problem” of increasing
longevity of retirees will likely become more severe. Wisniewski notes that a public pension
plan active employee to retiree ratio of 2.8 to 1 in 1996 had declined to 2.4 to 1 by 2002 (p.
116). This decreasing ratio means that governments will not be able to sustain their OPEB
by relying on any contributions that may be coming from active participants. It also suggests
that local governments will likely need to contend with the provision of healthcare to an
expanding pool of retirees.
One recent study sought to understand the magnitude of UAALs at the state level.
Franzel and Brown (2012) gather information on the recent UAAL and ARC reported by
each state as well as whether the state holds assets pledged toward its OPEB liability in an
irrevocable trust fund. The researchers obtain the information for their study from
comprehensive annual financial reports (CAFRs) and/or OPEB actuarial valuation reports.
They find that the state with the largest obligation was California with a UAAL of $59.9
billion ($1,620.90 per capita) and an ARC of $1.8 billion ($50.02 per capita). The UAALs of
Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin were $27.1 billion ($2,101 per capita), $525 million ($82 per
capita), and $1.3 billion ($235 per capita), respectively. The most recently reported ARCs
for those same states were $182.5 million ($141 per capita), $54 million ($8.41 per capita),
and $19 million ($8.67 per capita), respectively (p. 60). None of the four states had
established an irrevocable trust fund to receive assets pledged toward OPEB liabilities. The
total UAAL for the 50 states was $450.7 billion. The combined ARC was $31.6 billion.
Only 18 states had set up irrevocable OPEB trusts (p. 61). Franzel and Brown conclude that,
while a great deal of attention has been paid in recent years to unfunded pension obligations,
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state-level OPEB liabilities are comparable. Policymakers should consider “a range of
prefunding, cost sharing, cost containment, and wellness policy and program responses” (p.
63). With respect to the impact of GASB Statement No. 45 on the states, Stenson (2007)
comment, “States have only two real options. They can reduce retiree health coverage and
thereby scale back their liabilities, or they can begin to accumulate assets to offset these
costs” (p. 345).
As discussed above, actuarial valuations are based upon assumptions. The choice of
assumptions can have a significant impact on the results of a valuation. Lawrence Bell
(2006) examines the impact of using a long-term interest rate of 8% versus using a short-term
interest rate of 2%. Such a difference reveals the impact of using an irrevocable trust to hold
assets pledged to satisfy an OPEB obligation instead of funding the OPEB obligation through
a government’s general fund. Bell uses data on the State of Vermont’s OPEB obligation in
2004 to gauge the impact of using the different interest rates over the course of 30 years. He
finds that it was 250 times more expensive to fund OPEB through a mechanism for which
GASB Statement No. 45 requires the use of a short-term interest rate (2%) rather one for
which a long-term interest rate (8%) may be used (p. 36).
In many respects, defined benefit OPEB plans are similar to defined benefit pension
plans. The required financial disclosures for the two types of plans are comparable. An
actuarial valuation is also required for both types of plans. In each case, the actuarial
valuation is based upon assumptions. Vermeer, Styles, and Patton (2010) examine whether
local governments in Michigan and Pennsylvania have “a propensity to adopt optimistic
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actuarial methods and assumptions that reduce the annual required contribution” (p. 511).
Vermeer and his associates undertake their study with the following four hypotheses:
1. Governments with greater monitoring from credit agencies and external
auditors are less likely to adopt optimistic actuarial methods and
assumptions that reduce the ARC. (p. 515)
2. Pension plans for fire and police employees are less likely to have
optimistic actuarial methods and assumptions that reduce the ARC. (p.
515)
3. Governments with greater fiscal constraints are more likely to adopt
optimistic actuarial methods and assumptions that reduce the ARC. (p.
515)
4. There is no association between governments with appointed officials and
the likelihood of adopting optimistic actuarial methods and assumptions
that reduce the ARC. (p. 516)
Included in the sample are 114 local governments sponsoring a total of 219 individual
pension plans.
To measure a local government’s propensity to adopt optimistic assumptions, the
researchers construct an index with four components: the plan’s assumed rate of return on
investments (RETURN), whether the plan used an open or closed amortization period in its
valuation (METHOD), the remaining period over which the UAAL was to be amortized
(PERIOD), and the period over which changes in the market value of investment gains or
losses were to be amortized (SMOOTH). In the case of RETURN, METHOD, and
SMOOTH, Vermeer and his associates establish ranges of potential continuous values for the
assumptions and divided them into quartiles. Continuous values that fell into the most
optimistic quartile are coded with the value of 1 for the index. All other continuous values
are coded with a zero. Plans using an open amortization period are coded with a 1 for the
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index (PERIOD) and those using a closed amortization period were coded with a zero. Thus,
the range of possible values for the index is zero (least optimistic) to 4 (most optimistic).
The independent variables in the logistic regression include a ratio of non-current debt to
total population (DEBT), whether the plan’s auditors audit at least 10% of the local
governments in the state (AUDIT), whether the plan covers public safety employees/retirees
(STRONG), the ratio of unrestricted net assets to total expenses (ABILITY), whether the
plan has an AAL that exceeds the actuarial value of its assets (UNFUNDED), whether the
government is managed by a professional manager (APPPOINT); the natural log of the
population of the government’s constituency (POP); natural log of the average income per
capita (INCOME); and whether the government has received the GFOA’s Certificate of
Achievement for Excellence in Financial Reporting (GFOA) (pp. 518-519).
Vermeer, Styles, and Patton generate a model with a pseudo R2 of 0.41 and a chisquare value of 30.95 (p-value = less than 0.01). They find that the data support their second
and third hypotheses, as well as their first hypothesis in part. Their fourth hypothesis is not
confirmed. With respect to the first hypothesis, Vermeer and his associates find that the
potential for monitoring by credit agencies (DEBT) lowers a plan’s optimism (β = -0.01; p =
0.06). However, the governmental experience of the auditor (AUDIT) does not (β = 1.24; p
= 0.09). Also, plans with greater monitoring by public safety employees/retirees (STRONG)
(second hypothesis) are less likely to use optimistic assumptions (β = -3.35; p = 0.02). With
respect to the third hypothesis, the data suggest that plans with UAALs (UNFUNDED) tend
to adopt more optimistic assumptions (β = 0.17; 0.09). Finally, the researchers do not
confirm an association between governments with appointed officials and the optimism of
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actuarial assumptions (β = 1.24; p = 0.34) (p. 533). In sum, the optimism of actuarial
methods and assumptions appears to be affected by at last some exogenous influences.
Marlowe (2007) seeks to “examine whether OPEB liabilities are impounded in local
government credit ratings and borrowing costs” (p. 106). In other words, Marlowe attempts
to gauge the extent to which government credit ratings are affected by unfunded OPEB
liabilities. Credit ratings directly affect a government’s cost of borrowing. The better that a
government’s credit rating is, the lower its borrowing costs will be. Marlowe uses data from
the “Health Benefits Survey” conducted by the International City/County Management
Association in 2001-2002. The survey was sent by mail to city governments with
populations of 2,500 or more. County governments with populations of 2,500 or more and
having the council-administrator or council-elected executive form of government are also
included in the survey (p. 111). In total, data pertaining to 152 bonds issues by 112
governments are included in the study.
Marlowe constructs two basic models. The first model uses the government’s credit
rating as the dependent variable. Marlowe theorizes that a government’s credit rating is
determined by its OPEB liability, its fiscal characteristics, and its institutional characteristics
(p. 115). The second model estimates the cost of borrowing (interest rates as reflected by the
true interest costs of bond issues) (the dependent variable) predicted by the government’s
OPEB liability, fiscal characteristics, institutional characteristics, and the issue’s
characteristics (p. 116). Marlowe employs ordered logistic regression with the first basic
model. He uses ordinary least squares regression with the second basic model. Marlowe
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tests variants of his basic models that combined certain independent variables as interaction
terms.
Marlowe finds that OPEB liabilities alone do not have a statistically significant effect
(p. 126). However, the interaction of a government’s OPEB liability with “the capacity to
manage that liability is statistically significant” (p. 126). In one submodel for credit ratings,
Marlowe defines the capacity to manage the OPEB liability as the government’s current ratio
(p = 0.06) (p. 125). In a second submodel for credit ratings, he captures the capacity to
manage the OPEB liability as “tax structure” or “per capita general fund taxation” (p = 0.02)
(p. 125). An earlier study cited by Marlowe finds that higher tax effort improves
creditworthiness (p. 117). With respect to borrowing costs, Marlowe finds that OPEB
liabilities did not appear to have an impact on the interest rates associated with government
debt (p. 128).
The Center for State and Local Government Excellence (CSLGE) has published
several significant studies on OPEB. The report on the first study by Kearney, Clark,
Coggburn, Daley, and Robinson was published in mid-2009. This report opens with a brief
description of the retiree healthcare plans. Kearney and his colleagues finds that virtually all
states have some form of retiree healthcare plan. Generally, eligibility for benefits in the
state-level plans is bases upon the number of years of service with the state government (p.
9). Kearney then provides comparative actuarial information on the state-level retiree
healthcare plans. The UAALs range from $52 million for North Dakota to $58.1 billion for
New Jersey (p. 44). The report includes the results of a survey of the states conducted by
North Carolina State University between December 2007 and March 2008 on the changes
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that state governments had made to their retiree healthcare plans during the previous five
years and changes they planned to make during the next five years. In the past five years, at
least 66% percent of the states indicated they had increased retiree contribution premiums,
dependent contribution premiums, and co-payments for prescription drugs (p. 57). During
the five years subsequent to the survey, state governments generally planned to take
“incremental, piecemeal approaches, hoping to chip away at their current costs by cost
containment and cost sharing strategies and, by extension, reducing their longer-term
obligations” (p. 59). Finally, Kearney report the results of a survey of local governments
conducted by the International City/County Management Association between January and
February 2008. The ICMA survey reveals that local government officials consider retiree
healthcare benefits to be important to the successful recruitment and retention of qualified
employees. However, local governments are unsure how they will pay for these expensive
benefits over the long term (p. 68). Local governments are employing many of the same cost
containment strategies as the states, though the states have made greater use of preventive
medicine and wellness programs (p. 66).
Also in 2009, Coggburn and McCall published a CSLGE study on the prevalence of
the implementation of irrevocable trusts and the issuance of bonds for the funding of OPEB
obligations. Coggburn and McCall survey the 50 state governments and 2,136 municipal
governments on their use or intended use of irrevocable trust funds (i.e., a Section 401(h)
medical subaccount, a Section 501(c)(9) VEBA, or a Section 115 governmental trust). They
find that 20% of the states had adopted an irrevocable trust. The Section 115 governmental
trust is the most popular prefunding vehicle with the states (10% adoption). Also, another
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40% of the states indicate that they are likely to adopt some form of irrevocable trust in the
next five years. With respect to municipalities, 6.2% of those surveyed have adopted an
irrevocable trust. Another 18.2% express the intent to implement an irrevocable trust within
the next five years. Based upon the popularity of Section 115 trusts among the states,
Coggburn and McCall predict that the Section 115 trust will become the form of irrevocable
trust most preferred by state and local governments (p. 5). Furthermore, the researchers find
that only one municipality and no states have issued bonds to fund their OPEB obligations.
Only three states and 2% of municipalities indicate that they are likely to issue bonds within
the next five years (p. 9). Bonds represent a commitment to OPEB funding that state and
local governments are generally unwilling to make.
Coggburn conducted another study on OPEB for the CSLGE in 2010. Coggburn
surveys 112 local governments on their OPEB management practices. He finds that the
Section 115 trust is emerging as the predominant prefunding mechanism (p. 5). Coggburn
notes that 28% of governments are fully funding their ARCs, 38% are partially funding them,
and 34% are following pay-as-you-go funding (p. 6). Coggburn also examines the impact
that prefunding vehicles have on UAAL status. Of those responding to the survey, 24% state
that implementation of a prefunding vehicle substantially reduces their UAALs, 36% indicate
that the vehicle slightly reduces their UAALs, and 40% said that the prefunding vehicle has
no impact (p. 7). In attempting to gauge how governments are trying to reduce their OPEB
exposure, Coggburn finds that governments are variously eliminating retiree healthcare for
new hires (35%), increasing years of service for eligibility (23%), and increasing the
retirement age for eligibility (11%) (p. 9). In assessing the impediments to implementing a
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strategy for OPEB management, he finds, most notably, that governments were experiencing
fiscal stress associated with the economic recession, receiving insufficient revenues,
confronting competing budget priorities, and seeing uncertainty in national healthcare policy
(p. 10).
Clark, Morrill, and Riche (2011) examine initiatives undertaken by three
municipalities to contain their healthcare costs for active employees and the OPEB liabilities
associated with their retirees. The municipalities included in their study are Asheville, North
Carolina; Denver, Colorado; and Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Asheville and Oklahoma City
pay for their retiree healthcare costs on a pay-as-you-go basis. Denver uses an irrevocable
trust fund for its retiree healthcare program. All three cities require their retirees to enroll in
Medicare when they are eligible. The municipalities have also established chronic disease
management and wellness programs (p. 1). In one disease management program, Asheville
patients with chronic diseases, such as diabetes, asthma, hypertension, and high cholesterol
are “matched with a local pharmacist to ensure that they are using their medications
properly” (p. 4). Clark and his colleagues do not quantify the estimated impact of the
individual steps taken to contain the OPEB liabilities of the three municipalities. However,
they do show that Asheville and Oklahoma City’s UAALs decreased as a percentage of
payroll between 2009 and 2010 from 80% to 67.5% and from 367.6% to 276.1%,
respectively (p. 8).
In the most recent CSLGE study, Clark, Morrill, Anderson, and Pathak (2014)
examine “employee participation in primary and supplementary retirement plans, retiree
health care benefits, and Social Security in 20 large cities and counties” in the United States
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(p. 2). With respect to retiree healthcare plans, Clark and his colleagues summarize the
characteristics of the plans. Specifically, they describe the point at which employees become
eligible for retiree healthcare (i.e., years of service), the type of healthcare plans offered
(PPO, HMO, etc.), extent of employer subsidy (i.e., employer-paid portion of the premium)
for pre-Medicare retirees, and whether the employer subsidizes the coverage of retirees to
any degree. The researchers find that some plans permit participation after as little as five
years of service. Some plans adopt the applicable rule for pension eligibility when
determining retiree healthcare plan eligibility. Most commonly, 10 or 15 years is the
minimum amount of service required for plan participation. Plans generally have different
levels of employer premium subsidies based upon years of service. However, the pattern of
subsidies varies markedly across the local governments. For example, governments tend to
provide a larger subsidies for employees who retire with 20 years or more of service with the
final governmental employer (p. 10).
The most common types of healthcare plans offered are PPOs and HMOs. Even so,
deductible HMOs, point-of-service plans, exclusive provider organizations, open access
plans, and high-deductible plans are also reflected in the sample. The dependent coverage in
13 of the 20 plans is subsidized by the related employers. Six of the plans (30%) do not
offer employer-subsidized dependent coverage. One of the plans surveyed did not report
whether the associated employer provides a subsidy of dependent coverage (p. 10). Clearly,
there is considerable variability in the coverage and employer subsidies offered by retiree
healthcare plans.

62
In summary, scholars have devoted significant effort to describing the features of
Statement No. 45, how to implement it, the size of UAALs, various actuarial considerations,
and how some governments are attempting to contain OPEB costs. Voorhees (2005) offers a
history of financial reporting for OPEB and Kramer and Casciari (2005) describe the basic
requirements of the statement. Some scholars, such as Clark, Morrill, and Riche (2011)
attempt to report the characteristics of the OPEB plans themselves. Wisniewski (2005),
Gauthier (2008), and Coggburn (2010) discuss the various management issues to consider in
implementing the standard. Murphy and Zorn (2006) as well as Coggburn and McCall
(2009) describe the available alternative funding vehicles in depth.
There have been a few studies that have attempted to capture and convey the
magnitude of UAALs and how adjusting actuarial assumptions can affect them. In
particular, Keating and Berman (2007), Kearny (2009), Coe and Rivenbark (2010), Wirtz
(2011), and Franzel and Brown (2012) endeavor to quantify the UAALs of state and local
governments. Bell (2006) and Mattoon (2008) study the effects of interest rate assumptions
on ARCs and funded ratios, respectively. Vermeer, Styles, and Patton (2010) investigate
whether various financial monitoring methods impact upon actuarial assumptions and
methods that, in turn, affect a plan’s ARC. Examining the OPEB issue from the cost side,
Hurley (2006), Theon and Wade (2008), Kearney (2009), and Clark (2011) report on cost
containment strategies that governments are implementing or contemplating. Clarke,
Morrill, and Riche (2011) perform in-depth studies of efforts by three specific governments
to contain OPEB costs.
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Confronted by the very substantial financial obligations presented by OPEB, some
have considered the immutability of OPEB obligations. At its core, this issue is a legal
matter. Bond (2007) and Clarke (2009) consider this dimension of OPEB.
There has been substantial scholarly work done to describe the characteristics of
OPEB plans, explain how to implement GASB Statement No. 45, and survey the obligations
disclosed by the pronouncement. Scholars have also discuss the value of advance funding
OPEB obligations and effects of certain actuarial assumptions on AALs. Significant
scholarly attention has also been devoted to how the terms of OPEB plans can be modified to
reduce costs. However, no apparent effort has been applied to understanding whether the
attributes of the management team of a municipality can impact upon the municipality’s
OPEB obligation. The key members of a municipality’s management with respect to OPEB
management are arguably the municipality’s chief executive officer (mayor/manager) and
chief financial officer. It is possible that, if these two senior managers have more experience
or professional training, they may steer their governments toward more responsible financial
management of OPEB obligations.

Research Question and Hypotheses
Statement No. 45 is designed to require consistent, comprehensive, and coherent
reporting of OPEB costs and liabilities by state and local governments. However, reporting
is only the first step toward improved financial administration with respect to OPEB. The
second and arguably more difficult step is actually funding OPEB obligations. The basic
cumulative (long-term) measure of how well an OPEB plan is funded is its funded ratio (i.e.
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percentage of the UAAL that is offset by actual financial assets). The short-term (annual
measure) of funding effort is the percentage of the ARC contributed. As is discussed above,
actuarial assumptions and whether a municipality has established an irrevocable trust fund
will impact upon the OPEB plan’s funded ratio and its ARC. Yet, at a more fundamental
level, it is a municipality’s senior management team that selects a given set of actuarial
assumptions and may guide the municipality toward the creation of an irrevocable trust fund.
The question underlying this study is whether greater professional experience and
training of the senior management teams of municipalities increase the level of funding of
their OPEB plans. For the purpose of this study, senior management team is defined as the
municipality’s CEO and CFO. Generally, the CEO is deemed to be the highest ranking fulltime, appointed administrative official in the government with overall responsibility for
managing the government’s day-to-day operations. The CEO was most often the city or
village manager of the municipality. However, in some cases, where the municipality’s
mayor worked for the municipality on a full-time basis and no appointed manager existed,
the mayor was considered to be the CEO. The CFO was deemed to be the highest ranking
official in the government with specific responsibility for the government’s overall financial
administration. The operationalization of “professional experience and training” is discussed
in detail in Chapter 3.
The question of whether the professional experience of the senior management team
improves OPEB funding is testable with two hypotheses. One hypothesis corresponds to the
cumulative funding of OPEB plans (i.e., funded ratio). The other addresses the short-term
funding of plans (i.e., ARC contribution ratio).
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H1: As the professional experience and training of a municipality’s senior
management team increase, the cumulative funding of the municipal
OPEB plan increases.
Management experience and training may come in any number of forms. Members
of the municipality’s senior management team may have experience in both the private and
the public sectors. Government experience may be acquired with multiple municipalities in
any number of positions. Professional training can be similarly varied. Training can be
acquired in degree programs or continuing professional education programs. In the conduct
of this survey, the overall years of government service and the number of years of tenure in
the current position are believed to be most relevant. With respect to professional training,
degree programs pertaining to management, particularly government management, and
finance would appear to be most likely to engender an appreciation for the funding of OPEB
obligations.
GASB Statement No. 45 provides for the funded ratio to be the measure of
cumulative funding. However, the pronouncement only permits the reporting of a non-zero
funded ratio when the government concerned has placed assets into an irrevocable trust fund.
This study finds that a very small number of municipalities have established irrevocable trust
funds to advance fund their OPEB obligations. Therefore, as further described in chapter 3,
the construction of an alternative measure of cumulative funding was required in the conduct
of this study.
H2: As the professional experience and training of a municipality’s senior
management team increase, the ARC contribution ratio associated with its
OPEB plan increases.
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Where the funded ratio, or its surrogate, is a measure of the cumulative funding of an
OPEB plan, the ARC contribution ratio for a given year is a short-term measure of a
government’s OPEB funding effort. The ratio is calculated simply by dividing the amount of
money a government has contributed to its OPEB plan during a fiscal year divided by the
ARC determined for the plan by the plan’s actuary. The second hypothesis addresses how
professional training and experience impact the ARC contribution ratio.
If the professional experience of a municipality’s senior management team positively
impacts the funding of its OPEB plan, the municipalities in general would be well advised to
hire more experienced executives. That is, more experienced executives would tend to steer
the organization in a more responsible financial direction. Similarly, if professional training
positively impacts the funding of the municipality’s OPEB plan, municipalities should hire
executives with greater professional training or encourage their incumbent executives to
obtain such training.
The professional experience and training of the senior management team are not the
only factors that may impact the cumulative funding or ARC contribution ratio of an OPEB
plan. Actuarial parameters, such as assumed investment return and healthcare cost inflation
rate, also affect a plan’s funding. Other factors such as the structural features of the
government (e.g., form of government and home-rule status) and its financial condition may
also determine the government’s ability to fund its OPEB plan. A broad range of factors are
considered in the estimation of the models developed to evaluate the research hypotheses.
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In this study, independent variables associated with professional experience are
referred to as substantive variables. Other variables are considered to be control variables.
Figure 4 depicts the expected effects on the dependent variables.

Professional
Experience
(Substantive
Variables)

Other
Factors
(Control
Variables)

Cumulative
Funding or
ARC Ratio
(Dependent
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Figure 4. Basic expected study interactions.
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Training
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

General Research Design
This study employs generalized least square (GLS) panel regressions and ordinary
least squares (OLS) cross-sectional regressions to investigate the impact of a variety of
attributes of a municipality’s senior management team, government organizational structure,
political environment, legal environment, financial condition, and OPEB plan to ascertain
how those factors may impact the funding of the OPEB plans of those municipalities. The
funding of the municipal OPEB plans is assessed from two perspectives: a longterm/cumulative perspective and a short-term/annual perspective. Long-term OPEB funding
of a case municipality is assessed using a ratio calculated by dividing the unfunded accrued
actuarial liability (UAAL) of the municipality’s OPEB plan by the unrestricted net assets of
its governmental activities as reported in the municipality’s comprehensive annual financial
report (CAFR). Short-term funding is gauged by a ratio calculated by dividing government’s
monetary contribution to its OPEB plan in a given year by the corresponding annual required
contribution (ARC) (calculated by an actuary) for the corresponding year.
Relative to the two measures of OPEB funding of interest, the hypotheses upon which
this study is based are:
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H1:

As the professional experience and training of a municipality’s senior
management team increase, the cumulative funding of the municipal
OPEB plan increases.

H2:

As the professional experience and training of a municipality’s senior
management team increase, the ARC contribution ratio associated with
its OPEB plan increases.

The GLS panel regressions assess the progress made in funding over a span of fiscal
years ended in 2002 through 2011. The OLS panel regressions measure the most recent
efforts made in OPEB funding (i.e., for the fiscal year ended in 2011).
The particular strength of panel data analysis is that explanatory power of both space
and time can be brought to bear on the research question (Sayrs, 1989, p. 7). Panel data
collected for this study provide information across municipalities, states, and time. Differing
laws and financial practices across states could affect the successful funding of municipal
OPEB plans in each state. Given that characteristics of management and the financial
capacity differ from municipality to municipality, cross-sectional analysis is doubly useful.
Finally, because GASB Statement No. 45 with its requirements for disclosing OPEB
obligations is so new, municipal behavior relative to OPEB may have potentially changed or
developed over time.
This chapter presents the statistical equations, the sampling and data collection
techniques employed, and an overview of the independent and dependent variables
associated with the study.

70
Operationalizing Hypotheses with Statistical Equations
Testing the hypotheses that management matters for more successful OPEB funding
has been operationalized with a tristate sample of municipalities and a set of variables to
isolate the effects of management on OPEB funding. Obtaining the dependent variable for
cumulative funding has been challenged due to the lack of the establishment of irrevocable
trust funds by the case municipalities. In the absence of an irrevocable trust fund, GASB
Statement No. 45 prohibits the recognition of assets as being applied to an OPEB obligation.
The cumulative measure of OPEB plans prescribed by GASB Statement No. 45 is the funded
ratio. The funded ratio is calculated by dividing a plan’s actuarial value of plan assets by the
plan’s UAAL. Consequently, an alternative measure of cumulative funding is used in this
study: the UAAL ratio calculated by dividing the UAAL by a municipality’s unrestricted net
assets of governmental activities.
The basic form of the statistical equation used to test each hypothesis is:
UAALratio or ARCratio = a + b1CEOgovyrs + b2CEOjobyrs + b3CEOmpa +
b4CFOgovyrs + b5CFOjobhrs + b6CFOproindex +
b7STiowa + b8STwis + b9RECESS + b10AVpercap +
b11ILhome + b12TELindex + b13SStax + b14LOtax +
b15FORMmgr + b16FORMblend b17UNIONden +
b18NAvExp + b19GOvAV + b20FBvRev +
b21DSvRev + b22ACTreturn + b23ACTinflate +
b24TRUST115 + b25TRUST501 + b26IMPLICIT +
b27MEDPLNindex + b28ACMentry +
b29ACMfrozattain + b30ACMpuc + b31COUNTER
where,
UAALratio = UAAL / Unrestricted Net Assets of Governmental Activities (as
adjusted)
ARCratio = Annual Employer OPEB Contribution / ARC
CEOgovyrs = CEO Total Government Service (years)
CEOjobyrs = CEO Service in Position with Case Municipality (years)
CEOmpa = CEO with Master of Public Administration Degree
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CFOgovyrs = CFO Total Government Services (years)
CFOjobyrs = CFO Service in Position with Case Municipality (years)
CFOproindex = CFO Professional Index
STiowa = Iowa Indicator
STwis = Wisconsin Indicator
RECESS = Recession Indicator
AVpercap = Assessed Value Per Capita
ILhome = Illinois Home-Rule Municipality Indicator
TELindex = Tax and Expenditure Limitation Index
SStax = State-Shared Sales Tax Rate
LOtax = Local-Option Sales Tax Rate
FORMmgr = Form of Government Indicator: Council-Manager
FORMblend = Form of Government Indicator: Blended Form
UNIONden = Union Density
NAvExp = Unrestricted Net Assets / Expenses of Governmental Activities
GOvAV = General Obligation Debt Outstanding / Assess Value of Real Estate
FBvRev = General Fund Balance / Governmental Fund Revenues
DSvRev = GO Debt Service Payments / Governmental Fund Revenues
ACTreturn = Actuarial Assumption: Annual Rate of Return on Plan Investments
ACTinflate = Actuarial Assumption: Annual Rate of Inflation in Healthcare Costs
TRUST115 = Irrevocable Section 115 Trust Indicator
TRUST501 = Irrevocable Section 501 Trust Indicator
IMPLICIT = Implicit Rate Subsidy Indicator
MEDPLANindex = Medical Plan Generosity Index
ACMentry = Actuarial Cost Method Indicator: Entry Age
ACMfrozattain = Actuarial Cost Method Indicator: Frozen Attained Age
COUNTER = Annual Time Counter
All models are developed commencing with all of the variables listed above. The nature and
coding of the variables are discussed below.

Sample and Data Collection
Cases consisted of the OPEB plans of municipalities in Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin.
The impact of more than 35 indicator variables during fiscal years with ending dates
spanning from 2002 through 2011 were considered in the study.
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Data for the study were collected through a primary survey and a brief follow-up
survey. If a municipality sponsored more than one OPEB plan, the survey instrument asked
the municipality to complete the survey with respect to the OPEB plan that provided OPEB
for the largest proportion of their retirees who were non-sworn employees during their active
service (i.e., not former police officers or former firefighters). Certain information was also
gathered from the comprehensive financial reports of the municipalities concerned. Included
in Appendices C, D, and E are copies of the survey instruments as well as the cover letter for
the primary survey, respectively.
An institutional review board of the Northern Illinois University Office of Research
Compliance and Integrity reviewed the survey in July of 2013. The instrument was found to
be exempt from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Regulations for the
Protection of Human Subjects, 45 CFR 46. The primary survey was sent by mail to the CFO
of each municipality in August, 2013. While responses to the primary survey were requested
by September 30, 2013, follow-up efforts to obtain responses extended into early December
2013. Follow-up surveys were sent to the CFOs via e-mail.
To enhance the prospect of receiving responses to the primary survey, endorsements
from a recognized professional or education organization were sought. The Illinois
Government Finance Officers Association endorsed the survey to its members. The
Wisconsin Government Finance Officers Association encouraged its municipal finance
officers to complete the survey. Finally, the Institute of Public Affairs at the University of
Iowa endorsed the survey to Iowa’s municipal finance officers. Appendices F, G, and H
include copies of the respective endorsement letters.
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The comprehensive annual financial reports (CAFRs) from the case municipalities
include more information about a municipality’s financial position and results of financial
operations than the basic financial statements required under generally accepted accounting
principles (Gauthier, 2012, 589). In particular, a CAFR includes a statistical section with a
variety of multiple-year financial information. Pursuant to guidelines published by the
Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB), many of the schedules that comprise the
statistical section of a CAFR include information for a local government’s last ten fiscal
years (GASB statement no. 44, 2004, para.7). Thus, the CAFR of a municipality published
for its fiscal year ended in 2011 should generally include a statistical section with financial
information spanning the municipality’s fiscal years from 2002 through 2011. A large share
of the data for the study was obtained from the statistical sections of the CAFRs of the case
municipalities as well as the notes to the municipalities’ financial statements.
The municipalities that prepare CAFRs fully compliant with generally accepted
accounting principles and certain elaborating guidelines promulgated by the Government
Finance Officers Association (GFOA) (Gauthier, 2012, p. 590) may apply for recognition
from the GFOA with the Certificate of Achievement for Excellence in Financial Reporting
(also commonly known as the “CAFR Award.”) The CAFR Award serves to:
1. Encourage every government to publish a high quality CAFR;
2. Assist governments to meet this goal by providing educational materials,
comments, and suggestions for improvement; and
3. Recognize governments and individuals that have met the challenge. (p.
601)
Receipt of the CAFR Award represents a significant professional accomplishment for a local
government.
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The GFOA publishes a searchable database of local governments that earn the CAFR
Award each year on its website. In many cases, links to the CAFRs themselves are provided
beside the names of the certificate winners on the website. Table 1 presents the counts of
municipal CAFR Award winners in Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin for fiscal years ended in
2011 (GFOA, 2012). Also, presented are the counts of municipalities that received the
primary survey of this study as well as the counts and percentages of survey responses by
state.

Table 1
Survey Response Summary
No. of CAFR
Award Winners

State

No. of Survey
Recipients

No. of Survey
Respondents

Response Rate

Illinois

140

25

17

68.0%

Iowa

21

21

9

42,9%

Wisconsin

27

27

12

44.4%

Total

188

73

38

52.0%

Because of the limited number of municipal CAFR Award winners in Iowa and Wisconsin,
all winners were selected to receive the primary survey. Illinois had a much larger number of
CAFR Award winners (140 versus 21 in Iowa and 27 in Wisconsin). In an attempt to obtain
an approximately even distribution of cases across the three states in the study, 25 Illinois
cases were randomly selected from the total number of Illinois CAFR Award winners using
the RANDBETWEEN function in Excel.
Municipalities that publish CAFRs, as opposed to only basic financial statements, are
recognized as likely having finance staffs who possess greater professional training and
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expertise than those municipalities that do not publish CAFRs. The production of a CAFR
requires that the financial statement preparer have greater knowledge in governmental
financial reporting and greater motivation to do additional financial reporting work.
Therefore, it is acknowledged that selection bias is inherent in having chosen to include only
CAFR Award winners in this study. According to Campbell and Stanley (1963), selection
bias is a threat to the internal validity of a research project. While selection bias is
acknowledged in this study, it is not considered to be a fatal flaw in methodology.
CAFR Award winners are selected as study cases because CAFRs contain financial
data that are extremely difficult to gather through other means. CFOs who pursue CAFRs on
behalf of their municipalities may be more professional in their approach to financial
reporting. However, a CFO who is more professional in his/her approach to financial
reporting will not necessarily be more focused on motivating his/her municipality to address
its OPEB obligations. Also, in practice, finance officers are oftentimes heavily reliant on
their external auditors to prepare their CAFRs. The production of a CAFR may be a better
reflection of the professionalism of a municipality’s external auditing firm than its CFO.
Therefore, the selection bias is not expected to influence the relationship between CFO
professionalism and treatment of OPEB obligations. That is, any characteristics of
management in CAFR Award-winning municipalities found to be contributing to the
successful funding of OPEB plans could be operative in those municipalities that do not
publish CAFRs.
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Operationalizing Variables: Dependent Variables
This study sought to assess the impact of a number of characteristics of a municipality
on the funding of its OPEB plan. As discussed in Chapter 2, OPEB plans are generally
classified into one of two categories: defined benefit and defined contribution. All OPEB
plans included in this study were defined benefit plans or included a defined benefit
component. Thus, advance funding of all of the plans was theoretically appropriate.
The study examined funding from two perspectives: cumulative and short-term
(Models 1 and 2, respectively, in this study). The most comprehensive measure of the
funding of an OPEB plan is its funded ratio. The GASB defines the funded ratio of an OPEB
plan as “the actuarial value of assets expressed as a percentage of the actuarial accrued
liability” (GASB statement no. 45, 2004, para. 40). In other words, the funded ratio
represents the percentage of the cumulative cost of the OPEB benefits earned by plan
participants that are effectively paid for by assets on deposit in the OPEB plan at a
particularly point in time. The funded ratio is typically measured at the end of an OPEB
plan’s fiscal year and is a long-term measure of funding progress. GASB statement no. 45
specifies that local governments report the funded ratio for its OPEB plan for the valuation
year and two preceding valuations as required supplementary information (para. 26d).
A short-term measure of funding progress is the percentage of the ARC that a
municipality has contributed to the OPEB plan in a given fiscal year. When an actuarial
valuation is prepared for an OPEB plan, an ARC for the upcoming year is calculated. An
OPEB plan’s ARC is “(t)he employer’s periodic required contribution to a defined benefit
OPEB plan” (GASB Statement No. 45, 2004, para. 40). GASB statement no. 45 requires that
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local governments report their OPEB ARCs and associated actual contributions in the notes
to their financial statements (para. 25).
The study examined the percentage of the ARC made by the case municipalities
(expressed as the ratio of the contribution actually made divided by the ARC) (variable
name: ARCratio). Figure 5 presents the distribution of ratios of contributions made by the
case municipalities vs. the respective ARCs in the sample for Model 2. The ratios range from
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Figure 5. Distribution of ratios of contributions made vs. ARCs.
The analysis of the funded ratio (see Figure 5) used data associated with 37 of the 38
municipalities (133 observations for fiscal years ending between 2007 and 2011). The
analysis of the ARC contribution ratio (see Figure 6) included data from all 38
municipalities. A total of 139 observations for fiscal years ending between 2006 and 2011
were considered in Model 2. The observations associated with one municipality were deleted
from the Model 1 analysis because, as is described in greater deal below, the calculation of
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the UAAL ratio (the alternative to the funded ratio) used in the cumulative funding analysis
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Figure 6. Distribution of funded ratios.

The distribution of funded ratios in the sample for Model 2 is presented in figure 5. The vast
majority of case municipalities reported a funded ratio of zero for their OPEB plans
throughout the period under study. Indeed, only two municipalities (both in Wisconsin)
reported a funded ratio for any year that was non-zero. (The funded ratios for the OPEB
plans for those two municipalities ranged from 0.027% to 0.29% during the period from 2007
to 2011.) This apparent peculiarity was due to a requirement in GASB statement no. 45
(2004). The statement permits the recognition of contributions to an OPEB plan only if the
contributions are made to an irrevocable trust fund or the equivalent where by the assets are
“dedicated to providing benefits to retirees and their beneficiaries in accordance with the
terms of the plan and are legally protected from creditors of the employer(s) or plan
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administrator” (para. 13g). The study found that one of the Wisconsin municipalities had
established a Section 115 trust and the other had set up a Section 501 trust. (See Chapter 2 of
this study report for more information about irrevocable trust funds.)
The fact that so few municipalities had established an irrevocable trust fund to satisfy
their OPEB obligations is striking. In essence, it appears that most municipalities are not
taking steps to advance-fund their OPEB obligations at all. Thus, the research design was
revised to assess the factors that contribute to successful management of the magnitude of the
relative size of the unfunded actuarial accrued liabilities (UAALs) of OPEB plans.
The funded ratio of an OPEB plan is “(t)he actuarial value of assets expressed as a
percentage of the actuarial accrued liability (AAL)” (GASB statement no. 45, 2004, para.
40). As discussed above, the numerator of this faction was zero for most of the case
municipalities. Consequently, the funded ratios were most typically zero. The UAAL is
defined as “(t)he excess of the actuarial accrued liability over the actuarial value of assets”
(para. A-6). Because only two of the case municipalities had assets that could be recognized
for application to the AAL, for most of the case municipalities, the AAL was equal to the
UAAL for financial reporting purposes.
The relative magnitude of OPEB obligations can be alternatively measured as the
ratio of the UAAL over the unrestricted net assets of the governmental activities (hereafter
referred to as the “UAAL ratio”) (variable name: UAALratio) of each case municipality for
each fiscal year for which data are available. Unrestricted net assets of governmental
activities serves as the denominator of the ratio for two reasons: this financial statement
element is a cumulative measurement and it is associated with the general activities of the
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government. This is similar to a UAAL. A UAAL reflects an accumulated obligation of a
government. Also, it is largely associated with governmental (as opposed to business-type)
activities. Governmental activities can be contrasted with the business-type activities of a
municipality, which are generally accounted for in a separate fund and funded by specific
user fees.
A difficulty was encountered calculating the UAAL ratio. The unrestricted net assets
of the governmental activities of some case municipalities were negative. The negative
figures were large in a number of cases. In the most severe case, the unrestricted net assets of
one Illinois municipality were -$53.4 million at the end of the 2011 fiscal year. With only
positive numbers in the UAAL ratio, a smaller UAAL ratio would be favorable for a
municipality (i.e., a smaller actuarial obligation relative to the overall economic resources
available to a municipality). However, the existence of a negative number in the denominator
of the ratio would create an overall favorable (smaller) ratio when, in fact, the municipality
would be worse off than a municipality with a relatively small positive ratio.
Two steps were taken to obtain meaningful UAAL ratios. First, the denominator was
adjusted by adding the most negative amount of unrestricted net assets found in the sample ($53.4 million). This alleviated all negative UAAL ratios. However, this first step caused one
case municipality to have an extraordinarily large UAAL ratio ($219.7 million / 1). Retaining
this case municipality in the analysis would have skewed the study results. Therefore, the
researcher took the additional step of dropping the case municipality with the large amount of
negative unrestricted net assets of governmental activities from the Model 1 analysis.
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The distribution of UAAL ratios that resulted after the adjustments described above is
presented in Figure 7. The UAAL ratios range from zero to 2.11. The mean and standard
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Figure 7. Distribution of ratios of UAALs / Adjusted Unrestricted Net Assets of
Governmental Activities

The financial statement element of unrestricted net assets was similar to, but has been
replaced by, unrestricted net position. 1 Gauthier (2012) asserts that unrestricted net assets of
governmental activities is a useful measure of the “long-term financial health and fiscal
sustainability” of a municipality (Gauthier, 2012, p. 607). In a like sense, unrestricted net
assets represents the net cumulative results of a municipality’s economic activities over the
long term. Just as the unrestricted net assets figure represents long-term cumulative results,

Pursuant to GASB statement no. 63 (2011), unrestricted net position replaced
unrestricted net assets as the primary measure of the long-term economic position of a local
government. However, GASB statement no. 63 was effective for financial reporting periods
beginning after December 15, 2011 (p. 8). The case municipalities considered in this study
reported unrestricted net assets rather than unrestricted net position.
1
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so does the UAAL of the OPEB plan. Thus, marrying the two in a ratio across the case
municipalities provides an instructive metric for gauging the relative magnitude of OPEB
obligations.
Appendix I provides a summary of dependent and independent variables that were
examined in the study. Also presented are the type of variable, source of the associated data,
and whether calculation of the data was required to determine the value concerned. Each of
the variables is described in detail below.

Operationalizing Variables: Substantive Variables

Professional Background of the CEO (variable names:
CEOgovyrs, CEOjobyrs, and CEOmpa).
As discussed in Chapter 2, the underlying theoretical premise of this study is that the
professional background of a municipality’s management, specifically the CEO and the CFO,
impact how well the municipality manages its OPEB obligations. The multiple dimensions of
the CEO and CFO’s professional background measure the executive’s professional
experience (e.g., the executive’s years of government service and years of experience in his
current position) and formal training (e.g., graduate degree, undergraduate degree, field of
study, and professional certifications). One might reasonably expect that the richer a
government executive’s background, the more likely he or she will be to more responsibly
manage the municipality’s OPEB obligations. For the purposes of the study, the CEO is
defined as the highest ranking full-time administrative official. For municipalities operating
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under the mayor-council form or a blended form of government, this official was the mayor.2
The municipality’s manager was the highest ranking full-time administrative official in
governments operating under the council-manager form. Most of the data for the professional
background of the CEO came from the primary survey. However, the initial survey only
requested information on the professional background of the municipality’s manager. During
the data analysis phase of the study, the researcher recognized that it was necessary to know
the professional background of mayors in municipalities operating under the mayor-council
form of government to have comparable data for all case municipalities. Therefore, a followup survey requested information on the professional background of mayors leading
municipalities operating under the mayor-council form. In those cases where responses to the
follow-up survey were not received from the municipalities concerned, the researcher
obtained the information on the mayor’s professional background by interviewing other staff
members at the municipalities or examining the LinkedIn profiles of the mayors.
CEOgovyrs is an interval variable that measures the number of years of total
government service of the CEO at the beginning of each of the fiscal years ending in 2002
through 2011. Service is counted in all professional positions at the federal, state, and local
levels. .
CEOjobyrs is an interval variable that captures the number of years the CEO spent as
the CEO of the particular case municipality at the start of each of the fiscal years ending in
2002 through 2011 (i.e., years of tenure in current position).
2

In blended forms of government, there is oftentimes a sharing of overall
responsibility for managing the affairs of the municipality between the chief elected official,
such as the mayor, and the chief appointed official, such as the manager or administrator
(Frederickson, Logan, & Wood, 2003, p. 9).
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CEOmpa is a nominal variable reflecting whether the CEO had an MPA degree at the
beginning of each of the fiscal years under study (i.e., 1 for having an MPA degree and 0 for
not having the degree). The MPA degree is generally recognized as providing the standard
foundational knowledge for a professional career as a public administration generalist. An
MPA curriculum typically includes courses that help a public administrator appreciate the
longer term aspects of managing a government. One or more financial management courses
are also oftentimes included in an MPA curriculum. In those cases where a municipality
changed its CEO during a fiscal year, survey respondents were asked to provide information
on the CEO who was in place for the largest part of the fiscal year concerned.
Figures 8 and 9 present information on the distribution of years of total government
service of the CEOs (CEOgovyrs) and the years of tenure that the CEOs had in their current
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Each one of the 139 observations included in the Model 2 sample represented one of the
multiple years for which data pertaining to the case municipalities were collected. There were
79 instances (56.8%) of CEOs possessing an MPA degree.
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for CEOgovyrs, CEOjobyrs, and
CEOmpa.

Table 2
CEO Professional Background
Variable Name

Variable

OBS

Mean

SD

Min.

Max

Years of Total Government Service

CEOgovyrs

139

20.87

11.06

0

42

Years of Tenure in Current Position

CEOjobyrs

139

9.52

8.64

0

35

MPA Degree

CEOmpa

139

0.57

0.50

0

1

The distribution of CEOgovyrs roughly resembles a normal distribution. However, there are
more CEOs who have 27 or more years of experience than the normal curve would predict.
In other words, in terms of the years of total government experience, the sample includes a
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substantial number of CEOs with extensive overall government experience. On the other
hand, the CEOjobyrs distribution is clearly skewed to the left. Indeed, the mean for
CEOjobyrs was 9.52 years and its standard deviation was 8.64. This suggests that a
substantial number of CEOs in the sample had less than 10 years in their positions.

Professional Background of the CFO (variable names:
CFOgovyrs, CFOjobyrs, and CFOproindex).
The professional background of the CFOs was measured in similar, but not identical,
terms as the CEOs. The years of total government service of the CFO were captured as
CFOgovyrs. CFOjobyrs gauged the number of years of tenure that the CFO had in his/her
current position with the case municipality at the beginning of the fiscal years of interest.
This was akin to CEOgovyrs and CEOjobyrs, respectively for the CEOs. However,
professional credentials were measured differently.
The primary survey requested information about whether the CFO of the case
municipality possessed a finance- or business-related bachelor’s degree, and whether the
CFO possessed an MPA, MBA, or comparable degree emphasizing the study of management
and/or finance. Finally, the survey inquired about whether the CFO was a certified public
accountant. Both registered and licensed CPAs were counted as CPAs. These measures of
professional credentials were consolidated into a CFO professional index (CFOproindex).
One point each was granted for having a graduate degree of the type described above,
a bachelor’s degree of the type described above, and a CPA registration or license. Thus, if a
CFO possessed all three levels of professional credentials at the start of a given fiscal year,
his/her professional index value would be 3. Conversely, if a CFO possessed none of the
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credentials, his/her index value would be 0. Of course, if a CFO acquired any of the
credentials during the course of the period under study, his/her index would change over the
years. X6 is an interval variable.
Figures 10 through 12 present information on the distribution of years of total
government service of the CFOs (CFOgovyrs), the years of tenure that the CFOs had in their
positions with the case municipalities (CFOjobyrs), and the CFO professional indices
(CFOproindex) in the Model 2 sample. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for X4, X5,
and X6. If a municipality changed its CFO during a fiscal year, the survey respondent was
asked to provide information on the CFO who was in place for the largest part of the fiscal
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Table 3
CFO Professional Background
Variable Name

Variable

OBS

Mean

SD

Years of Total Government Service

Min.

Max

CFOgovyrs

139

19.60

8.93

0

45

Years of Tenure in Current Position

CFOjobyrs

139

8.92

7.27

0

35

CFO Professional Index

CFOproindex

139

1.56

0.81

0

3

The distribution of the years of total CFO service (CFOgovyrs) more closely approximates
the normal curve than that of the CEOs. However, there is an accentuated peak at the 19-to20-year point. The mean and range of total CFO service is similar to the CEOs, but the
standard deviation for CFO total service is smaller. Like the distribution of years of CEO
tenure, the distribution of years of CFO tenure (CFOjobyrs) is skewed to the left. Many of
the CFOs have been in their positions for less than 10 years. The range of service years for
CFOs and CEOs is identical: 0 to 35. The CFOs have a slightly lower number of years in
their positions (8.92) than the CEOs (9.52), but the standard deviation for the CFO
distribution is smaller.
The mean for the CFO professional index (CFOproindex) was 1.56 with a standard
deviation of 0.81. This suggests the CFOs generally possessed one or two of the professional
credentials of interest. Cronbach’s alpha is “a measure of internal consistency, that is, how
closely related a set of items are as a group.” A coefficient of 0.70 is considered to be
acceptable (UCLA, n.d.). The coefficient for the CFOproindex is 0.55. Thus, the internal
consistency of the index is somewhat limited.
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Operationalizing Variables: Control Variables
Several independent variables were included in the models to control for state
location, economic climate, and other potentially influential factors.

State Identifiers (variable names: STiowa, STwis, and STill).
The first three control variables identify the state in which the case municipality is
located. The states are specified with separate nominal variables (coded as 1 or 0). That is,
STiowa, STwis, and STill identify Iowa, Wisconsin, and Illinois municipalities, respectively.
In the actual statistical analyses, STill (Illinois) is omitted to avoid perfect collinearity
(Gujariti & Porter, 2009, p. 281). As shown in Table 1, there were 9, 12, and 17 case
municipalities in Iowa, Wisconsin, and Illinois, respectively.

The Recession of 2007 – 2009 (variable name: RECESS).
An economic recession occurred in the middle of the time frame of the study. The
United States Government defers to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) to
measure and declare economic recessions (The Recession, 2012). The NBER determined that
a recession existed in the United States from December of 2007 through June of 2009. The
recession may have affected the trends in the data collected for this study, particularly
financial information. However, it is unlikely that the recession impacted the financial
information of a municipality instantaneously. For example, any impact on property tax
revenues probably took time to manifest itself. Consequently, a nominal variable (RECESS)

91
identifies the lagged effect of the 2007-2009 national recession. RECESS is coded as 1 for
the years of 2009 and 2010, and 0 for the other years.

Per Capita Assessed Value (variable name: AVpercap).
The property tax base of a municipality is determined by the assessed value (AV) of
the real estate within its jurisdiction. (Personal property is sometimes also included in the tax
base.) Municipalities with greater AV generally have greater taxing capacity. However, this
taxing capacity is relative. Larger municipalities must provide a larger magnitude of services.
Per capita AV (AVpercap) provides an independent variable that measures the relative value
of property across municipalities. Per capita AV is an interval variable calculated from data
available in the statistical section of CAFRs. The CAFRs include ten-year information on the
population of the case municipalities and their real estate assessed value (Gauthier, 2012, pp.
621 and 630).
Figure 13 presents the distribution of AV per capita in the Model 2 sample. Per
capita AV ranges from $8,501 to $173,052 with a mean of $55,871 and a standard deviation
of $34,626.
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Figure 13. Distribution of per capita assessed values.

One adjustment was needed in determining the real estate AV of municipalities in
Iowa. The AV information provided in the CAFRs of Iowa municipalities generally include
the AV of personal property subject to taxation. To ensure comparability of the data
associated with the municipalities across the states, the personal property AV was subtracted
from total gross AV to provide a net real estate AV for the per capita AV calculation.
Illinois municipalities present another AV anomaly that merits consideration. In
Illinois, equalized assessed value (EAV) is the basis for real estate property taxation. The
process of equalization may adjust AV by a factor so as to achieve “a uniform level of
market value (33-1/3 percent)” as a basis for real estate property taxation (Illinois, 2010, p.
16). The equalization process compensates for variances in assessment practices across
Illinois townships and counties. Because EAV is the actual basis for real estate property
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taxation in Illinois, EAV figures are used in the calculation of per capita AV for Illinois
municipalities.

Illinois Home-Rule Status (variable name: ILhome).
State governments are the sovereigns within their borders. An 1868 Iowa Supreme
Court case, City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids and Missouri Railroad Company, established the
generally accepted legal principle of Dillon’s rule: that local governments have no powers
except those that are delegated to them by their state governments (Krane, Rigos, & Hill,
2001, p. 10). However, by state constitutional provision or statute, home-rule status may be
conveyed to local governments. Depending upon the state concerned, “(h)ome rule units may
exercise and perform concurrently with the State any power or function…to the extent that
the General Assembly by law does not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or declare
the state’s exercise to be exclusive” (p. 14). Home-rule powers can be extensive. Having
attained home-rule status, a municipality may have considerable fiscal autonomy. This
autonomy may include the power to budget, raise revenues, incur expenditures, and issue
debt with limited or no restrictions by the state (p. xi).
Given that home-rule status can entail significant fiscal autonomy, such status may
impact a municipality’s ability to address its OPEB obligations. For example, a home-rule
municipality may have unrestricted powers to impose or raise a sales tax to apply to its
OPEB obligation. Alternatively, a home-rule municipality may have unrestricted ability to
issue debt that would provide the resources to mitigate its OPEB obligation.
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While home-rule status may financially empower a municipality, home-rule powers
vary across the United States. Some states entrust their municipalities with very significant
home-rule powers. In other states, home-rule status is largely meaningless. Iowa and
Wisconsin are two states in which home-rule powers are hollow. According to Krane, Rigos,
and Hill, “(l)ocal government in Iowa has never had a great deal of authority in fiscal
matters, and the passage of home rule did little to change that situation” (p. 152). In
Wisconsin, the state constitution grants home-rule status to incorporated cities and villages
(Morse, 2013, p. 7). Home-rule powers are supplemented in Wisconsin by state statute (p.
10.). However, as a practical matter, the state “limits the sources of revenue that local
government units can tap” (Krane et. al., p. 457). The revenue-raising constraints placed
upon municipalities in Wisconsin has largely negated the strength of home rule to help
municipalities address their OPEB obligations.
Illinois offers a sharp contrast to Iowa and Wisconsin with regard to powers of homerule municipalities. The 1970 Illinois Constitution conveys automatic home-rule status upon
municipalities with a population of more than 25,000. Municipalities with a population of
25,000 or less may obtain home-rule status by referendum approval (Krane et. al., p. 129).
Substantial fiscal autonomy comes with home-rule status in Illinois. Illinois home-rule
municipalities may impose a local-option sales tax in 0.25% increments. Furthermore, homerule municipalities are exempt from the state’s annual 5% tax extension increase limitation.
Also, no general obligation debt limits exist for Illinois home-rule municipalities (Krane, et.
al., p. 133).

95
Given the fiscal importance of home-rule status in Illinois, a nominal variable (coded
as 1 or 0) is included in the models to measure the effect of that status. Nine home-rule
municipalities are included in the Model 1 sample, and 10 in the Model 2 sample. Home-rule
municipalities were identified through the primary survey.

Tax and Expenditure Limitation Index (variable name: TELindex).
State governments oftentimes place legal limits on the power of municipalities to
raise revenue and spend money. These limits are referred to as tax and expenditure
limitations (TELs). TELs may have constitutional or statutory origins. The general classes of
TELs may include limits on a) overall property tax rates, b) specific property tax rates, c)
property tax levies, d) general revenue or expenditure increases, and e) assessment increases,
as well as f) full disclosure requirements (ACIR, 1995, pp. 1 – 3). TELs could have an
impact on a municipality’s ability to successfully manage its OPEB obligations. That is, if a
state restricts the ability of a municipality to raise revenue, the municipality could lack
sufficient resources to apply to OPEB costs.
Amiel, Deller, & Stallmann (2009) construct state and local TEL indices for each of
the 50 states. The state-level index captures the extent to which the states restrict their own
ability to tax and spend through constitutional or statutory measures. The local index gauges
the degree to which the states limit the fiscal autonomy of the local governments within their
borders. Amiel et. al. develop a separate state-level and local index for each state for the
years 1969 through 2005. In general, their indices are based upon the six ACIR (1995) TEL
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dimensions outlined above. Amiel et. al. assign points based upon the strength of the TEL in
each dimension.
Models 1 and 2 required the development of TELs for municipalities located in
Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin for the years 2002 through 2011. Because the local indices of
Amiel et. al. were available only for years through 2005, those indices alone could not
provide the data necessary to conduct the analysis associated with this study. However, their
work provided the basis for the development of the TEL index for this study. Appendices J,
K, and L provide the support for the calculation of this study’s TEL index. Following Amiel
et. al., points have been assigned across the TEL dimensions based upon the strength of each
type of limitation. The local government indices of Amiel et. al. addressed limitations that
pertained to counties, municipalities, special districts (e.g., school districts), and other
districts. The indices used in this study incorporate only those limitations applicable to
municipalities. The TEL index values used in this study for Illinois and Iowa are 13 and 11,
respectively. The Wisconsin TEL index values are zero from 2002 through 2005 and 7 from
2006 through 2011. The TEL index value for Wisconsin changes because of the adoption of a
levy increase limit effective July 1, 2005 (Wisconsin Statutes, 2013-2014, sec. 66.0602).

State-Shared Sales Tax Rate (variable name: SStax)
Some states share their sales tax revenues with their local governments. Any revenues
shared by a state with its municipalities give those municipalities greater capacity to address
their OPEB obligations. Illinois is one such state. The State of Illinois imposed a retailers’
occupation tax, more commonly known as the state-shared sales tax (35 ILCS 120, 2014, §2).
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During the years under study, Illinois’ state tax rate was generally 6.25% (35 ILCS 120,
2014, §2-10). Since January 1, 1990, Illinois has deposited 16% of the 6.25% tax to the Local
Government Tax Fund for distribution to municipalities (35 ILCS 120, 2014, §3). This
municipal share of the state-shared sales tax is distributed to municipalities based upon a
point of sale (Illinois, 2002, p. 9). The portion of the state-shared sales tax equates to an
effective 1% tax. Thus, SStax for Illinois municipalities included in this study was coded
0.01. Neither Iowa nor Wisconsin shares sales tax revenues with its municipalities. Thus,
SStax for Iowa and Wisconsin municipalities was coded with a 0.

Local-Option Sales Tax Rate (LOST) (variable name: LOtax).
A LOST, when permitted by a state government, can also give a municipality
enhanced capacity to address its OPEB obligations. This is the case even when the
municipality concerned must use the proceeds of the LOST for a non-OPEB purpose, such as
for capital projects. If a LOST is used to satisfy any special governmental purpose, fiscal
capacity is created elsewhere in a municipal budget to potentially address OPEB obligations.
Illinois permits its municipalities to impose a LOST on tangible personal property.
The parameters for a LOST differ in Illinois depending upon whether the municipality
possesses home-rule powers. Home-rule municipalities may impose a LOST in 0.0025
(0.25%) increments. There is no maximum limit on the home-rule LOST and there are no
restrictions on how the proceeds of the tax must be spent (65 ILCS 5, 2014, §8-11-1).
The parameters for non-home-rule municipalities in Illinois are more stringent. With
referendum approval, non-home-rule municipalities may impose a LOST in 0.25%

98
increments up to a maximum of 1.0%. If an authorizing referendum were passed on or before
July 14, 2010, the proceeds of the non-home-rule municipality’s LOST tax may only be
expended on public infrastructure or used to achieve property tax relief. If the authorizing
referendum were passed after July 14, 2010, the proceeds of the tax may be used for any
municipal purpose (65 ILCS 5, 2014, §8-11-1.3). Data on the LOST in Illinois was gathered
for this study from the online Illinois Tax Rate Finder (2014).
A LOST is permitted in Iowa as well. After receiving referendum approval, Iowa
municipalities may impose a LOST of 1% (Iowa Code, 2014, §423B.1). The Iowa LOST
potentially gives Iowa municipalities an additional means of addressing their OPEB
obligations. The Iowa Sales Tax Rates Lookup (2014) at the Iowa Department of Revenue
website was used to gather the tax rates for this study.
Wisconsin has significantly limited the fiscal autonomy of its municipalities.
Municipalities in the state rely primarily on property taxes to fund their operations. Other
municipal revenue sources include user fees, fines, permits, licenses, and gifts (Krane et. al.,
2001, p. 457). While Wisconsin has permitted its counties to impose a LOST (Wisconsin
Statutes, 2011-2012, §77.70), the state legislature has not granted similar authority to
municipalities. In recognition of the considerable constraints on Wisconsin municipalities,
there have been proposals to convey the authority to Wisconsin municipalities to impose a
LOST (Probst, 2009). However, to date, the State of Wisconsin has only authorized its
counties and special districts to impose a sales tax (Wisconsin Statutes, 2013-2014, sec.
77.71; Haines, 2015).
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Figure 14. Distribution of local-option sales tax rates.

The range of LOST rates spanned from zero percent to 0.015 (1.5%). The mean LOST rate
was 0.0038 with a standard deviation of 0.0049. The modal rate was zero. Of the total of 139
observations in the Model 2 sample, 56.8% included a LOST rate of zero. Wisconsin
accounted for 50 of the 79 zero-rate observations.

Form of Government Indicators (variable names:
FORMmayor FORMmgr, and FORMblend).
The form of government adopted by a municipality can be a fundamental determinant
of how the government operates and makes policy decisions, such as the extent to which
OPEB obligations will be funded. The two most broadly defined forms of municipal
government are the mayor-council and the council-manager forms. The council-manager
form developed in the early 1900s as a means of delineating the bounds of responsibilities of
political officials and public administrators in municipal government (Svara, 1998, p. 52).
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While classifying municipal governments as being either of the mayor-council or the councilmanager form is a basic approach to distinguishing forms of government, scholars have
argued that such a simplistic dichotomy is not genuinely descriptive. Wood and Fan (2008)
assert that “the distinction between mayor-council and council-manager cities has become
blurred as cities adapt by taking on the characteristics of the other” (407).
Despite the difficulties associated with distinguishing the forms of municipal
government, there is value in understanding whether municipalities operating under the
various forms differ in the way they manage and fund their OPEB obligations. To capture the
impact of the different forms on the funding of OPEB obligations, three nominal variables
capture a municipality’s form of government: mayor-council (FORMmayor), councilmanager (FORMmgr), and blended (FORMblend). In the actual data analysis, FORMmayor
was excluded from the models to mitigate collinearity. Excluding FORMmayor from the
modeling also permitted comparisons between the council-manager and the mayor-council
government forms. Whichever form of government a given municipality had, the appropriate
variable is coded 1. The other variables are coded 0.
The form of government data were collected through the primary survey. The survey
instrument defined how each form of government should be recognized:
● Mayor-Council Form: Mayor is chief administrative officer. There is no
formal manager.
● Council-Manager Form: Manager is chief administrative officer.
The survey respondents were permitted to explain their form of government. Where
comments indicated that the municipality could not be placed squarely into one of the two
basic forms, the researcher classified the municipality’s form of government as blended. For
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example, if a municipality claimed to have a full-time mayor and a full-time manager, the
municipality was considered to have a blended form.
Table 4 presents the forms of government in the Model 2 sample. Because no
municipality changed its form of government during the period under study, the numbers of
governments, rather than the number of observations, are shown in the table.

Table 4
Forms of Government
Illinois
Form of
Government

Iowa

Wisconsin

Total

Count

Percent

Count

Percent

Count

Percent

Count

Percent

MayorCouncil

1

5.9

1

11.1

5

41.7

7

18.4

CouncilManager

13

76.5

8

88.9

6

50.0

27

71.1

Blended

3

17.6

0

0.0

1

8.3

4

10.5

17

100.0

9

100.0

12

100.0

38

100.0

Total

The council-manager form of government is the modal form of government. However, the
mayor-council form had a notable presence in Wisconsin.

Union Density (variable name: UNIONden).
Many municipalities must contend with collective bargaining when making changes
to the compensation and benefit packages for their employees. Fichenbaum and Olson (2002)
corroborated earlier research, finding that unionized employers tend to be more generous in
providing healthcare benefits than their nonunionized counterparts (p. 329). The extent of
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unionization in Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin municipalities could affect the ability of those
municipalities to manage their OPEB obligations.
Survey respondents were asked to estimate the extent of unionization in their
municipalities at the beginning of each of the fiscal years under study. The ordinal scale
ranges of unionization offered to the survey respondents were 0% to 25%, 26% to 50%, 51%
to 75%, and 76% to 100%. Responses were coded as 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively.
Figure 15 shows the distribution of unionization responses in the Model 2 sample.
The modal response 51% to 75%, (45.3% of responses). The median value for the sample
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Figure 15. Distribution of unionization responses.

The general financial condition of a municipality could impact the ability of a
municipality to manage its OPEB obligation. In the modeling of, four ratios are used in this
study to control for the general financial condition of each municipality. Two of the ratios
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capture the financial condition of the case municipalities from a long-term perspective. The
other two ratios offer a more current perspective.

Ratio of Unrestricted Net Assets of Governmental Activities
Divided by the Expenses of Governmental Activities
(variable name: NAvExp).
The first long-term variable is the ratio of unrestricted net assets of governmental
activities divided by the expenses of governmental activities. The unrestricted net assets of a
municipality’s government activities is the residual equity of the municipality after all of its
assets are subtracted from its liabilities, net assets invested in capital assets, and restricted net
assets (Gauthier, 2005, pp. 133, 161, and 162). In other words, unrestricted net assets
represent a municipality’s “free and clear” economic (not financial) resources. The ratio was
standardized across the case municipalities by placing the expenses of governmental
activities in the denominator. Both unrestricted net assets and expenses are amounts
calculated using the economic resources measurement focus and the accrual basis of
accounting. The data for the ratios was gathered from the statistics sections of the CAFRs of
the case municipalities.
Figure 16 reflects the distribution of ratios of unrestricted net assets of governmental
activities divided by the expenses of governmental activities in the Model 2 sample.
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Figure 16. Distribution of the ratios of unrestricted net assets divided by expenses of
governmental activities.
The ratios range from -0.97 to 1.39. The mean ratio is 0.21 with a standard deviation of 0.41.
Indeed, for 39 of the 139 observations, the ratio was negative. This means that, in 39
instances, the municipality’s liabilities (and net assets with any restrictions) were greater than
its assets. Because there are multiple observations for each municipality, the 39 instances did
not include all case municipalities. In actuality, 15 of 38 municipalities considered in the
Model 2 sample reported negative unrestricted net assets in one or more of the fiscal years
under study.

Ratio of General Obligation Debt (Principal) Outstanding Divided by the
Assessed Value of Real Estate (variable name: GOvAV).
Another long-term financial variable included in the modeling is GO debt (principal)
outstanding divided by the assessed value of real estate. This ratio is a generally accepted
statistic for gauging the relative debt burden of municipalities (GASB, Disclosure
Guidelines, 1991, p. 38). With the placement of assessed value of real estate in the
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denominator, the ratio reflects the debt burden of a community with respect to its wealth as
reflected in value of its real property. Those communities with real estate of greater value
have greater capacity to pay public debt.
Figure 176 shows the distribution of the ratios of GO debt outstanding divided by real
restate AV in the Model 2 sample. The ratios ranged from zero to 0.25. The mean ratio is
0.03 with a standard deviation of 0.04. The median ratio is 0.022. As the histogram above
reflects, the distribution of ratios is heavily skewed to the left with most ratios falling
between zero and 0.03. The data for both the numerator and denominator of the ratios was

0

10

Percent

20

30

obtained from the statistical section of municipal CAFRs.

0

.05

.1

.15
Ratio Value

.2

.25

Figure 17. Distribution of the ratios of general obligation debt divided by real estate assessed
value.

Ratio of General Fund Balance Divided by Governmental
Fund Revenues (variable name: FBvRev).
One of the two measures of shorter term financial condition used in the modeling is
the ratio of general fund balance divided by governmental fund revenues. This ratio indicates
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shorter-term financial condition because it is based upon fund-level data that uses the current
financial resources measurement focus. General fund balance is a common gauge of financial
flexibility. However, the amount of fund balance that a municipal government may find
adequate is dependent upon the size of the government. Therefore, it should be standardized
by some measure of the governmental financial activity to make general fund balance data
comparable across municipalities. Standardizing general fund balance data by dividing it by
government fund revenues is generally accepted (Maher & Nollenberger, 2009, p. 63). For
this study, information on both general fund balances and governmental fund revenues was
obtained from the statistical section of municipal CAFRs.
Figure 18 reflects the distribution of ratios of general fund balances divided by
governmental fund revenues in the Model 2 sample. The mean ratio was 0.22 with a standard
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Figure 18. Distribution of the ratios of general fund balance divided by governmental fund
revenues.
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Ratio of General Obligation Debt Service Payments Divided by
Governmental Fund Revenues (variable name: DSvRev).
Where the ratio of GO debt outstanding to real estate AV (GOvAV) is a shorter-term
gauge of debt burden, the ratio of GO debt service payments divided by governmental fund
revenues measures debt service from the perspective of the current financial resources
measurement focus. Maher and Nollenberger (2009) have proposed the similar statistic of
debt service to general fund revenues as a barometer of debt burden (p. 65). For this study,
information pertaining to GO debt payments and governmental fund revenues was obtained
from the statistical section of municipal CAFRs.
Figure 19 presents the distribution of the ratios of GO debt service payments divided
by governmental fund revenues in the Model 2 sample. The ratios range from zero to 0.599,
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Distribution of the ratios of GO debt service divided by governmental fund
revenues.
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Actuarial Assumptions (variable names:
ACTreturn and ACTinflate).
To prepare an actuarial valuation in compliance with GASB Statement No. 45, the
consulting actuary must make certain assumptions. Two of the key assumptions related to an
actuarial valuation are the annual rate of return on plan investments and the annual rate of
inflation in healthcare costs (GASB Statement No. 45, 2004, paras. 13b and c). The modeling
of this study incorporates these two parameters as control variables (ACTreturn and
ACTinflate, respectively). The municipal CFOs generally provided these rates in their
responses to the primary survey. In some instances, such as if a survey response were
incomplete, the rates were obtained from the notes to the municipality’s financial statements.
The distributions of the assumed rates of return and healthcare cost inflation in the
Model 2 sample are presented in Figures 20 and 21. The assumed annual rates of return on
plan investments (X25) range from 0.02 (2.0%) to 0.075 (7.5%), with a mean of 0.045 and a
standard deviation of 0.009. The modal rate is 0.05 (5.0%). The span of assumed rates of
inflation in healthcare costs (X26) is from 0.05 (5.0%) to 0.164 (16.4%). The mean assumed
inflation rate is 0.085, with a standard deviation of 0.019. The median rate is 0.075 (7.5%).
Information on both rates was obtained from the primary surveys.
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Figure 20. Distribution of actuarial assumptions of annual rates of return on plan
investments.
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Distribution of actuarial assumptions of annual rates of inflation in healthcare
costs.

Irrevocable Trust Funds (variable names: TRUST115,
TRUST501, and TRUST401).
GASB Statement No. 45 only permits the recognition of the advance funding of
OPEB obligations if a state or local government has established an irrevocable trust fund.
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The types of irrevocable trust funds include those established pursuant to Section 115,
501(c)(9), and 401(h) of the Internal Revenue Code. A Section 115 plan is a single-employer
trust fund established by a governmental entity. Section 501(c)(9) trusts are established by an
employees’ association, such as a union group. Finally, a Section 401(h) trust is established
as part of a qualified pension fund (Establishing and Administering, 2012). The survey
revealed that only two Wisconsin municipalities had established irrevocable trust funds. One
of the municipalities had established a Section 115 trust and the other had created a Section
501(c)(9) trust.
The scarcity of irrevocable trust funds necessitated the use of the UAAL ratio
(UAALratio) for this study rather than the more traditional funded ratio to assess the
magnitude of OPEB obligations as previously discussed.

OPEB Plan Redesign (variable name: PLANredes).
A municipality may take steps to redesign its OPEB plan to reduce the cost of OPEB,
including increasing deductibles, co-pay amounts, or the share of the premium that a retiree
must pay. Plan redesign steps could also consist of reducing the types of benefits covered.
Increasing deductibles, co-pay amounts, and the share of the premium that a retiree must pay
were gauged by other variables included in the models of this study. PLANredes was
intended to capture other steps that a municipality might take to reduce its OPEB costs, such
as reducing the types of benefits covered. A question about plan redesign steps was included
in the primary survey; however, few responded to this question. Most of those responses
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provided insufficient detail to permit meaningful coding. Consequently, PLANredes was not
used in the modeling.

Implicit Rate Subsidy (variable name: IMPLICIT).
Some municipal governments seek to charge their retirees for the full cost of an
OPEB plan premium. However, they establish the same premium rates for active employees
and retirees. Providing OPEB coverage to retirees is inherently more expensive than
providing coverage to active employees (i.e., because of their age, retirees tend to become ill
more frequently and treating their illnesses is oftentimes more costly). When the same
premium is applied to active employees and retirees, a portion of the premium of current
employees effectively serves as a subsidy of retiree benefits. GASB Statement No. 45 (2004)
recognized this phenomenon:
When an employer provides benefits to both active employees and retirees
through the same plan, the benefits to retirees should be segregated for
actuarial measurement purposes, and the projection of future retiree benefits
should be based on claims costs, or age-adjusted premiums approximating
claims costs, for retirees, in accordance with actuarial standards issued by the
Actuarial Standards Board. (para. 13a(2))
This phenomenon of a local government OPEB plan sponsor using the same premium rates
for both active employees and retirees is commonly referred to as an “implicit rate subsidy.”
The primary survey included a question to identify implicit rate subsidies. IMPLICIT is
coded 1 for plans with the subsidy, and 0 for those that had no subsidy.
In the Model 2 sample, 36 of the 38 case municipalities (94.7%) were found to have
implicit rate subsidies in their OPEB plans. Only two Iowa municipalities indicated that the
premium rates of their OPEB plans did not include an implicit rate subsidy.
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Medical Plan Generosity Index (variable name: MEDPLANindex).
Retiree participants in OPEB plans oftentimes contribute financially toward their
OPEB plans. These contributions can take a number of forms, which include paying a
percentage of the coverage premium, an annual deductible, and/or office visit co-pay amount.
The primary survey inquired about all three of these contribution forms. In the study, the
various contributions forms were melded into a “medical plan generosity index” in the
interest of data analysis efficiency. The retiree contribution forms were coded as follows.
The tiers for the coding were based upon breaks in the distribution of the components
of the index (see Table 5). The percentage of a premium paid by a single retiree and a retiree
couple was weighted twice as heavily as the deductibles and the office visit co-pay amounts
because the dollar amount of a premium for healthcare is generally much larger than an
annual deductible. An annual premium for medical insurance coverage is generally several
thousand dollars. In this study, the maximum amounts of annual deductibles for a single
retiree and a retiree couple were $2,500 and $5,000, respectively. The mean deductibles were
$322.66 and $619.42, respectively. The maximum co-pay for an office visit was $50. Given
the maximum point value of each component of the index as shown above, the maximum
possible total points for the index was 28.
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Table 5
Coding of Components of the Medical Plan Generosity Index
Component

Component Range

Percentage of Premium Paid by a
Single Retiree

Up to 25%

5

More than 25% and up to 50%

6

More than 50% and up to 75%

7

More than 75%

8

Up to 25%

5

More than 25% and up to 50%

6

More than 50% and up to 75%

7

More than 75%

8

Up to $200

1

More than $200 and up to $400

2

More than $400 and up to $600

3

More than $600

4

Up to $400

1

More than $400 and up to $800

2

More than $800 and up to $1200

3

More than $1200

4

Up to $10

1

More than $10 and up to $20

2

More than $20 and up to $30

3

More than $30

4

Percentage of Premium Paid by a
Retiree Couple

Annual Plan Deductible for Single
Retiree

Annual Plan Deductible for Retiree
Couple

Office Visit Co-Pay

Possible Code Value
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Figure 22 presents the distribution of the total index points for the Model 2 sample. The
actual range for the index is from 13 to 28, with a mean of 20.99 and standard deviation of
3.84. The median for the index is 21.5. The distribution suggests that distinct differences
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Figure 22. Medical plan generosity index.

Actuarial Cost Methods (variable names: ACMentry, ACMfrozen,
ACMattain, ACMfrozattain, ACMpuc, ACMagg, and ACMamm).
The actuarial cost method employed in an actuarial valuation is a major determinant
of the ARC, AAL, and funded ratio. In the primary survey, the case municipalities were
asked to identify the actuarial cost method that they used during each fiscal year included in
the study. A nominal variable was included in the modeling to identify the cost method used
by each of the case municipalities in their actuarial valuations (1 for use of a particular
actuarial cost method and 0 for not using the method). The actuarial cost methods permitted
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by GASB Statement No. 45 (2004) are entry age, frozen entry age, attained age, frozen
attained age, projected unit credit, and aggregate (para. 13d). Also, employers with fewer
than 100 members in their OPEB plan may use the alternative measurement method in their
actuarial valuations. A description of each actuarial cost method is included in the glossary.
Only the entry age (ACMentry), frozen attained age (ACMfrozattain), projected unit
credit (ACMpuc), and alternative measurement method (ACMamm) had been employed by
the case municipalities. As in the discussion of all previous independent variables, Table 6 is
based upon the Model 2 sample.

Table 6
Actuarial Cost Methods Employed
Illinois
Cost Method

Count

Iowa
Percent

Count

Percent

Wisconsin

Total

Count

Count

Percent

Percent

Entry Age (ACMentry)

17

100.0

2

22.2

1

7.7

20

51.2

Frozen Entry Age
(ACMfrozen)

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

Attained Age
(ACMattain)

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

Frozen Attained Age
(ACMfrozattain)

0

0.0

1

11.1

0

0.0

1

2.6

Projected Unit Credit
(ACMpuc)

0

0.0

5

55.6

12

92.3

17

43.6

Aggregate (ACMagg)

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

Alternative
Measurement Method
(ACMamm)

0

0.0

1

11.1

0

0.0

1

2.6

Total

17

100.0%

9

100.0%

13

100.0%

39

100.0%

In all but one case, each municipality used the same actuarial cost method across all survey
years. Consequently, Table 6 generally provides a single count of actuarial method for each
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municipality. In one case, a Wisconsin municipality changed from using the projected unit
credit to the entry actuarial cost method. This municipality is, therefore, counted twice in
Table 6. The predominant actuarial cost method employed by Illinois is the entry age
method. Wisconsin municipalities are similarly slanted toward the projected unit credit
method. While not as dominant in Iowa, the project unit credit method is still the most
popular. To avoid perfect collinearity, X39 (the alternative measurement method) was omitted
from the modeling.

Annual Time Counter (variable name: COUNTER).
To control for the general effects of inflation, a time counter was incorporated into the
modeling. COUNTER was coded with a 1 for fiscal years ended in 2002, a 2 for fiscal years
ended in 2003, and so on through a 10 for fiscal years ended in 2011.

Development of the Final Forms of Statistical Equations
Model 1 examines the impact of the various independent variables on the UAAL ratio
(UAALratio) (UAAL divided by adjusted unrestricted net assets of governmental activities).
Model 2 considers the effect of the independent variables upon the percentage of the ARC
contributed (ARCratio) during a fiscal year. The approach used to develop the models in this
study is to start with models that include all independent variables (except those omitted
because of lack of meaningful or reliable data).
After full models (i.e., with all independent variables included) are constructed,
subsequent models are developed by deleting independent variables that are a source of
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multicollinearity or were statistically insignificant. Independent variables are deleted from
the models until only models with significant or near significant variables remained. Given
the exploratory nature of this research an alpha of 0.10 was used to assess significance.
The next chapter discusses the other major findings of this study.

CHAPTER 4

MANAGEMENT MATTERS TO A DEGREE,
BUT NOT ENTIRELY AS EXPECTED

The hypothesis in this study is that greater professional experience and training in a
municipal government’s management team contributes to better management of the
government’s OPEB obligations. This hypothesis can be tested from two perspectives: longterm (cumulative) and short-term (year-to-year) impacts. In considering the long-term status
of OPEB plans, the study examines factors that impact the ratio of a municipality’s UAAL
divided by its unrestricted net assets of governmental activities (i.e., UAAL ratio). Better
management of a government’s OPEB obligations from a long-term perspective should result
in a lower UAAL ratio. The short-term perspective is offered by the analysis of factors that
affect the ARC contribution ratio corresponding to the percentage of the ARC contributed by
the case municipalities during their fiscal years. The study considers one municipality’s
OPEB obligations to be better managed than another municipality’s obligations from a shortterm perspective if the ARC contribution ratio of one municipality is higher than another.
Examining the effect of the wide range of relevant independent variables provides
considerable insight into changes in the UAAL ratio and ARC contribution ratio.
The findings lead to a rejection of H1 and a partial acceptance of H2. As is described
below, greater professionalism of the CEO and CFO do not lead to an increase in OPEB
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funding from the long-term/cumulative perspective. In a limited regard, the opposite is true.
As the CEO gains more years of overall experience in government, the UAAL ratio of the
municipality under his/her leadership increases. In the case of short-term funding, as the
number of years of tenure that the CEO has in his/her current position and the number of
years of total government service that the CFO increase so does the ARC contribution ratio.
However, the number of years of tenure that the CFO has in his/her current position has an
opposing effect.
A notable finding of this study became evident early in the data collection phase.
After the release of the primary survey in August of 2013, the researcher received several email inquiries from the CFO recipients of the survey. The CFOs generally asked if the
survey was applicable to their municipalities because they pay their OPEB costs on a pay-asyou-go basis or they had “only had an implicit rate subsidy.” Those CFOs believed that,
because their municipalities were not attempting to advance fund their OPEB obligations or
were seeking to have their OPEB plan participants pay all of the explicit plan premium, there
was no requirement to comply with the requirements of GASB Statement No. 45. All of the
municipalities concerned had actually implemented GASB Statement No. 45 as indicated by
their financial statements. Apparently, the CFOs concerned did not understand the
requirements of the pronouncement and their auditors had implemented it for them.
Recognizing that the response to the primary survey could be exceedingly low if the
lack of understanding of the requirement to implement GASB Statement No. 45 were
pervasive, the researcher initiated a follow-up communication with the CFO recipients of the
survey. Included in Appendix M is a copy of the e-mail message that clarifies for the CFOs
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that GASB Statement No. 45 applies to their municipalities even if they are funding their
OPEB obligations on a pay-as-you-go basis or have only an implicit rate subsidy. The
message seemed to alleviate the confusion and promote a better response to the survey.

Model 1 – The Long-Term/Cumulative Perspective
Model 1 examined the factors that affect the UAAL ratio. The model is represented
by equation 4.1.
UAALratio = a + b1CEOgovyrs + b2CEOjobyrs + b3CEOmpa +
b4CFOgovyrs + b5CFOjobhrs + b6CFOproindex +
b7STiowa + b8STwis + b9RECESS + b10AVpercap +
b11ILhome + b12TELindex + b13SStax + b14LOtax +
b15FORMmgr + b16FORMblend+ b17UNIONden +
b18NAvExp + b19GOvAV + b20FBvRev +
b21DSvRev + b22ACTreturn + b23ACTinflate +
b24TRUST115 + b25TRUST501 + b26IMPLICIT +
b27MEDPLNindex + b28ACMentry +
b29ACMfrozattain + b30ACMpuc + b31COUNTER

(4.1)

where,
UAALratio = UAAL / Adjusted Unrestricted Net Assets of Governmental Activities
CEOgovyrs = CEO Total Government Service (years)
CEOjobyrs = CEO Service in Position with Case Municipality (years)
CEOmpa = CEO with Master of Public Administration Degree
CFOgovyrs = CFO Total Government Services (years)
CFOjobyrs = CFO Service in Position with Case Municipality (years)
CFOproindex = CFO Professional Index
STiowa = Iowa Indicator
STwis = Wisconsin Indicator
RECESS = Recession Indicator
AVpercap = Assessed Value Per Capita
ILhome = Illinois Home-Rule Municipality Indicator
TELindex = Tax and Expenditure Limitation Index
SStax = State-Shared Sales Tax Rate
LOtax = Local-Option Sales Tax Rate
FORMmgr = Form of Government Indicator: Council-Manager
FORMblend = Form of Government Indicator: Blended Mayor-Manager
UNIONden = Union Density
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NAvExp = Unrestricted Net Assets / Expenses of Governmental Activities
GOvAV = General Obligation Debt Outstanding / Assess Value of Real Estate
FBvRev = General Fund Balance / Governmental Fund Revenues
DSvRev = GO Debt Service Payments / Governmental Fund Revenues
ACTreturn = Actuarial Assumption: Annual Rate of Return on Plan Investments
ACTinflate = Actuarial Assumption: Annual Rate of Inflation in Healthcare Costs
TRUST115 = Irrevocable Section 115 Trust Indicator
TRUST501 = Irrevocable Section 501 Trust Indicator
IMPLICIT = Implicit Rate Subsidy Indicator
MEDPLNindex = Medical Plan Generosity Index
ACMentry = Actuarial Cost Method Indicator: Entry Age
ACMfrozattain = Actuarial Cost Method Indicator: Frozen Attained Age
ACMpuc = Actuarial Cost Method Indicator: Projected Unit Credit
COUNTER = Annual Time Counter
Through an iterative (reverse stepwise) process, insignificant variables can be eliminated
from consideration one or a few at a time. Independent variables with the highest p-values in
a given iteration of the model are considered for elimination first. STiowa (Iowa indicator)
and STwis (Wisconsin indicator) were included throughout the modeling so as to retain the
capacity to distinguish the effect of states on the UAAL ratio. As stated in the preceding
chapter, independent variables with p-values of 0.1 or less were considered to be statistically
significant. However, for all other statistical tests, a more conventional p-value of 0.05 was
used to assess statistical significance.
The reduced model after initial screening of variables is presented in equation 4.2.
Only variables that met the threshold of p≤ 0.10 in equation 4.1 are included in the reduced
form model.
UAALratio = -0.844 + 0.006CEOgovyrs + 0.141STiowa
+ 0.707STwis + 0.366FORMmgr + 0.774 FORMblend
+ 3.804GOvAV + 0.030COUNTER
where,

(4.2)
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UAALratio = = UAAL / Unrestricted Net Assets of Governmental Activities (as
adjusted)
CEOgovyrs = CEO Total Government Service (years)
STiowa = Iowa Indicator
STwis = Wisconsin Indicator
FORMmgr = Form of Government Indicator: Council-Manager
FORMblend = Form of Government Indicator: Blended Mayor-Council
GOvAV = General Obligation Debt Outstanding / Assess Value of Real Estate
COUNTER = Annual Time Counter
The generalized least squares regression results of the reduced form equations suggest
that the only element of a municipal management team that impacts the cumulative funding
of OPEB plans is the professional experience of the CEO. Disappointingly, the influence is
the opposite of the expected result. That is, as the CEO gains more total years of service in
government, the cumulative funding declines. This refutes H1. The detailed results are
indicated in tables 7 and 8 below. The table presents the results for regression analyses
beginning with the version of the model including all substantive independent variables and
ending with the version of the model that includes only significant substantive independent
variables (plus the Iowa and Wisconsin identifiers). In the actual iterative process employed
to arrive at Model 1F-R below, substantive independent variables were removed from
consideration intermittently with control variables depending upon their respective p-values.
However, all substantive independent variables are presented in tables 7 and 8 to permit the
reader to understand the extent to which the underlying theory of the research was supported
by the data collected.

Table 7
Model 1 – Dependent Variable: UAAL Ratio – Initial GLS Panel Regression Results with Ordinary Standard Errors
Model 1A

Model 1B

Model 1C

Model 1D

Model 1E

Model 1F

Dependent
Variable

C

SE

P

C

SE

P

C

SE

P

C

SE

P

C

SE

P

C

SE

P

CEO Total
Government
Service – Years
(CEOgovyrs)

0.004

0.004

0.351

0.004

0.004

0.357

0.004

0.004

0.350

0.004

0.004

0.294

0.007

0.003

0.027

0.006

0.003

0.049

CEO Service in
Position with
Municipality –
Years (CEOjobyrs)

0.004

0.005

0.447

0.004

0.005

0.420

0.004

0.005

0.385

0.004

0.005

0.417

---

---

---

---

---

---

CEO with MPA
Degree (CEOmpa)

0.248

0.113

0.827

0.025

0.113

0.822

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

CFO Total
Government
Service – Years
(CFOgovyrs)

0.003

0.006

0.678

0.002

0.006

0.708

0.002

0.006

0.715

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

CFO Service in
Position with
Municipality –
Years (CFOjobyrs)

0.003

0.005

0.523

0.003

0.005

0.521

0.003

0.005

0.507

0.005

0.004

0.187

0.004

0.003

0.257

---

---

---

CFO Professional
Index
(CFOproindex)

0.009

0.043

0.835

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

Iowa Indicator
(STiowa)

0.153

0.148

0.301

0.152

0.147

0.302

0.154

0.146

0.291

0.155

0.143

0.278

0.159

0.141

0.261

0.141

0.143

0.326

Wisconsin
Indicator (STwis)

0.735

0.153

0.000

0.732

0.152

0.000

0.737

0.149

0.000

0.727

0.144

0.000

0.716

0.141

0.000

0.707

0.144

0.000

(continued on following page)
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Table 7 (continued)
Manager-Council
Governmental
Form Indicator
(FORMmgr)

0.352

0.190

0.065

0.353

0.190

0.063

0.374

0.162

0.021

0.373

0.159

0.019

0.360

0.156

0.021

0.366

0.159

0.021

Blended
Governmental
Form Indicator
(FORMblend)

0.767

0.238

0.001

0.767

0.237

0.001

0.781

0.227

0.001

0,773

0.222

0.001

0.768

0.219

0.000

0.774

0.223

0.001

GO Debt
Principal/AV of
Real Estate Ratio
(GOvAV)

4.050

1.346

0.003

4.048

1.340

0.003

4.069

1.326

0.002

3.984

1.285

0.002

3.770

1.238

0.002

3.804

1.258

0.002

Annual Counter
(COUNTER)

0.030

0.011

0.006

0.030

0.011

0.005

0.030

0.011

0.006

0.029

0.011

0.006

0.029

0.011

0.005

0.030

0.010

0.004

Constant

-0.782

0.241

0.001

-0.798

0.228

0.000

-0.803

0.225

0.000

-0.824

0.216

0.000

-0.825

0.213

0.000

-0.844

0.216

0.000

R2

0.450

0.446

0.442

0.446

0,452

0.473

Wald Chi-Square

46.78

47.13

47.84

48.69

49,02

46.33

P > Chi-Square

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

N = 133; Municipalities/Groups = 37
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All six of the initial versions of Model 1 are significant (p-value for the F-statistic of
nearly zero). Also, each version of Model 1 explained approximately 50% of the variation in
the UAAL ratio. Model 1A yielded the following explanatory equation.
UAALratio = -0.782 + 0.004CEOgovyrs + 0.004CEOjobyrs+ 0.248CEOmpa
– 0.003CFOgovyrs – 0.003CFOjobyrs – 0.009CFOproindex
+ 0.153XSTiowa + 0.735STwis + 0.352FORMmgr
+ 0.767FORMblend + 4.050GOvAV +0.031COUNTER

(4.3)

Model 1F (Table 7) tests H1 with an equation 4.4 after deleting insignificant variables
in Model 1A.
UAALratio = -0.844 + 0.006CEOgovyrs + 0.141STiowa
+ 0.707STwis + 0.366FORMmgr + 0.774 FORMblend
+ 3.804GOvAV + 0.030COUNTER
Model 1F is interpreted as follows.
● CEO Total Government Service (CEOgovyrs) – For each additional year of
government service that the municipality’s CEO possesses, the municipality’s
UAAL ratio increases by 0.006.
● Iowa (STiowa) – A municipality’s location in Iowa serves to increase the
UAAL ratio relative to Illinois municipalities by 0.141.
● Wisconsin (STiowa) – A municipality’s location in Wisconsin serves to
increase the UAAL ratio relative to Illinois municipalities by 0.707.
● Council-Manager Form of Government (FORMmgr) – Operation under the
council-manager form of government serves to increase a municipality’s
UAAL ratio by 0.366 relative to a mayor-council form of government.
● Blended Form of Government (FORMblend) – Operation under a blended
form of government serves to increase a municipality’s UAAL ratio by 0.774
relative to a mayor-council form of government.
● Ratio of GO Debt Principal Outstanding Divided by Assessed Value of Real
Estate (GOvAV) – Every one (1.0) unit increase in this ratio contributes to a
3.804 increase in the UAAL ratio.

(4.4)
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● Annual Counter (COUNTER) – The passage of an additional year increases
the UAAL ratio by 0.030.
All independent variables in Model 1F were significant at the 0.10 level except the Iowa
indicator (STiowa).
A Hausman test (1978) of model 1F produces a chi-square statistic of 7.11 (p ≤ 0.07)
suggesting that this random effects version of Model 1F is superior to a fixed effects model.3

Model 1F Diagnostics
Regression diagnostics of Model 1F did not identify any significant challenges to the
regression model assumptions.
Linearity. Scatterplots created to assess the existence of linear relationships reflect
each independent variable in Model 1F and the idiosyncratic residuals of the model, and none
of the scatterplots revealed a nonlinear pattern.

The Hausman test (1978) is a test of whether the individual effects in crosssectional time-series data are best specified with a fixed-effects or a random-effects
model. The basic cross-sectional time-series model is specified as:
3

Yit = Xβit + µi + εit

(4.5)

Where i is an idiosyncratic case, t is an observation at a particular point in time, µ is the
individual effect. In a fixed-effects model, µ is “fixed but unknown constant differing
across individuals.” The test compares the coefficients of a fixed-effects model to the
coefficients of the related random effects model. The coefficients of the fixed-effects
model are consistent while the coefficients of the random-effects model are considered
to be efficient. The null hypothesis in the test is that the coefficients of the randomeffects model are both efficient and consistent (Stata Base Reference Manual, 2013, p.
769). If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, the random-effects version of the model
should be used in data analysis. If the null hypothesis is rejected, the fixed-effect
version of the model should be used. In applying the Hausman test, the differences in
the coefficients of the two models are examined in accordance with a chi-square
distribution.
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Collinearity. The pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients calculated for the interval
independent variables and the lambda statistics calculated for the nominal independent
variables in Model 1F were low (under r = 0.20), suggesting no collinearity problems.
Heteroscedasticity. Homoscedasticity describes the condition of constant variance of
error (Gujarati & Porter, 2009, p. 65). If the assumption of homoscedasticity is violated in
regression analysis (i.e., heteroscedasticity exists), the estimators of a regression equation
will be biased and inferences made may be misleading (p. 375). When heteroscedasticity is
present, compensating measures are necessary. In determining whether the errors were
homoscedastic in Model 1F, the researcher tested for homoscedasticity using the graphical
method (p. 377). That is, the linear prediction of Model 1F was graphed (see Figure 23)
against both idiosyncratic (individual observation) and unit-level (case municipality)
residuals using a lowess plot (Stata, 2013, p. 1102-1107). The plot of the idiosyncratic
residuals reflects no discernable pattern. However, the Lowess plot of the linear prediction
and the unit-level residual reveals an issue.

-.5

0

.5

1

Lowess Smoother

-.5

0

.5
Linear Prediction

1

bandwidth = .8

Figure 23: Linear prediction v. unit-level residuals in Model 1F.
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The distinctive u-pattern in Figure 23 suggests a violation of the homoscedasticity
assumption (i.e., the existence of heteroscedasticity).
One remedial measure for the existence of heteroscedasticity is to estimate a model
using White’s heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors (White, 1980, pp. 817-818).
White’s heteroscedasticity-corrected errors are also known as robust standard errors (Gujarati
& Porter, 2009, p. 391). Estimating a model using robust standard errors compensates for the
presence of heteroscedastic residuals. Stata has the capacity to estimate GLS regression
models with panel data using robust standard errors (Stata, 2013, p. 365). Table 8 below
presents the results of the previous Models 1A through 1F with robust standard errors.
Autocorrelation. The Wooldridge (2002) test detects first-order autocorrelation in
panel data at the idiosyncratic level. This test assumes an F-distribution. The null hypothesis
for the test is that first-order autocorrelation is not present. Stata performs the Wooldridge
test through the xtserial command. When the test was applied to Model 1F, the resultant Fstatistic was 2.02. The associated p-value was 0.16. Thus, the researcher concludes that no
first-order correlation is present.
Outliers. To detect possible outliers in Model 1F, the combined residual is examined.
A combined residual is the sum of the idiosyncratic and unit-level residual. According to
Gordon (2010), observations with residuals of a value of more than 2.0 or 3.0 may be outliers
that influence the regression coefficients (p. 367). In the examination of residuals of Model
1F, none were found to be greater than 2.0. Only two observations had combined residuals
that were greater than 1.0. Both of those residuals were 1.2.
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Model 1F-R – UAAL Ratio
Models 1A through 1F are re-estimated using robust standard errors to account for the
heteroscedasticity problem. The results of the new estimations are presented in Table 8
below. The final model with robust standard errors includes the same independent variables
as the Model 1F with ordinary standard errors. To differentiate between models estimated
with ordinary and robust standard errors, the suffix “-R” (for robust standard errors) has been
added to the labels of the models. For example, the last estimation of Model 1 with robust
standard errors has been labeled “Model 1F-R.”

Table 8
Model 1 – Dependent Variable: UAAL Ratio – GLS Panel Regression Results with Robust Standard Errors
Model 1A-R
Dependent
Variable

Model 1B-R

Model 1C-R

Model 1D-R

Model 1E-R

Model 1F-R

C

RSE

P

C

RSE

P

C

RSE

P

C

RSE

P

C

RSE

P

C

RSE

P

CEO Total
Government
Service – Years
(CEOgovyrs)

0.004

0.004

0.340

0.004

0.004

0.231

0.004

0.003

0.200

0.004

0.003

0.203

0.004

0.003

0.198

0.006

0.002

0.020

CEO Service in
Position with
Municipality –
Years
(CEOjobyrs)

0.004

0.005

0.433

0.003

0.004

0.430

0.004

0.004

0.382

0.004

0.004

0.326

0.002

0.003

0.382

---

---

---

CEO with MPA
Degree (CEOmpa)

0.248

0.080

0.757

0.027

0.079

0.734

0.027

0.080

0.736

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

CFO Total
Government
Service – Years
(CFOgovyrs)

-0.003

0.009

0.776

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

CFO Service in
Position with
Municipality –
Years
(CFOjobyrs)

-0.003

0.004

0.401

-0.005

0.006

0.421`

-0.005

0.006

0.438

-0.005

0.006

0.425

---

---

---

---

---

---

CFO Professional
Indx
(CFOproindex)

-0.009

0.031

0.775

-0.006

0.031

0.858

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

Iowa Indicator
(STiowa)

0.153

0.082

0.061

0.155

0.084

0.066

0.154

0.084

0.067

0.155

0.085

0.068

0.136

0.081

0.093

0.141

0.082

0.086

Wisconsin
Indicator (STwis)

0.735

0.253

0.004

0.722

0.232

0.002

0.722

0.231

0.002

0.727

0.229

0.002

0.713

0.215

0.001

0.707

0.211

0.001
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Table 8 (continued)
Model 1A-R
Dependent
Variable

Model 1B-R

Model 1C-R

Model 1D-R

Model 1E-R

Model 1F-R

C

RSE

P

C

RSE

P

C

RSE

P

C

RSE

P

C

RSE

P

C

RSE

P

Blended
Governmental
Form
Indicator
(FORMblend)

0.767

0.200

0.000

0.758

0.209

0.000

0.759

0.208

0.000

0.773

0.210

0.000

0.778

0.206

0.000

0.774

0.206

0.000

GO Debt
Principal/AV
of Real Estate
Ratio
(GOvAV)

4.050

1.240

0.001

3.954

1.101

0.000

3.960

1.101

0.000

3.984

1.091

0.000

3.946

1.073

0.000

3.804

1.042

0.000

Annual
Counter
(COUNTER)

0.030

0.017

0.072

0.029

0.016

0.071

0.029

0.016

0.061

0.029

0.015

0.062

0.030

0.016

0.059

0.030

0.016

0.058

Constant

-0.782

0.323

0.016

-0.812

0.323

0.012

-0.820

0.334

0.014

0.824

0.333

0.013

0.846

0.340

0.013

0.844

0.337

0.012

R2

0.450

0.454

0.451

0.446

0.471

0.473

Wald ChiSquare

47.04

46.10

45.72

46.81

44.94

45.89

P > ChiSquare

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

N = 133; Municipalities/Groups = 37

131

132
As with the versions of Model 1 estimated with ordinary standard errors, the versions
of all of the versions of Model 1 estimated with robust standard errors are significant (pvalue of nearly zero). The estimations of Model 1 with robust standard errors does not
change the values of the regression coefficients. However, where STiowa (Iowa indicator) is
not significant at the 0.1 level in Model 1F, the variable is significant in Model 1F-R.
Between Models 1F and 1F-R, the p-value of STiowa dropped from 0.326 to 0.086. All
other independent variables included in Model 1F-R remain significant at the 0.1 level.
The Hausman specification test cannot be performed on models estimated with robust
standard errors. However, the estimation of the fixed-effects version of Model 1F-R does not
yield a statistically significant model (F = 1.88; p = 0.15).

An Alternative View of the UAAl Ratio
To provide an another perspective on factors that impact on the UAAL ratio, the
study regressed the various independent variables on the UAAL ratio with a standard
ordinary least squares (OLS) cross- sectional regression procedure. The GLS version of
Model 1 captures the effect of the various independent variables on the UAAL ratio over the
course of the entire study period. The OLS version isolates the most recent effect of the
independent variables. The data for the OLS cross-sectional regression pertain to the fiscal
years of the case municipalities ending in 2011. The total number of cases included in the
regression was 37. All indices for the OLS cross-sectional regression were calculated in
exactly the same manner as the GLS panel regression. The results of the OLS cross-sectional
regression are presented in Table 9 below.
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The range of the UAAL ratio for the 37-case sample was from zero to 2.114. The
mean of the sample was 0.32 with a standard deviation of 0.56. Thus, the standard deviation
of the UAAL ratio for the OLS cross-sectional estimations was slightly higher and the
standard deviation was somewhat larger than that for the GLS panel estimations (µ = 0.29; σ
= 0.47), indicating that the dispersion of the UAAL ratios in the OLS estimations is slightly
larger than those in the GLS estimations.

Table 9
Model 1 – Dependent Variable: UAAL Ratio – OLS Cross-Sectional Regression Results with Ordinary Standard Errors
Model 1A-OLS
Dependent Variable

Model 1B-OLS

Model 1C-OLS

Model 1D-OLS

Model 1E-OLS

Model 1F-OLS

C

SE

P

C

SE

P

C

SE

P

C

SE

P

C

SE

P

C

SE

P

CEO Total
Government Service
– Years
(CEOgovyrs)

0.013

0.009

0.167

0.014

0.007

0.052

0.013

0.006

0.049

0.014

0.006

0.037

0.013

0.006

0.051

0.012

0.006

0.059

CEO Service in
Position with
Municipality – Years
(CEOjobyrs)

0.002

0.012

0.837

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

CEO with MPA
Degree (CEOmpa)

0.033

0.149

0.825

0.035

0.145

0.809

0.029

0.141

0.838

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

CFO Total
Government Service
– Years (CFOgovyrs)

0.003

0.010

0.771

0.003

0.010

0.754

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

CFO Service in
Position with
Municipality – Years
(CFOjobyrs)

-0.013

0.014

0.360

-0.012

0.013

0.361

-0.011

0.012

0.381

-0.011

0.012

0.335

---

---

---

---

---

---

CFO Professional
Index (CFOproindex)

-0.126

0.103

0.231

-0.118

0.092

0.214

-0.126

0.087

0.161

-0.128

0.085

0.144

-0.128

0.085

0.142

---

---

---

Iowa Indicator
(STiowa)

0.184

0.199

0.366

0.185

0.195

0.354

0.173

0.189

0.367

0.174

0.185

0.357

0.128

0.179

0.481

0.109

0.183

0.556

Wisconsin Indicator
(STwis)

0.867

0.211

0.000

0.867

0.207

0.000

0.863

0.203

0.000

0.864

0.199

0.000

0.844

0.198

0.000

0.812

0.202

0.000

(continued on following page)
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Table 9 (continued)

Dependent
Variable

Model 1A-OLS

Model 1B-OLS

Model 1C-OLS

Model 1D-OLS

Model 1E-OLS

C

SE

P

C

SE

P

C

SE

P

GO Debt Service
Payments /
Governmental
Fund Revenues
(DSvRev)

-2.272

1.080

0.047

-2.286

1.057

0.041

-2.155

0.955

0.033

-2.174

0.932

0.028

-2.075

0.926

Section 115 Trust
Indicator
(TRUST115)

-0.820

0.490

0.108

-0.842

0.469

0.085

-0.895

0.430

0.048

-0.915

0.412

0.035

-0.909

Implicit Rate
Subsidy
(IMPLICIT)

-0.975

0.466

0.048

-0.972

0.456

0.044

-0.952

0.444

0.042

-0.975

0.421

0.029

Medical Plan
Generosity Index
(MEDPLANindex)

-0.063

0,023

0.012

-0.062

0.022

0.010

-0.063

0.021

0.007

-0.064

0.021

Constant

2.365

0.823

0.009

2.330

0.789

0.007

2.393

0.749

0.004

2.444

0.693

Adjusted R2 / F / P
>F

0.511 / 3.89 / 0.002

0.530 / 4.39 / 0.001

0.547 / 4.96 / 0.000

Model 1F-OLS
C

SE

P

0.034

-1.953

0.944

0.048

0.412

0.036

-0.954

0.420

0.031

-0.832

0.395

0.044

-0.889

0.402

0.035

0.005

-0.062

0.021

0.006

-0.063

0.021

0.006

0.002

2.221

0.651

0.002

2.076

0.659

0.004

0.564 / 5.66 / 0.000

0.565 / 6.18 / 0.000

0.544 / 6.38 / 0.000

N = 37
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In a manner similar to the formulation of the GLS panel regression models, Model
1F-OLS is the model that results after starting with a model including all independent
variables and successively estimating OLS cross-sectional models by eliminating the most
insignificant models independent variable, except the Iowa (STiowa) and Wisconsin (STwis)
indicators. (The annual counter (COUNTER) was not included in the OLS cross-sectional
estimations.) A p-value of 0.10 was used as the threshold for deletion of an independent
variable. After arriving at Model 1F-OLS, Models 1A-OLS through 1E-OLS were estimated
simply to illustrate the impact of the substantive control variables.
All six versions of OLS cross-sectional panel regression of Model 1 are significant
(p-value for the F-statistic of less than 0.05). Each OLS version of Model 1 explains
approximately 50% of the variation in the UAAL ratio. Model 1A-OLS yields explanatory
equation 4.6.
UAALratio = 2.365 + 0.013CEOgovyrs + 0.002CEOjobyrs
+ 0.033CEOmpa + 0.003CFOgovyrs
– 0.013CFOjobyrs – 0.126CFOproindex
+ 0.184STiowa + 0.867STwis + 6.216GOvAV
– 2.272DSvRev – 0.820TRUST115
– 0.975MPLICIT – 0.063MEDPLANindex
In Model 1A-OLS, none of the substantive variables is significant at the 0.10 level.
However, Model 1F-OLS reveals that one of the substantive variable is significant.
The following equation describes Model 1F-OLS.

(4.6)

137

UAALratio = 2.076 + 0.012CEOgovyrs + 0.109STiowa
+ 0.812STwis + 5.944GOvAV
– 1.953DSvRev – 0.954TRUST115
– 0.889MPLICIT – 0.063MEDPLANindex

(4.7)

● CEO Total Government Service (CEOgovyrs) – For each additional year of
government service that the municipality’s CEO possesses, the municipality’s
UAAL ratio increases by 0.012.
● Iowa (STiowa) – A municipality’s location in Iowa increases the UAAL ratio
relative to Illinois municipalities by 0.109.
● Wisconsin (STwis) – A municipality’s location in Wisconsin served to
increase the UAAL ratio relative to Illinois municipalities by 0.812.
● Ratio of GO Debt Principal Outstanding Divided by Assessed Value of Real
Estate (GOvAV) – Every one (1.0) unit increase in this ratio contributes to a
5.944 increase in the UAAL ratio.
● Ratio of General Obligation Debt Service Payments Divided by Governmental
Fund Revenues (DSvRev) – Every one (1.0) unit increase in this ratio
contributes to a 1.953 decrease in the UAAL ratio.
● Section 115 Trust (TRUST115) – A municipality’s use of a Section 115 trust
to advance fund its OPEB obligation decreases the UAAL ratio by 0.954.
● Implicit Rate Subsidy (IMPLICIT) – A municipality’s inclusion of an implicit
rate subsidy in its OPEB decreases the UAAL ratio by 0.889.
● Medical Plan Generosity Index (MEDPLANindex) – Every one (1.0) unit
increase in this index contributes to a 0.063 decrease in the UAAL ratio.

Model 1F-OLS Diagnostics
The assumptions underlying the OLS cross-sectional regression were examined in the
course of the study with the results discussed below.
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Normality of Residuals. Unlike GLS regression, OLS regression assumes a normal
distribution of residuals. The distribution of residuals in Model 1F-OLS are presented below.

0

.5

Density

1

1.5

Figure 24 illustrates that the residuals are nearly normally distributed.

-1

-.5
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.5

1

Kernel density estimate
Normal density

Figure 24. Distribution of residuals of model 1F-OLS

Linearity. As with the GLS estimations of Model 1, linearity of Model 1F-OLS is
examined through scatter plots of each independent variable and the residuals of the model.
A nonlinear pattern was not detected in any of the scatterplots.
Collinearity. To identify potential situations of significant collinearity among the
independent variables, variance inflation factors (VIFs) are calculated for each independent
variable. VIFs are calculated easily in Stata using the post-estimation estat vif command.
Gujarati and Porter (2009) state that VIFs “show how the variance of an estimator is inflated
by the presence of multicollinearity” (p. 328). According to Gordon (2010), a cutoff value of
4 or 10 is high and signals that multicollinearity may be significantly affecting the estimators.
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The VIFs for the independent variables included in Model 1F-OLS range from 1.19 to
2.50. The mean of the VIFs is 1.70. Consequently, collinearity is not problematic in Model
1F-OLS.
Heteroscedasticity. To determine whether the error variance is nonconstant, the
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisburg test is conducted (Gujarati & Porter, 2009, pp. 385-387).
The null hypothesis for this test is that the error variance is constant. It is a test that uses the
chi-square distribution. In the test of Model 1F-OLS, the chi-square value is 12.79 with an
associated p-value of 0.0003. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected and the existence of
heteroscedasticity is acknowledged. To compensate the OLS models are re-estimated with
robust standard errors as discussed below.
Autocorrelation. Because Model 1F-OLS is a cross-sectional model, there is no
reason to expect autocorrelation (Gujarati & Porter, 2009, p. 67).
Outliers. To identify possible outliers (and influential observations) in Model 1FOLS, the diagnostic test of DFFITS is employed. DFFITS captures “changes in the ‘fit’ of
the regression, both the coefficients and conditional variance, when a case is excluded from
the sample” (Gordon, 2010, p. 367). Stata calculates DFFITS statistic with the postestimation command of predict [new variable name], dfits. Gordon suggests that cutoff
values of 1 or 2 may be used to identify influential observations (p. 367). When DFFITS
statistics are calculated for Model 1F-OLS, none surpass the value of 1.
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Model 1F-OLS-R – UAAL Ratio
Like the error variance of the best GLS panel estimation of Model 1, the error
variance of the best OLS version of Model 1 (Model 1F-OLS) exhibits heteroscedasticity.
Consequently, Models 1A-OLS through 1F-OLS are estimated using robust standard errors.
The results of the new estimations are presented in Table 10. The process for arriving at the
version of Model 1F-OLS with robust standard errors is the same as that used to estimate
Model 1F-R. (As with the GLS models, the suffix “-R” is used to identify models estimated
with robust standard errors.) However, versions of Model 1A-OLS through 1F-OLS with
robust standard errors could not be estimated with precisely the same independent variables.
This is because one of the control variables, TRUST115 (Section 115 trust indicator), has
only one non-zero observation. This causes the outer-product-of-gradients variance matrix to
be of insufficient rank to perform the test. To remedy this problem, the versions of Model
1A through 1F with robust standard errors are estimated with TRUST115.
The one municipality that has established a Section 115 trust fund to advance fund its
OPEB plan is located in Wisconsin.

Table 10
Model 1 – Dependent Variable: UAAL Ratio – OLS Cross-Sectional Regression Results with Robust Standard Errors
Model 1A-OLS-R

Model 1B-OLS-R

Model 1C-OLS-R

Model 1D-OLS-R

Model 1E-OLS-R

Model 1F-OLS-R

C

RSE

P

C

RSE

P

C

RSE

P

C

RSE

P

C

RSE

P

C

RSE

P

CEO Total
Government
Service – Years
(CEOgovyrs)

0.009

0.013

0.486

0.012

0.009

0.177

0.013

0.009

0.159

0.012

0.009

0.175

0.011

0.009

0.211

---

---

---

CEO Service in
Position with
Municipality –
Years (CEOjobyrs)

0.007

0.012

0.567

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

CEO with MPA
Degree (CEOmpa)

0.090

0.140

0.526

0.101

0.135

0.460

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

CFO Total
Government
Service – Years
(CFOgovyrs)

0.008

0.013

0.527

0.009

0.012

0.451

0.009

0.012

0.469

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

CFO Service in
Position with
Municipality –
Years (CFOjobyrs)

-0.016

0.012

0.172

-0.014

0.011

0.222

-0.016

0.012

0.196

-0.011

0.012

0.344

---

---

---

---

---

---

CFO Professional
Indx
(CFOproindex)

-0.132

0.056

0.028

-0.108

0.061

0.086

-0.118

0.063

0.074

-0.141

0.079

0.086

-0.142

0.077

0.075

-0.137

0.084

0.115

Iowa Indicator
(STiowa)

0.216

0.137

0.127

0.221

0.136

0.116

0.222

0.136

0.113

0.191

0.126

0.141

0.147

0.117

0.219

0.173

0.116

0.147

Wisconsin
Indicator (STwis)

0.864

0.281

0.005

0.862

0.269

0.004

0.862

0.270

0.004

0.850

0.276

0.005

0.831

0.263

0.004

0.726

0.245

0.006

Dependent
Variable

(continued on following page)
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Table 10 (continued)

Dependent
Variable

Model 1A-OLS-R

Model 1B-OLS-R

Model 1C-OLS-R

Model 1D-OLS-R

Model 1E-OLS-R

Model 1F-OLS-R

C

C

C

C

C

C

RSE

P

RSE

P

RSE

P

RSE

P

RSE

P

RSE

P

GO Debt Service
Payments /
Governmental
Fund Revenues
(DSvRev)

-2.705

0.973

0.010

-2.779

0.927

0.006

-2.858

0.979

0.007

-2.518

0.802

0.004

-2.420

0.764

0.004

-2.190

0.755

0.007

Implicit Rate
Subsidy
(IMPLICIT)

-1.023

0.302

0.002

-1.020

0.293

0.002

-1.103

0.326

0.002

-1.040

0.304

0.002

-0.900

0.248

0.001

-0.796

0.251

0.004

Medical Plan
Generosity Index
(MEDPLANindex)

-0.054

0,028

0.064

-0.051

0.025

0.055

-0.051

0.025

0.050

-0.054

0.024

0.031

-0.053

0.023

0.028

-0.068

0.018

0.001

Constant

2.161

0.996

0.040

2.043

0.890

0.030

2.220

0.892

0.019

2.359

0.735

0.003

2.132

0.653

0.003

2.593

0.495

0.000

R2

0.650 / 7.70 / 0.000

/F / P > F

0.645 / 6.20 / 0.000

0.638 / 6.79 / 0.000

0.625 / 6.90 / 0.000

0.614 / 8.15 / 0.000

0.575 / 7.16 / 0.000

N = 37
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While Model 1F-OLS initially suggests that the total years of service of the CEO
(CEOgovyrs) has an adverse impact on the UAAL ratio, the effect is found to be insignificant
when adjusting the model for heteroscedasticity with the use of robust standard errors in
Model 1F-OLS-R. In fact, none of the substantive variables is found to have a significant
effect at the 0.10 level when adjusting for heteroscedasticity.

Overall Assessment of Model 1
The study provides two perspectives on the relationship between the UAAL ratio and
the professional management of the case municipalities. The GLS panel regression
estimations indicate that professional management has a limited effect on the funding of
OPEB plans in municipalities. As the number of years of total government service
(CEOgovyrs) of the case municipality’s CEO increases, so does the UAAL ratio. The final
OLS estimation suggests that none of the dimensions of professionalism of the municipal
management team has an impact on cumulative OPEB funding. None of the professional
characteristics of the CFO impact the UAAL ratio in either analysis. Based upon the analysis
of Model 1, H1 is rejected.
The final GLS estimation indicates that municipalities in Iowa (STiowa) and
Wisconsin (STwis) tend to have higher UAAL ratios than Illinois municipalities. The final
OLS estimation partially corroborates this finding. The Wisconsin indicator is significant in
the final OLS estimation.
The final GLS estimation finds that the form of a municipality’s government affects
the level of UAAL. Employment of the manager-council form of government (FORMmgr)
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increases the UAAL ratio by 0.366 relative to the mayor-council form. Yet, the blended
form (FORMblend) indicates an even larger increase (0.774). A municipality’s form of
government is not a significant factor in the OLS modeling.
Two other control independent variables are significant in the final GLS estimation.
These are the ratio of general obligation debt principal divided by the assessed value of real
estate (GOvAV), and the annual counter (COUNTER). The coefficient of GOvAV is a
relatively large positive value of 3.804, suggesting that municipalities with heavy general
obligation debt burden also tend to have higher UAAL ratios. The positive coefficient of
0.030 on the annual counter is to be expected as the UAAL ratio is likely to rise with
inflation. None of these independent variables is significant in the final OLS estimation.
As in the GLS panel-sectional estimation, the ratio of general obligation debt
principal divided by the assessed value of real estate (GOvAV) is significant in the OLS
cross-section estimation. However, the effect in the OLS estimation is more substantial
(6.258 in OLS vs. 3.804 in GLS).
After relative general obligation debt principal burden is considered, a different set of
control variables affects the UAAL ratio in the OLS cross-sectional model, suggesting that
exogenous factors impacting the UAALratio in the most recent fiscal year examined (2011)
are somewhat different than the exogenous factors affecting the ratio over the entire study
period. The significant control variables in the OLS estimation are the ratio of general
obligation debt service payments divided by governmental fund revenues (DSvRev), implicit
rate subsidy (IMPLICT), and the medical plan generosity index (MEDPLANindex). As the
DSvRev increases by one unit, the UAAL ratio decreases by 2.190.

The debt service ratio
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suggests that municipalities making higher relative current general obligation debt service
payments are more apt to hold their UAAL down.
The existence of an implicit rate subsidy served to decrease the UAAL ratio by 0.796.
While many municipalities in the study indicate that their OPEB plan premiums include
implicit rate subsides (approximately 75%), the downward effect of this control variable
likely reflects the effect of municipalities that charge their plan participants 100% or nearly
100% of the nominal coverage premium, leaving those municipalities only responsible for
paying the implicit subsidy itself. Finally, a one-unit increase in the medical plan generosity
index led to a 0.068 decrease in the UAAL ratio. This comports with expectations.
MEDPLANindex is formulated so that plans requiring generally higher contributions from
their participants are assigned a higher index value. As plan participants pay more, the
UAAL ratio should decline.
Model 2 – The Short-Term Perspective
Model 2 examines the factors that affect the ARC contribution ratio (ARCratio). As
discussed in Chapter 3, the values of the ratio range from zero to 1.626. The value of zero in
the ratio corresponds to 0% of the ARC being contributed by a municipality to its OPEB fund
in a given (single) fiscal year and 1.626 corresponding to a municipality contributing
162.6%. However, in only one year did one municipality contribute more than 100% of the
ARC to its OPEB plan. Higher ARC contribution ratios are more favorable than lower
ratios.
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The model is represented by the following equation.
ARCratio =

a + b1CEOgovyrs + b2CEOjobyrs + b3CEOmpa +
b4CFOgovyrs + b5CFOjobhrs + b6CFOproindex +
b7STiowa + b8STwis + b9RECESS + b10AVpercap +
b11ILhome + b12TELindex + b13SStax + b14LOtax +
b15FORMmgr + b16FORMblend+ b17UNIONden +
b18NAvExp + b19GOvAV + b20FBvRev +
b21DSvRev + b22ACTreturn + b23ACTinflate +
b24TRUST115 + b25TRUST501 + b26IMPLICIT +
b27MEDPLNindex + b28ACMentry +
b29ACMfrozattain + b30ACMpuc + b31COUNTER

(4.10)

where,
ARCratio = Annual Employer OPEB Contribution / ARC
CEOgovyrs = CEO Total Government Service (years)
CEOjobyrs = CEO Service in Position with Case Municipality (years)
CEOmpa = CEO with Master of Public Administration Degree
CFOgovyrs = CFO Total Government Services (years)
CFOjobyrs = CFO Service in Position with Case Municipality (years)
CFOproindex = CFO Professional Index
STiowa = Iowa Indicator
STwis = Wisconsin Indicator
RECESS = Recession Indicator
AVpercap = Assessed Value Per Capita
ILhome = Illinois Home-Rule Municipality Indicator
TELindex = Tax and Expenditure Limitation Index
SStax = State-Shared Sales Tax Rate
LOtax = Local-Option Sales Tax Rate
FORMmgr = Form of Government Indicator: Council-Manager
FORMblend = Form of Government Indicator: Blended Mayor-Manager
UNIONden = Union Density
NAvExp = Unrestricted Net Assets / Expenses of Governmental Activities
GOvAV = General Obligation Debt Outstanding / Assess Value of Real Estate
FBvRev = General Fund Balance / Governmental Fund Revenues
DSvRev = GO Debt Service Payments / Governmental Fund Revenues
ACTreturn = Actuarial Assumption: Annual Rate of Return on Plan Investments
ACTinflate = Actuarial Assumption: Annual Rate of Inflation in Healthcare Costs
TRUST115 = Irrevocable Section 115 Trust Indicator
TRUST501 = Irrevocable Section 501 Trust Indicator
IMPLICIT = Implicit Rate Subsidy Indicator
MEDPLNindex = Medical Plan Generosity Index
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ACMentry = Actuarial Cost Method Indicator: Entry Age
ACMfrozattain = Actuarial Cost Method Indicator: Frozen Attained Age
ACMpuc = Actuarial Cost Method Indicator: Projected Unit Credit
COUNTER = Annual Time Counter
The process for refining Model 2 is the same as is for Model 1. That is, the
estimations begin with all independent variables included. Then, through successive
estimations, insignificant variables are omitted. The most insignificant variables, as reflected
by their respective p-values, are omitted first. In the end, only independent variables that are
significant at the 0.10 level are retained in the final GLS panel regression. Also, a series of
parallel OLS cross-sectional regressions were estimated for the purpose of comparison.
As with Model 1, STiowa (Iowa indicator) and STwis (Wisconsin indicator) are
included throughout the modeling so as to retain the capacity to distinguish the effect of
states on the ARC contribution ratio relative to Illinois.
Table 11 below presents the results of the initial GLS panel regression estimations.
The Model 2 estimations include all 38 case municipalities and 139 observations. There is
no need to delete a case municipality to permit the analysis of data as there was for Model 1.
As was shown for Model 1 in Table 7 above, Table 11 presents the effects of all substantive
independent variables for the purposes of illustration.

In the actual reverse stepwise

procedure employed in the study, the substantive independent variables are omitted
intermittently from the estimations with the control variables as their (high) p-values
suggested is appropriate.

Table 11
Model 2 – Dependent Variable: ARC Contribution Ratio – Initial GLS Panel Regression Results
Model 2A

Model 2B

Model 2C

Model 2D

Dependent Variable

C

SE

P

C

SE

P

C

SE

P

C

SE

P

CEO Total Government Service – Years
(CEOgovyrs)

0.002

0.003

0.658

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

CEO Service in Position with Municipality
– Years (CEOjobyrs)

0.003

0.004

0.424

0.004

0.003

0.161

0.004

0.003

0.159

0.005

0.003

0.098

CEO with MPA Degree (CEOmpa)

0.076

0.069

0.268

0.080

0.068

0.240

0.073

0,067

0,272

---

---

---

CFO Total Government Service – Years
(CFOgovyrs)

0.011

0.004

0.018

0.011

0.004

0.017

0.010

0.004

0.019

0.009

0.004

0.023

CFO Service in Position with Municipality
– Years (CFOjobyrs)

-0.007

0.004

0.090

-0.007

0.004

0.088

-0.007

0.004

0.062

-0.007

0.004

0.059

CFO Professional Index (CFOproindex)

0.019

0.032

0.555

0,020

0.032

0.535

---

---

---

---

---

---

Iowa Indicator (STiowa)

-0.158

0.130

0.223

-0.165

0.127

0.193

-0.161

0.126

0.202

-0.139

0.124

0.263

Wisconsin Indicator (STwis)

-0.093

0.144

0.518

-0.102

0.141

0.466

-0.096

0.140

0.490

-0.084

0.139

0.546

Section 115 Trust Indicator (TRUST115)

0.797

0.236

0.001

0.824

0.226

0.000

0.814

0.223

0.000

0.771

0.218

0.000

Entry Age ACM (ACMentry)

-0.360

0.199

0.071

-0.371

0.196

0.058

-0.363

0.194

0.061

-0.326

0.189

0.086

Projected Unit Credit ACM (ACMpuc)

-0.429

0.180

0.017

-0.436

0.178

0.014

-0,428

0.176

0.015

-0.403

0.172

0.019

Constant

0.587

0.231

0.011

0.618

0.218

0.005

0.663

0.203

0.001

0.669

0.201

0.001

2

R

0.370

0.377

0.368

0.366

Wald Chi-Square

24.44

24.73

24.76

24.05

P > Chi-Square

0.011

0.006

0.003

0.002

N = 139; Municipalities/Groups = 38
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Four estimations of Model 2 are presented in Table 11. All four of these initial
versions of the model are significant at the 0.05 level. However, the estimations of Model 1
explained only about 37% of the variation in the ARC contribution ratio, less than the Model
2 estimations of the UAAL ratio. Model 2A yields the following explanatory equation.
ARCratio =

0.587 + 0.002CEOgovyrs + 0.003CEOjobyrs
+ 0.076CEOmpa + 0.011CFOgovyrs – 0.007CFOjobhrs
+ 0.019CFOproindex – 0.158STiowa – 0.093STwis
+ 0.797TRUST115 – 0.360ACMentry
–0.429ACMpuc

(4.11)

Two of the substantive independent variables were significant at the 0.10 level: the total
number years of the CFO’s government service (CFOgovyrs) and the number of years the
CFO had served in his position with the case municipality (CFOjobyrs). Three of the control
variables are significant: the Section 115 trust (TRUST115), entry age actuarial cost method
(ACMentry), and projected unit credit cost method (ACMpuc) indicators.
The best initial GLS panel regression estimation is Model 2D described by the
following equation.
ARCratio =

0.669 + 0.005CEOjobyrs + 0.009CFOgovyrs
– 0.007CFOjobhrs – 0.139STiowa – 0.084STwis
+ 0.771TRUST115 – 0.326ACMentry
–0.403ACMpuc

Model 2D is interpreted as follows.
● CEO Service in Position with the Municipality (CEOjobyrs) – For each
additional year of service that the CEO has in this position with the
municipality, the municipality’s ARC contribution ratio increases by 0.005.
● CFO Total Government Service (CFOgovyrs) – For each additional year of
government service that the municipality’s CFO possesses, the municipality’s
ARC contribution ratio increases by 0.009.

(4.12)
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● CFO Service in Position with the Municipality (CFOjobyrs) – For each
additional year of service that the CFO had in this position with the
municipality, the municipality’s ARC contribution ratio decreases by 0.007.
● Iowa (STiowa) – A municipality’s location in Iowa decreases the ARC
contribution ratio relative to Illinois municipalities by 0.139.
● Wisconsin (STwis) – A municipality’s location in Wisconsin decreases the
ARC contribution ratio relative to Illinois municipalities by 0.084.
● Section 115 Trust (TRUST115) – A municipality’s use of a Section 115 trust
to advance fund its OPEB obligation increases the ARC contribution ratio by
0.771.
● Entry Age Actuarial Cost Method (ACMentry) – A municipality’s use of the
entry age actuarial cost method decreases the ARC contribution ratio by
0.326.
● Projected Unit Credit Cost Method (ACMpuc) – A municipality’s use of the
PUC actuarial cost method decreases the ARC contribution ratio by 0.403.
All independent variables in Model 2D are significant at the 0.10 level except the state
indicators (STiowa and STwis).

Model 2D Diagnostics
The regression assumptions of Model 2D are tested as described below.
Linearity. The linear relationships in Model 2D are assessed by examining
scatterplots of each independent variable in idiosyncratic residuals. None of the scatterplots
reveal a nonlinear pattern.
Collinearity. As for the GLS panel estimations of Model 1, the possible collinearity
of the independent variables is investigated by calculating pairwise Pearson correlation
coefficients for interval variables and lambda statistics for nominal variables. The highest
Pearson correlation coefficients for the interval variables is 0.43. Most of the lambda
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statistics are very low as well, ranging from zero to 0.125. However, the lambda for two
nominal independent variables in Model 2D were high. The lambda for the Wisconsin
indicator (STwis) and the entry age actuarial cost method indicator (ACMentry) is 0.599 and
the statistic for the Wisconsin indicator and the PUC actuarial cost method indicator
(ACMpuc) is 0.699. The issue of collinearity between STwis and ACMentry is resolved
when ACMentry is omitted from Model 2 as discussed below. In the case of the PUC
indicator, the researcher opts to make no changes to the model (Gujarati & Porter, 2009, p.
342). To assess the collinear impact of the PUC indicator on the significance of the
Wisconsin indicator, Model 2D is re-estimated with the PUC indicator omitted. With the
revision of the model, the impact of the Wisconsin indicator does not change markedly. That
is, the coefficient for STwis changes from -0.084 to -0.137 and remains insignificant at the
0.10 level (i.e., the p-value associated with the variable changes from 0.546 to 0.347).
Heteroscedasticity. The possible existence of heteroscedasticity is investigated by
plotting the linear prediction against both the idiosyncratic and unit-level residuals. Neither
plot reflects a discernable pattern. Consequently, the threat of heteroscedasticity is
dismissed.
Autocorrelation. As with Model 1F, the Wooldridge (2002) test is employed with
the Stata xtserial command to detect first-order autocorrelation in panel data at the
idiosyncratic level. This test is based upon an F-distribution. The F-statistic is 71.14 with an
associated p-value of near zero. Thus, first-order autocorrelation is detected. To compensate
for this autocorrelation, Model 2 is re-estimated using the xtregar function. The xtregar
function permits the fitting of “cross-sectional time-series regression models when the
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disturbance term is first-order autoregressive” (Stata Panel-Data Reference Manual, 2013, p.
395). The results of the estimations of Model 2 adjusting for first-order autocorrelation are
presented below.
Outliers. To detect possible outlying observations, combined (idiosyncratic and unitlevel) residuals are calculated for Model 2D as they are for Model 1F. As discussed above,
Gordon (2010) maintains that observations with residuals of a value of more than 2.0 or 3.0
may be outliers that influence the regression coefficients (p. 367). In Model 2D, none of the
observations has a combined residual greater than 2.0. Only one observation has a combined
residual greater than 1.0 (i.e., 1.2).

Model 2E-AC – ARC Contribution Ratio
As discussed previously, the Wooldridge test (2002) reveals first-order
autocorrelation in Model 2D. To compensate for this phenomenon, Model 2 is re-estimated
using Stata’s xtregar function. Table 12 below reflects the results of the autocorrelationadjusted results. To distinguish the autocorrelation-adjusted estimations, the suffix “-AC”
(for autocorrelation-adjusted) is added to the labels of the estimations. For example, the best
autocorrelation-adjusted estimation of Model 2 is labeled “Model 2E-AC.”

Table 12
Model 2 – Dependent Variable: ARC Contribution Ratio – Autocorrelation-Adjusted GLS Panel Regression Results
Model 2A-AC

Model 2B-AC

Model 2C-AC

Model 2D-AC

Model 2E-AC

Dependent Variable

C

SE

P

C

SE

P

C

SE

P

C

SE

P

C

SE

P

CEO Total Government Service – Years
(CEOgovyrs)

0.001

0.003

0.863

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

CEO Service in Position with
Municipality – Years (CEOjobyrs)

0.004

0.004

0.327

0.004

0.003

0.162

0.004

0.003

0.150

0.005

0.003

0.097

0.006

0.003

0.047

CEO with MPA Degree (CEOmpa)

0.081

0.061

0.187

0.083

0.061

0.176

0.074

0,060

0,219

---

---

---

---

---

---

CFO Total Government Service – Years
(CFOgovyrs)

0.011

0.004

0.004

0.011

0.004

0.004

0.010

0.004

0.007

0.010

0.004

0.010

0.009

0.004

0.017

CFO Service in Position with
Municipality – Years (CFOjobyrs)

-0.007

0.004

0.062

-0.007

0.004

0.061

-0.008

0.004

0.039

-0.008

0.004

0.041

-0.007

0.004

0.050

CFO Professional Index (CFOproindex)

0.028

0.031

0.372

0,028

0.031

0.374

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

Iowa Indicator (STiowa)

-0.108

0.117

0.357

-0.111

0.117

0.341

-0.108

0.117

0.355

-0.089

0.116

0.443

0.013

0.100

0.895

Wisconsin Indicator (STwis)

-0.046

0.131

0.726

-0.050

0.130

0.703

-0.045

0.130

0.728

-0.037

0.130

0.775

0.048

0.119

0.686

Section 115 Trust Indicator (TRUST115)

0.824

0.206

0.000

0.833

0.198

0.000

0.823

0.198

0.000

0.778

0.196

0.000

0.772

0.196

0.000

Entry Age ACM (ACMentry)

-0.312

0.177

0.079

-0.316

0.177

0.073

-0.307

0.177

0.082

-0.273

0.175

0.119

---

---

---

Projected Unit Credit ACM (ACMpuc)

-0.437

0.159

0.006

-0.439

0.159

0.006

-0,426

0.159

0.007

-0.400

0.158

0.011

-0.210

0.099

0.035

Constant

0.527

0.207

0.011

0.540

0.198

0.006

0.602

0.186

0.001

0.613

0.187

0.001

0.343

0.073

0.000

R2

0.385

0.389

0.377

0.374

0.359

Wald Chi-Square

31.37

31.15

30.16

28.40

26.03

P > Chi-Square

0.002

0.001

0.001

0.001

0.001

N = 139; Municipalities/Groups = 38
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All of the autocorrelation-adjusted versions of Model 2 shown in Table 13 above are
significant. The R2 for the models ranged from 0.359 to 0.385. Model 2A-AR yielded the
equation 4.13.
ARCratio =

0.527 + 0.001CEOgovyrs + 0.004CEOjobyrs
+ 0.081CEOmpa + 0.011CFOgovyrs – 0.007CFOjobhrs
+ 0.028CFOproindex – 0.108STiowa – 0.046STwis
+ 0.824TRUST115 – 0.312ACMentry
– 0.437ACMpuc

(4.13)

The same two substantive independent variables that are significant at the 0.10 level in
Model 2A were significant in Model 2A-AC: the total number years of the CFO’s
government service (CFOgovyrs) and the number of years the CFO has served in his position
with the case municipality (CFOjobyrs). Similarly, three of the control independent variables
are significant: Section 115 trust (TRUST115), entry age actuarial cost method (ACMentry),
and projected unit credit cost method (ACMpuc).
With the omission of insignificant independent variables, Model 2E-AC results.
Model 2E-AC is the best GLS panel autocorrelation-adjusted regression estimation.
Equation 4.14 describes the model.
ARCratio =

0.343 + 0.006CEOjobyrs + 0.009CFOgovyrs
– 0.007CFOjobhrs + 0.013STiowa + 0.048STwis
+ 0.772TRUST115 – 0.210ACMpuc

Model 2E-AC may be interpreted as follows.
● CEO Service in Position with the Municipality (CEOjobyrs) – For each
additional year of service that the CEO had in this position with the
municipality, the municipality’s ARC contribution ratio increases by 0.006.
● CFO Total Government Service (CFOgovyrs) – For each additional year of
government service that the municipality’s CFO possessed, the municipality’s
ARC contribution ratio increases by 0.009.

(4.14)
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● CFO Service in Position with the Municipality (CFOjobyrs) – For each
additional year of service that the CFO had in his position with the
municipality, the municipality’s ARC contribution ratio decreases by 0.007.
● Iowa (STiowa) – A municipality’s location in Iowa increases the ARC
contribution ratio relative to Illinois municipalities by 0.013.
● Wisconsin (STwis) – A municipality’s location in Wisconsin increases the
ARC contribution ratio relative to Illinois municipalities by 0.048.
● Section 115 Trust (TRUST115) – A municipality’s use of a Section 115 trust
to advance fund its OPEB obligation increases the ARC contribution ratio by
0.772.
● Projected Unit Credit Cost Method (ACMpuc) – A municipality’s use of the
PUC actuarial cost method decreases the ARC contribution ratio by 0.210.
All independent variables in Model 2E-AC are significant at the 0.10 level except the state
indicators (STiowa and STwis). However, in the evolution of autocorrelation-adjusted
estimations from Model 2A-AC to Model 2E-AC, the indicator for the entry age actuarial
cost method (ACMentry) as it was no longer significant at the 0,10 level. (See Model 2DAR above.)
To determine whether random-effects or fixed-effects modeling would be most
appropriate for Model 2, the Hausman test (1978) is employed. The null hypothesis for the
test is that the difference in coefficients is not systematic (i.e., that random-effects modeling
is most appropriate). The chi-square statistic for the test was 7.90. The probability
associated with this statistic is 0.10. Thus, based upon a 0.05, the null hypothesis cannot not
be rejected. Random-effects modeling is, therefore, be most appropriate for Model 2E-AC.
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The Alternative View of the Arc Contribution Ratio
As in the analysis of Model 1 (UAAL ratio), OLS cross-sectional regression
estimations were prepared for Model 2 (ARC contribution ratio). These estimations are
prepared to isolate the most recent effects of factors impacting on the ARC contribution ratio.
As with the OLS regressions for Model 1, the data for the OLS cross-sectional regression
pertains to the fiscal years of the case municipalities ending in 2011. Thus, the total number
of cases (municipalities) included in the estimations is 38. All indices for the OLS crosssectional regression are calculated in exactly the same manner as the GLS panel regression.
The results of the OLS cross-sectional regression are presented in Table 13 below.
The range of the ARC contribution ratio for the 38-case sample is from zero to 1.0.
The mean of the sample is 0.46 with a standard deviation of 0.24. Thus, the mean of the
ARC contribution ratio for the OLS cross-sectional estimations is comparable to that of the
GLS panel estimations (µ = 0.44; σ = 0.27). However, the range of ARC contributions
values in the GLS sample is wider, ranging from zero to 1.63.

Table 13
Model 2 – Dependent Variable: ARC Contribution Ratio – OLS Cross-Sectional Regression Results
Model 2A-OLS

Model 2B-OLS

Model 2C-OLS

Model 2D-OLS

Model 2E-OLS

Model 2F-OLS

Dependent
Variable

C

SE

P

C

SE

P

C

SE

P

C

SE

P

C

SE

P

C

SE

P

CEO Total
Government
Service –
Years
(CEOgovyrs)

-0.001

0.004

0.958

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

CEO Service
in Position
with
Municipality –
Years
(CEOjobyrs)

0.002

0.006

0.738

0.002

0.005

0.709

0.002

0.004

0.710

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

CEO with
MPA Degree
(CEOmpa)

0.121

0.077

0.129

0.121

0.075

0.121

0.121

0.074

0.112

0.128

0.701

0.082

0.109

0.069

0.122

---

---

---

CFO Total
Government
Service –
Years
(CFOgovyrs)

0.011

0.005

0.031

0.011

0.005

0.028

0.011

0.004

0.020

0.011

0.004

0.016

0.010

0.004

0.025

0.009

0.004

0.045

CFO Service
in Position
with
Municipality –
Years
(CFOjobyrs)

-0.001

0.007

0.924

-0.001

0.007

0.925

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---
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(continued on following page)

Table 13 (continued)
Model 2A-OLS
Dependent
Variable

C

SE

Model 2B-OLS
P

C

SE

P

Model 2C-OLS

Model 2D-OLS

Model 2E-OLS

Model 2F-OLS

C

SE

P

C

SE

P

C

SE

P

C

SE

P

Iowa
Indicator
(STiowa)

-0.305

0.144

0.044

-0.305

0.141

0.039

-0.308

0.133

0.028

-0.314

0.130

0.023

-0.318

0.130

0.021

0.304

0.133

0.029

Wisconsin
Indicator
(STwis)

-0.207

0.155

0.193

-0.206

0.151

0.183

-0.207

0.148

0.173

-0.219

0.142

0.135

-0.218

0.143

0.136

0.223

0.146

0.136

Section 115
Trust
(TRUST115)

0.803

0.250

0.004

0.798

0.231

0.002

0.795

0.225

0.001

0.794

0.222

0.001

0.779

0.221

0.001

0.706

0.222

0.003

Entry Age
ACM
(ACMentry)

-0.444

0,213

0.047

-0.443

0.208

0.043

-0.443

0.204

0.039

-0.471

0.188

0.018

-0.457

0.187

0.021

0.430

0.191

0.032

Projected
Unit Credit
ACM
(ACMpuc)

-0.393

0.188

0.046

-0.392

0.183

0.042

-0.391

0.180

0.038

-0.408

0.171

0.024

-0.389

0.171

0.030

0.357

0.174

0.048

Constant

0.606

0.267

0.032

0.601

0.248

0.022

0.600

0.243

0.020

0.628

0.229

0.010

0.731

0.206

0.001

0.787

0.207

0.001

Adjusted R2
// F / P > F

0.239 / 2.05 / 0.064

0.267 / 2.34 / 0.038

O.293 / 2.70 / 0.021

0.314 / 3.11 / 0.012

0.312 / 3.40 / 0.009

0.279 / 3.37 /
0.011

N = 38
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Again, this analysis parallels the analysis of Model 1. Model 2F-OLS is the model
that results after starting with a model including all independent variables and successively
estimating OLS cross-sectional models by eliminating the most insignificant models
independent variable, except the Iowa (STiowa) and Wisconsin (STwis) indicators. A pvalue of 0.10 is used as the threshold for deletion of an independent variable. After arriving
at Model 2F-OLS, Models 2A-OLS through 2E-OLS are estimated simply to illustrate the
impact of the substantive control variables.
Five of the six versions of OLS cross-sectional panel regression of Model 2 were
significant (p-value for the F-statistic of less than 0.05). The iterations of Model 2-OLS
explained between 23.9% and 31.4% of the variation in the ARC contribution ratio. Model
2A-OLS yielded the following explanatory equation.
ARCratio =

0.606 – 0.001CEOgovyrs + 0.002CEOjobyrs
+ 0.121CEOmpa + 0.011CFOgovyrs – 0.001CFOjobhrs
+ 0.041CFOproindex – 0.305STiowa – 0. 207STwis
+ 0.803TRUST115 – 0.444ACMentry
– 0.393ACMpuc

(4.15)

Several independent variables in Model 2A-OLS were significant at the 0.10 level. Only one
of these was a substantive variable: total years of government service of the CFO
(CFOjobyrs). Interestingly, the Iowa indicator (STiowa) was also significant. Beyond that,
the indicators for a Section 115 trust (TRUST115), entry age actuarial cost method
(ACMentry), and projected unit credit actuarial cost method (ACMpuc) are significant as
well.
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The more refined OLS version of Model 2 was found to be:
ARCratio =

0.787 + 0.009CFOgovyrs – 0.304STiowa
– 0.223STwis + 0.706TRUST115
– 0.430ACMentry – 0.357ACMpuc

(4.16)

The above equation for Model 2F-OLS is interpreted as:
● CFO Total Government Service (CFOgovyrs) – For each additional year of
government service that the municipality’s CFO possesses, the municipality’s
ARC contribution ratio increases by 0.009.
● Iowa (STiowa) – A municipality’s location in Iowa decreases the ARC
contribution ratio relative to Illinois municipalities by 0.304.
● Wisconsin (STwis) – A municipality’s location in Wisconsin decreases the
ARC contribution ratio relative to Illinois municipalities by 0.223.
● Section 115 Trust (TRUST115) – A municipality’s use of a Section 115 trust
to advance fund its OPEB obligation increases the ARC contribution ratio by
0.706.
● Entry Age Actuarial Cost Method (ACMentry) – A municipality’s use of the
entry age actuarial cost method decreases the ARC contribution ratio by
0.430.
● Projected Unit Credit Cost Method (ACMpuc) – A municipality’s use of the
PUC actuarial cost method decreases the ARC contribution ratio by 0.357.
All independent variables included in Model 2F-OLS were found to be significant at the 0.10
level except the Wisconsin indicator (STwis).

Model 2F-OLS Diagnostics
The results of the examination of the assumptions underlying the OLS cross-sectional
regression of Model 2F-OLS are examined with the results discussed below.
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Normality of Residuals. The distribution of residuals in Model 2F-OLS are
presented in Figure 25. Figure 25 illustrates that the residuals of are nearly normally
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Figure 25. Distribution of residuals of model 2F-OLS.

Linearity. As with the GLS estimations of Model 2, linearity of Model 2F-OLS is
examined through scatter plots of each independent variable and the residuals of the model.
A nonlinear pattern is not detected in any of the scatterplots.
Collinearity. To identify potential situations of significant collinearity among the
independent variables, variance inflation factors (VIFs) are calculated for each independent
variable. The VIFs range from 1.13 to 8.19. Thus, none of the VIFs is higher than the higher
cutoff value of 10 recommended by Gordon (2010, p. 387). The VIF for the one substantive
variable in the model, the total number of years of government service of the CFO
(CFOgovyrs) is only 1.16. The indicators for Iowa (STiowa) and the Section 115 trust
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(TRUST115) have VIFs of 2.89 and 1.13, respectively. However, the VIFs for the
Wisconsin (STwis), entry age actuarial cost method (ACMentry), and projected unit credit
actuarial cost method (ACMpuc) indicators were 4.14, 8.19, and 6.60, respectively.
To examine the collinearity of the Wisconsin, entry age actuarial cost method, and
PUC actuarial cost method indicators, lambda statistics are calculated. The lambda statistic
for the Wisconsin and the entry age actuarial cost method is 0.467. The Wisconsin and PUC
actuarial cost method indicators generate a lambda of 0.571. Thus, proportional reduction of
error statistics in these cases was greater than the 0.3 standard (SPSS eTutor, n.d.). However,
no changes are made to estimating methodology for Model 2F-OLS because the existence of
collinearity does not preclude any of the independent variables concerned from being
significant in the model. Also, the associated VIFs do not pierce the highest threshold for
concern.
Heteroscedasticity. To determine whether the error variance is nonconstant, the
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisburg test is conducted (Gujarati & Porter, 2009, pp. 385-387).
The test generates a chi-square value of 0.95 with a p-value of 0.33. Thus, the null
hypothesis (constant variance), cannot not be rejected. That is, Model 2F-OLS appeared to
be substantially free of heteroscedasticity.
Autocorrelation. Because Model 2F-OLS is a cross-sectional model, there is no basis
for expecting to encounter autocorrelation (Gujarati & Porter, 2009, p. 67).
Outliers. To identify possible outliers (and influential observations) in Model 2FOLS, the diagnostic test of DFFITS is employed. As previously discussed, Gordon (2010)
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suggests that cutoff values of 1 or 2 may be used to identify influential observations (p. 367).
None of the DFFITS statistics calculated for Model 2F-OLS surpass the value of 1.

Overall Assessment of Model 2
Model 2 is designed to afford a more short-term or annual gauge of the factors
affecting the funding of OPEB obligations. Overall, the Model 2 results measuredly support
H2. That is, as the professional experience of a management team increases, so does the
municipality’s ARC contribution ratio (the measure of annual funding). However, the results
are mixed. Specifically, as the CFO gains more tenure in his/her current position, the
municipality’s ARC contribution the decreases.
The analysis of Model 1 and Model 2 begins with the same set of 38 independent
variables. As with Model 1, the Model 2 GLS panel estimations reveal the impact of the
independent variables over the course of the study period. The final autocorrelationcorrected Model 2 (Model 2E-AC) demonstrates that, as the number of years of the CEO’s
service with the case municipality (CEOjobyrs) increased, so did the ARC contribution ratio.
The background of the CFO also had an impact. When the total years of government
experience of the CFO (CFOgovyrs) increased, the ARC ratio did as well. However, as the
CFO serves additional years in his/her position (CFOjobyrs), downward pressure is placed on
the ARC contribution ratio.
The indicators for Iowa (STiowa) and Wisconsin (STwis) are insignificant in Model
2E-AC. However, two other control independent variables are found to be impactful. The
establishment of a Section 115 trust (TRUST115) served to very substantially increase the
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ARC contribution ratio – by 0.772. These results are based upon only one municipality in
Wisconsin having established a Section 115 trust. Conversely, the use of the projected unit
credit actuarial cost method (ACMpuc) served to reduce the ARC contribution ratio.
The OLS cross-sectional model reflects the impact of the most recent values of the
independent variables on the ARC contribution ratio. In the final OLS cross-sectional
estimation of Model 2 (Model 2F-OLS), only one of the substantive independent variables is
found to be significant: total years of government experience of the CFO (CFOgovyrs). For
each additional year of the CFO’s total government service, the ARC contribution ratio
increases by 0.009. The number of years of service of the CEO and the CFO with the case
municipality (CEOjobyrs and CFOjobyrs) are not significant in Model 2F-OLS as they are in
Model 2E-AC. This underscores the importance of the impact of the total years of
government experience of the CFO a municipality’s year-to-year approach to managing its
OPEB obligations.
In both the final GLS and final OLS estimations, the Wisconsin indicator (STwis) is
insignificant. However, while the Iowa indicator (STiowa) is insignificant in the GLS
estimation, it was significant in the OLS estimation. A municipality’s location in Iowa
reduces the ARC contribution ratio by 0.304 relative to a municipality located in Illinois.
The final OLS estimation mirrors the final GLS estimation in finding that the Section
115 trust indicator (TRUST115) is significant in increasing the ARC contribution ratio. The
coefficients in the two estimations are comparable (0.772 and 0.706, respectively). The
projected unit credit actuarial cost method (ACMpuc) has the opposite effect both model.
That is, use of the PUC actuarial cost method decreases the ARC contribution ratio. This
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actuarial cost method has a larger impact on the ARC contribution ratio in the OLS
estimation (ACMpuc coefficient = -0.357). Unique to the final OLS estimation is the
significance of the entry age actuarial cost method indicator (ACMentry). The entry age
actuarial cost method has an even larger impact than the PUC method (ACMcoefficient = 0.430).

The Summarized Findings
In summary, the results of this study provide the basis for rejecting H1 and
measuredly accepting H2. With regard to H1, the GLS version of Model 1 indicates that
increasing professional experience of the municipal CEO actually contributes to lower longterm/cumulative OPEB funding. The results of Model 2 focusing on short-term/annual
OPEB funding are more encouraging, but mixed. The tenure of the CEO and the total years
of government service of the CFO increase the percentage of the ARC that a municipality
contributes to its OPEB plan. The OLS version of Model 2 reinforces the positive effect of
the CFO’s years of overall government experience in increasing annual OPEB contributions.
However, the GLS version of Model 2 suggests that the tenure of the CFO in his/her current
position decreases annual OPEB contributions.
Because it considers the element of time, the GLS panel regression arguably
possesses the greater explanatory power than the OLS estimation. However, drawing
conclusions based upon a consideration of both forms of estimation is helpful. The OLS
estimation provides insight into the effect of the most recent values of the independent
variables. The first hypothesis formulated for this study (revised for the development of the
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UAAL ratio) is that, as professional experience and training of a municipality’s senior
management team increase, the UAAL ratio associated with its OPEB plan decreases. The
estimations of Model 1 do not support that hypothesis. The professional experience and
training of the CFO do not influence the UAAL at all. With respect to the CEO, professional
experience and training have the opposite effect from what was expected. The GLS panel
regression finds that, as a CEO gains more years of total government experience, the UAAL
ratio also rises. This suggests that CEOs become less concerned about the long-term
financial health of their governments as they are more established in their careers. Along a
similar line, the OLS cross-section regression reveals that the UAAL ratio increases where
the CEO had an MPA. A possible explanation for this would be that CEOs holding an MPA
are more focused on delivering government programs today than on devoting resources to
long-term financial obligations that provide no apparent current public benefit.
In the GLS panel regression for Model 1, a municipality’s location in Wisconsin was
significant and served to increase the UAAL ratio relative to Illinois municipalities. The
effect on UAAL ratio if a municipality is located in Wisconsin is about five times greater
than a municipality’s location in Iowa. Keith Strey, the Finance Director of Marshfield,
Wisconsin, suggests that difference could be attributed to a labor shortage that Wisconsin
experienced in the late 1990s (Personal communication, December 9, 2014). Green (1999)
reports on this phenomenon in the state. In the late 1990s, Wisconsin employers were
recognizing that the labor pool could be limited for a considerable period of time.

To

compete effectively with the private sector for limited workers, Wisconsin municipalities
may have been more generous in offering OPEB than they would have been if the supply of
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labor had been more plentiful. The extensive OPEB benefits may have led to larger UAALs.
Brookfield, Wisconsin, Director of Finance Robert Scott (2014) offers a possible alternative
explanation. Scott asserts that property tax levy limits adopted in the state in 2005 “may
have limited the ability of Wisconsin municipalities to set asset funds for OPEB” (Personal
communication, December 10, 2014).
The results with respect to the effect of the form of government on the UAAL ratio
are surprising. In the GLS estimation, the council-manager form of government is found to
be significant in increasing the UAAL ratio (relative to the mayor-council form of
government). Blended forms of government have an even greater effect in increasing the
UAAL ratio (0.774 for FORMblend vs. 0.366 FORMmgr). While this effect is not seen in
the OLS cross-sectional regression for Model 1, the GLS estimation suggests that the
typically more political nature of mayor-council may motivate the government to better
control its OPEB costs and hold its associated liabilities down. It may be that municipalities
operating under the mayor-council form of government are more sensitive to the political
criticism that may come with higher OPEB obligations.
The GLS and OLS version of Model 1 agree that the ratio of GO debt principal
outstanding divided by assessed value of real estate (GOvAV) has a very pronounced effect
on the UAAL ratio (coefficient = 3.804 and 6.258, respectively). In other words, a higher
relative GO debt burden tends to lead to a greater OPEB obligation. This phenomenon
should be disconcerting for municipalities with lesser economic wherewithal. Such
municipalities may not only struggle with conventional debt, but they may also be facing
larger relative non-bonded debt in the form of OPEB liabilities.
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The OLS cross-sectional version of Model 1 yields some different significant control
variables. The ratio of general obligation debt service payments divided by government fund
revenues (DSvRev) that is significant in the estimation suggests that a municipality’s
financial condition motivates the government to address OPEB. This financial measure
indicates that, as the ratio increases, the UAAL ratio decreases (coefficient = -2.190). On a
short-term basis, municipalities with higher relative debt service payments are trying to
reduce their OPEB obligations.
The effect of the implicit rate subsidy (IMPLICIT) in the OLS cross-sectional model
in decreasing the UAAL ratio may be counterintuitive. All but two of the case municipalities
report the existence of an implicit subsidy in their OPEB plan contribution rates. When a
municipality incorporates an implicit subsidy into its retiree healthcare premiums, the
amounts of the premiums are the same as those applicable to active employees. That is, the
premiums assessed to retirees are lower than they would be if they reflected the full cost
exposure of covering an older person for healthcare benefits. Thus, the amount that the
retiree is contributing to the plan is less than it would be otherwise because the basis for the
contribution does not reflect the full cost of coverage. Consequently, less contribution
money is flowing into the OPEB plan from retirees than would flow into the plan if the
plan’s premiums reflected the actual cost exposure. In any case, the actual cost of claims will
be the same. A large share of the municipalities (approximately 75%) in the study sample
charge their retirees 100% or near 100% of the nominal plan premium (approximately 75%).
This leaves many of the case municipalities responsible only for the financial obligation
associated with an implicit subsidy, which is a relatively small part of the total real premium.
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The effect of the medical plan generosity index (MEDPLANindex) is as expected.
The medical plan generosity index gauges the extent that retirees are required to pay a higher
percentage of the plan premium, a higher annual deductible, and a higher office visit copay
amount. Thus, as the value of the index goes up, the UAAL ratio should go down. The OLS
cross-sectional estimation indicates that a one-point decrease in the medical plan generosity
index leads to a 0.068 decrease in the UAAL ratio.
The first hypothesis (H1) posits that, as the professional experience and training of a
municipality’s senior management team increase, the UAAL ratio associated with its OPEB
plan decreases. The research did not support this hypothesis. Rather, to a limited extent, the
research indicates that the opposite is true. As the CEO gains more work experience in
government, the UAAL ratio increases. This is a disappointing testament to professionalism
in municipal government. Apparently, senior management in municipal government – at
least in the three states whose municipalities were the subject of this study – have not
acquired an appreciation for or understanding of the importance of successfully managing
their OPEB obligations. In the mind of the CEO, programmatic concerns may be trumping
any desire to address long-term financial obligations.
Model 2 considers the effect of the professional experience and training of the CEO
and CFO of the case municipalities, as well as a variety of control variables, on the
municipalities’ ARC contribution ratio. Where the UAAL ratio is a cumulative reflection of
the funding of an OPEB plan, the ARC contribution ratio is a short-term (annual) measure.
Where a lower UAAL ratio was favorable, the opposite is true for the ARC contribution
ratio. That is, a higher ARC contribution ratio is more favorable. A higher ARC
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contribution ratio means that a municipality has contributed a higher percentage of the
amount recommended by the OPEB plan actuary.
Model 2 presents CEOs in a more positive light than Model 1. Where Model 1 shows
that the incumbency of more generally experienced CEOs leads to higher UAAL ratios, the
GLS panel regression version of Model 2 indicates that having CEOs who were longer
tenured in their current positions (CEOjobyrs) leads to their governments contributing a
higher portion of the ARC to their OPEB plans. The ARC contribution ratio is a fraction
calculated by dividing the contribution to an OPEB plan in a given year by the corresponding
ARC for the year as determined by the OPEB plan actuary. In cases where an OPEB plan is
not operated within an irrevocable trust, only amounts paid for current costs may be reported
as contributions to the plan (GASB Statement No. 45, 2004, para. 13g). Therefore, these
CEOs are either motivating their municipalities to contribute more to their OPEB plans (if an
irrevocable trust has been established) or they are working to contain their annual OPEB
costs (in general) on a year-to-year basis.
In the Model 1 analysis, the professional experience and training of CFOs is
inconsequential in the successful funding of OPEB obligations. That was not the case in the
Model 2 analysis. This research suggests that the professional experience of the CFOs
(CFOgovyrs) matters. Both the GLS panel and OLS cross-sectional estimations of Model 2
indicates that CFOs with greater total government experience lead municipalities with higher
ARC contribution ratios. This is encouraging. Yet, the results of the GLS panel regression
with respect to the tenure of the CFO with his/her current municipality (CFOjobyrs) temper
that optimism. Those results are that, as tenure of the CFO increases, the ARC contribution
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ratio decreases. The conclusion to be drawn here is that a governmentally experienced CFO
will have greatest impact in the first few years in his/her position. Apparently, CFOs become
desensitized to the need to address OPEB obligations as they gain more tenure in their
current positions.
In comparing the GLS panel and OLS cross-sectional versions of Model 2, some
control independent variables are more helpful in explaining the successful funding of OPEB
plans than others. In the Model 2 analysis, the location of a municipality within a particular
state was generally insignificant. The notable exception is that the location of a municipality
within Iowa (STiowa) is a significant factor in reducing the ARC contribution ratio in the
OLS cross-sectional regression relative to Illinois municipalities. Brandon Wright, the
finance director of Davenport, Iowa, indicates that OPEB is not generously provided by
municipalities in Iowa. When it is provided, the retirees typically pay a large portion of the
total cost of coverage (Personal communication, December 15, 2014). It is possible that the
comparatively high cost of OPEB coverage in Iowa is causing fewer retirees to participate in
OPEB plans than actuarial valuations generally assume. With the use of irrevocable trust
funds being rare, employers are only permitted to recognize payments made to cover the
actual cost of claims in the calculation of their ARC contribution percentages. Because Iowa
municipalities absorb a relatively small share of the cost of their OPEB plans, it is reasonable
to find that a municipality’s location in Iowa has the effect of reducing the ARC contribution
ratio.
In both the GLS panel and the OLS cross-sectional regressions, the existence of a
Section 115 trust (TRUST115) increases the ARC contribution ratio. The increase in the
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ARC contribution ratio is substantial in both cases (0.772 for the GLS panel estimation and
0.706 for the OLS cross-sectional estimation). This is completely consistent with
expectations. A municipality can only report contributions to an OPEB plan in excess of
current-year claims costs if the plan is operated within an irrevocable trust fund. Even so,
this underscores the benefit of establishing an irrevocable trust fund to receive contributions
to an OPEB plan.
With regard to actuarial cost methods, the regressions yielded expected results as
well. By far, the entry age (ACMentry) and projected unit credit (ACMpuc) actuarial cost
methods are the predominant actuarial cost methods used by the case municipalities. These
methods are used in all but two cases. In both the GLS panel and the OLS cross-sectional
regressions, the PUC actuarial cost method is found to decrease the ARC contribution ratio.
In the OLS cross-sectional estimation, the entry age actuarial cost method leads to a
somewhat greater decrease in the ARC contribution ratio (-0.430 for entry age and -0.357 for
projected unit credit). GASB Statement No. 45 (2004) permits governments to amortize their
UAALs over a period up to 30 years (para. 13f(1)). The data gathered for this study pertain
to fiscal years relatively early in any likely amortization period (i.e., through fiscal years
ending in 2011). The PUC actuarial cost method generally results in a lower ARC in the
early portion of the amortization period and a higher ARC later. The trend for ARCs
calculated under the entry age actuarial cost method is the opposite (Mercer, 2006, slide 20).
The overall effect that the use of the PUC method had in depressing the ARC contribution
ratio may be attributed to a general desire on the part of the municipalities to contribute as
little as possible to their OPEB plans. Use of the PUC method in the early years of the
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UAAL amortization period presents them with the lowest funding target possible under any
actuarial cost method. However, the relatively larger negative impact of the entry age
method shown in the OLS cross-sectional version of Model 2 may represent a truer
mathematical effect. That is, all other things being equal, use of the entry age method will
typically result in a larger ARC in the early years of a UAAL amortization period. Any
given contribution divided by a larger ARC results in a lower ARC contribution ratio.
The second hypothesis for this research effort is that, as the professional experience
and training of a municipality’s senior management team increase, the ARC contribution
ratio associated with its OPEB plan increases. The study results partially support this
hypothesis. Additional years of service of the CEO in his/her current position (CEOjobyrs)
indeed lead to a higher ARC contribution ratio. However, the CEO’s total service in
government (CEOjobyrs) and MPA status (CEOmpa) are not significant. The CFO’s
background has a mixed effect. The CFO’s total service in government (CFOgovyrs) leads
to a higher ARC contribution ratio. However, the CFO’s tenure in his/her current position
(CFOjobyrs) works against this effect. As with the CEOs, the effect of the professional
credentials of the CFOs (CFOproindex) does not have a significant impact on the ARC
contribution ratio.
Chapter 5 will explore the likely underlying reasons for the findings discussed in this
chapter and what the findings may mean for financial management in local government.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

This study has revealed important phenomena with respect to how municipal
governments in Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin have approached the funding of their OPEB
plans and what factors contribute to the successful funding of OPEB plans. It is striking that
a notable share of finance officers do not realize that their governments have any OPEB
liability at all even though the CAFRs of their governments report such liabilities. This
suggests a deficiency in training of municipal finance officers with respect to financial
reporting. If finance officers do not recognize that their municipalities have OPEB liabilities,
they are unlikely to help their governments address them. Professional associations should
consider the offering of training that would remedy the deficiency in financial reporting
knowledge.
Also notable is that few municipal governments have chosen to advance fund their
OPEB liabilities through an irrevocable trust fund. Indeed, only two municipalities of 38 in
the sample have established an irrevocable trust fund. (One municipality has established a
Section 115 trust and the other has created a Section 501(c)(9) trust.) Under GASB
Statement No. 45, an OPEB plan not supported by an irrevocable trust fund has a funded
ratio of zero. The scarcity of irrevocable OPEB trust funds complicates this study and
necessitates the construction of an index to serve as a proxy for funded ratio. However, more
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importantly, the lack of irrevocable trust funds suggests that municipalities have not
embraced the principle of advance funding.
The resultant pay-as-you-go approach used by municipalities may indicate that
governmental management teams do not understand that a daunting OPEB liability may one
day come due and payable without the resources on hand to liquidate it. Alternatively,
management teams may know that an OPEB liability is looming, but they are choosing to
disregard it. The cognitive dismissal of the liability may not be catastrophic in cases where
the municipality has only a nominal OPEB liability. Unfortunately though, in the sample of
municipalities that were the subject of this study, the unfunded accrued actuarial liability
ratios ranged up to 2.11 (i.e., a UAAL was 211% of the amount of unrestricted net assets of
governmental activities). In this particular case, for example, the municipality had not
established an irrevocable trust fund. The absolute values of the UAALs ranged up to
$219,723,000. While a municipal government may try to ignore a liability of such a
magnitude, bond rating agencies certainly will not (Previdi et. al., 2013, p. 30).
This research project provides mixed results with respect to the impact of a
municipality’s senior management team on the successful funding of OPEB plans. The first
hypothesis of the project is that as the professional experience and training of a
municipality’s senior management team increase, the cumulative funding of the municipal
OPEB plan increases. The findings of the survey in the examination of this hypothesis are a
disappointing testament to the influence of municipal senior management on OPEB plans.
From a cumulative perspective, the experience of the CEO has actually worked against better
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OPEB funding. The study finds that as a CEO gains more years of overall government
experience, the cumulative funding of his/her municipality declines.
The second hypothesis addresses the short-term (annual) perspective on OPEB
funding in municipalities as reflected in the ARC contribution ratio. That second hypothesis
is that as the professional experience and training of a municipality’s senior management
team increase, the ARC contribution ratio increases. The study provides a measured
confirmation of the hypothesis. The study finds that municipalities having CEOs with
greater experience in their current positions tend to contribute a higher percentage of the
ARC. The results pertaining to CFOs are mixed. It is reasonably clear that, as CFOs acquire
more total government service, their municipalities tend to contribute a higher percentage of
the ARC to their OPEB plans. However, as the CFOs gain more experience in their current
positions, the municipal ARC contribution ratios decline. The effect of the CFO from the
cumulative perspective was not significant. Presumably, the differences between how these
members of senior municipal management influence their municipalities and what could be
reasonably expected are attributable to political and/or economic forces operating within
their jurisdictions.
Regardless, this begs the question of whether their professional training has been
adequate. Have the training programs imparted an adequate understanding of the nature and
ultimate impact of unfunded long-term liabilities? The finding that some CFOs did not know
that they even had an OPEB obligation would suggest not. Even if the technical training has
been adequate, has the instruction in ethics been sufficient to motivate these professionals to
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speak out as necessary to help their governments understand the genuine substance of their
financial condition with respect to OPEB obligations?
For the professional public administrator, a particularly disappointing finding in this
study is that, from the cumulative perspective, municipalities operating under the mayorcouncil form of government are actually managing their OPEB obligations better, as
measured by the UAAL ratio, than municipalities operating under the council-manager form.
(Form of government is not a significant factor in Model 2, the model measuring the ARC
contribution ratio.) One would expect that, given the presumably professional orientation of
municipalities having a city manager, the council-manager form of government would have
had a greater impact upon the successful funding of OPEB plans than the mayor-council
form. This phenomenon also draws into question the efficacy of the programs that provide
training for future municipal managers.
The small number of municipalities that have established irrevocable trust funds for
the OPEB plans is yet another disturbing finding. The financial benefits of establishing an
irrevocable trust fund are clear: municipalities that establish an irrevocable trust fund may
use a longer-term rate of return in their OPEB valuations, they may count contributions made
in excess of the current cost of claims in their ARC contribution ratio, and they may count
assets on hand in the OPEB plan in the calculation of the plan’s funded ratio. Beyond this,
irrevocably setting aside assets for OPEB obligations will be viewed favorably by bond
rating agencies and help ensure that adequate resources are available when future retiree
healthcare claims must be paid. Clearly, there must be other factors dissuading
municipalities from establishing irrevocable trust funds. One explanation may be that
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municipalities generally do not want to make a permanent commitment to their OPEB plans.
This position likely has political and economic underpinnings.
This study informs public administration scholars in four important ways. First, the
study offers one method of gauging the cumulative funded status of an OPEB plan in
research when the formal funded ratio established by GASB Statement No. 45 cannot be
used. GASB Statement No. 45 prohibits the reporting of a funded ratio (plan assets divided
by the plan AAL) when the assets of an OPEB plan have not been placed in an irrevocable
trust fund. This study uses an alternative ratio to measure alternative OPEB funding: the
UAAL ratio. This ratio is calculated by dividing the UAAL by the unrestricted net assets of
the governmental activities of a municipality. While the UAAL ratio serves its intended
purpose in this study, it is somewhat cumbersome. An adjustment to the denominator of the
ratio is necessary to make the results reasonably comparable across the municipalities in the
sample. A more parsimonious cumulative funding status ratio could be calculated by
dividing the UAAL by a municipality’s population or its real estate assessed value.
Second, the medical plan generosity index (MEDPLANindex) developed in this study
offers public administration scholars a method of condensing multiple types of quantitative
data related to medical insurance plans for future OPEB research. MEDPLANindex
integrates three key factors that typically have a substantial effect upon the total cost of an
OPEB plan: participant contribution percentage, participant annual deductible amount, and
office visit co-pay amount. The index considers differentials between individual plan
participants and couples. MEDPLANindex also weights factors to reflect their anticipated
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financial impact. The index will be helpful to scholars seeking an efficient means of gauging
a participant’s stake in his/her OPEB plan.
Third, this study lays the foundation for the holistic modeling of OPEB funding
behavior in a manner that has not been previously attempted. Bell (2006) seeks to assess the
effect of differing investment rate assumptions on OPEB plan funding. However, that
research is narrow. This study provides models considering a far broader range of potentially
explanatory factors. Public administration scholars can modify and expand the models used
in this study to grow the body of knowledge associated with governmental OPEB plans.
Fourth, this study notes the applicability of the multiple rationalities model in the area
of OPEB. Thurmaier (1995) proposes the multiple rationalities model to explain the policy
recommendations of budgeteers. Thurmaier’s theory suggests that budgeteers consider a
multitude of factors before making a policy recommendation. These factors extend beyond
mere technical or economic considerations. In his research, Thurmaier conducts interviews
of 18 budgeteers and three budget directors in the Kansas City metropolitan area during
December 1991 and January 1992. His interviews are “designed to elicit a description of
budgeter activities during the budget cycle, with particular reference to budget formulation
analyses whenever they occurred” (p. 107). Thurmaier asserts that central budget bureaus
(CBBs) may be arrayed across a continuum describing those bureaus that are control oriented
to those policy oriented (p. 109). Where a CBB falls along this continuum is determined by
the professional characteristics of the budget director and the professional characteristics of
the staff he/she hired. However, the recommendations of the CBBs included in the study
reflect the consideration of certain factors that are not technical or economic in nature.
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Namely, recommendations considered social, legal, and political factors (pp. 110-113).
Thurmaier’s research prompts him to propose the multiple rationalities model of budgetary
theory. Simply stated, the multiple rationalities model predicts that budgeting outcomes are
the result of multiple fiscal (e.g., technical and economic) and non-fiscal (e.g., social, legal,
and political) rationalities operating in the budgetary environment.
This research project provides support for the multiple rationalities model. From a
purely technical standpoint, municipalities having CEOs and CFOs with greater professional
experience and training should have had better funded OPEB plans (i.e., lower UAAL ratios
and higher ARC contribution ratios). However, that is not necessarily the case. As discussed
above, deficiencies in training may have preclude senior management teams from
understanding and addressing their OPEB obligations. Yet, a lack of senior management
professionalism does not entirely explain the propensity to fund OPEB obligations. The
financial condition of a municipality, as reflected in the financial ratios that are significant in
Model 1, impacts its OPEB funding behavior. This points to economic realities. Form of
government, which was also significant in Model 1, suggests that differences in the political
landscape are relevant. The location of a municipality within a particular state was
significant in some versions of the models. Consequently, legal and, again, political realities
apparently have an impact.
In recent years, the obligations associated with public pensions have garnered much
scholarly and public attention. However, OPEB obligations are similarly weighty.
Consequently, the field of public administration would be well served by greater research on
OPEB. As alluded to earlier, we need to better understand how public administration
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programs are addressing important financial topics such as OPEB and its associated
liabilities. Any deficiencies should be reported and addressed in appropriate curricula.
Remedies may also include explaining to future public administrators the need to more
thoroughly report the comprehensive financial condition of municipalities to their governing
boards (i.e., expanded and more specific ethics instruction).
This research examines in part, the existence of irrevocable trust funds in support of
OPEB plans in Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin. Similar research should be conducted in other
parts of the country to assess progress made on this fundamental early step toward
successfully funding OPEB plans. The results of this research should be published in
journals that are read by elected officials, professional managers, and CFOs. Practitioners
apparently need help in understanding that they are deficient in addressing their OPEB
obligations. In addition to reporting their results, scholars should explain the steps that
practitioners should take to correct their current course.
Furthermore, more empirical research is necessary to help determine what plan
features promote better OPEB plan funding. In this project, a medical plan generosity index
seeks to generally capture the features of the plans under study. The index includes retiree
contribution rates, annual deductible amounts, and office co-pay amounts. Future research
should break down these components and examine their individual impacts on interval
scales. Of course, actuarial assumptions of investment return and healthcare cost inflation
can have a dramatic impact on the funding of an OPEB plan. However, municipal
governments would benefit from knowing what they can do on a practical level to reduce
their OPEB obligations.
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The impact of plan design changes on OPEB funding would be another area for
worthwhile scholarly research. Plan design concerns the terms a healthcare plan pertaining
to what services will be covered and to what financial extent. For example, a healthcare plan
may or may not cover certain forms of cosmetic surgery. As another illustration, a plan may
cover 90% of the cost of certain treatments provided by pre-selected healthcare providers.
However, if a plan participant elects to receive the same treatment from a different provider,
the plan may pay only 80% of the cost of the treatment. The design of a group healthcare
plan can have a substantial effect on its costs to the sponsoring employer. The initial survey
conducted in this study sought to capture the effects of plan redesign efforts. However, few
of the case municipalities responded to the question concerned. The responses that were
received could not be meaningfully coded for analysis. A focused examination of the effect
of plan redesign efforts would provide insights to municipal administrators on how to contain
OPEB costs and improve OPEB plan funding.
GASB Statement No. 45 has done much to improve the quality of financial reporting
by state and local governments in the United States. The pronouncement has provided a
fuller view of what OPEB actually costs. Yet, GASB Statement No. 45 is really an interim
solution to the financial reporting of OPEB. In May of 2014, the GASB issued its exposure
draft Accounting and Financial Reporting for Postemployment Benefits Other than Pensions.
The GASB issues exposure drafts as part of its process of facilitating public comment on the
accounting and financial reporting standards it is considering. The GASB has approved a
new authoritative statement based upon the exposure draft. The new pronouncement will
require state and local governments to provide greater information on their OPEB obligations

183
in their financial statements. The new pronouncement is scheduled for release during the
second quarter of 2015 (GASB Technical Plan, 2015, p. 3).
The impending OPEB pronouncement will place financial reporting for OPEB plans
on a par with new financial reporting requirements for pension obligations. The new pension
standards are contained in GASB Statement No. 68, Accounting and Financial Reporting for
Pensions, which was released in 2012. GASB Statement No. 68 changed pension-related
note disclosures and required supplementary information that must be presented in financial
statements. However, arguably the most significant change contained in GASB Statement
No. 68 is the requirement to report a net pension liability on the face of government-wide
statement of net position of a government. A net pension liability is “the actuarial present
value of projected benefit payments that is attributed to past periods of employee service”
(para. 20). Prior to the issuance of GASB Statement No. 68, state and local governments
were only required to report the accumulation of unpaid ARCs on their financial statements
as liabilities. Unfunded benefits earned were only reported in the notes to the financial
statements and required supplementary information as an UAAL. GASB Statement No. 68 is
effective for fiscal years beginning after June 14, 2014 (para. 136). Thus, state and local
governments are now implementing the new pension standard.
The exposure draft on OPEB financial reporting is patterned after GASB Statement
No. 68. The major changes that will be introduced in the new OPEB standard include:
1. Employer Liability. Disclosure of a net OPEB liability on the face of the
government-wide and proprietary financial statements equal to the amount
by which the present value of benefits earned to date by employees (total
OPEB liability) exceeds the value of the accumulated resources held in
trust to pay benefits (plan net position). Currently, employers only report
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a liability if they fail to fully fund their annual actuarially determined
contribution.
2. OPEB Expense. Currently, an OPEB expense is calculated based on the
employer’s annual actuarially determined contribution for funding
purposes. Under the proposed standard, the calculation of the OPEB
expense would no longer be tied to employer funding.
3. Actuarial Methodology Used for Calculating the OPEB Expense. At
present, employers may use any one of six actuarial funding methods for
purposes of calculating the OPEB expense. Under the proposed
pronouncement, only the entry age actuarial cost method will be
acceptable for calculating the OPEB expense, regardless of the actuarial
method used for employer funding purposes.
4. Length of Amortization. A number of circumstances could affect the
calculation of an employer’s net OPEB liability…. Today, the net effect
of any of circumstances on an employer’s net OPEB obligation may be
amortized over a period not to exceed 30 years. Under the proposed
pronouncement, the effect must be recognized over a much shorter period,
as follows:
a. A change in benefits = recognize immediately.
b. A change in economic or demographic assumptions = amortize over a
closed period equal to the average remaining service period of plan
members, including retirees (the “average remaining service life” of a
retiree = 0 years).
c. A difference between economic and demographic assumptions and
actual experience (other than investment returns) = amortized over a
period equal to the average remaining service period of plan members,
including retirees.
d. A difference between expected and actual investment returns =
amortized over a closed five-year period. (Gauthier, 2014, p. 55)
The new OPEB pronouncement is expected to be effective for fiscal years beginning after
December 15, 2016 (Exposure Draft, 2014, para. 221).
While GASB Statement No. 45 provided vast improvements in the financial reporting
of OPEB obligations over the previous practice, the new OPEB pronouncement will advance
financial reporting for OPEB significantly yet again. The placement of the net OPEB

185
liability on the face of the statement of net position will arguably be the most important
change. While GASB Statement No. 45 requires the disclosure of OPEB obligations, the
genuine magnitude of those obligations is not readily apparent to the unsophisticated
financial statement reader. Under the current standard, the financial statement reader must
examine the notes to the financial statements or the required supplementary information to
gain a full appreciation for a government’s OPEB obligation. Under the proposed new
pronouncement, the net OPEB liability will directly offset a government’s assets in the
statement of net position. If the government has a sizable net OPEB liability, the impact on
the government’s net position will be difficult to overlook.
No doubt, OPEB obligations will be a subject of keen interest to public administrators
and scholars for many years to come as state and local governments wrestle with how to fund
them.

GLOSSARY

Accrual basis of accounting. The basis of accounting that recognizes the financial effect of
transactions, events, and interfund activity when they occur, regardless of related cash
flows (Gauthier, 2012, p. 1052).
Actuarial accrued liability. That portion, as determined by a particular actuarial cost
method, of the actuarial present value of pension plan benefits and expenses which is
not provided for by future normal costs (GASB Statement No. 45, 2004, para. A-4).
Actuarial cost method. A procedure for determining the Actuarial Present Value of pension
plan benefits and expenses and for developing an actuarially equivalent allocation of
such value to time periods, usually in the form of a normal cost and an actuarial
accrued liability (GASB Statement No. 45, 2004, para. A-2).
Actuarial present value. The value of an amount or series of amounts payable or receivable
at various times, determined as of a given date by the application of a particular set of
actuarial assumptions (GASB Statement No. 45, 2004, para. A-1).
Actuarial value of assets. The value of cash, investments and other property belonging to
an OPEB plan, as used by the actuary for the purpose of an actuarial valuation
(GASB Statement No. 45, 2004, para. A-5).
Aggregate actuarial cost method. A method under which the actuarial present value of
projected benefits of the group included in an actuarial valuation over the actuarial
value of assets is allocated on a level basis over the earnings or service of the group
between the valuation date and the assumed exit. This allocation is performed for the
group as a whole, not as a sum of individual allocations. That portion of the actuarial
present value allocated to a valuation year is called the normal cost. The actuarial
accrued liability is equal to the actuarial value of assets (GASB Statement No. 45,
2004, para. B-4).
Alternative measurement method. An optional method of preparing an actuarial valuation
under GASB Statement No. 45 for employers with less than 100 participants in their
OPEB plans. This method includes the same broad measurement steps as an actuarial
valuation (projecting future cash outlays for benefits, discounting projected benefits
to present value, and allocating the present value of benefits to periods using an
actuarial cost method). However, it permits simplification of certain assumptions to
make the method potentially usable by nonspecialists (Summary, 2004).
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Annual required contribution. The employer’s periodic required contributions to a defined
benefit OPEB plan, calculated in accordance with the parameters (GASB Statement
No. 45, 2004, para. 40).
Attained age actuarial cost method. A method under which the excess of the actuarial
present value of projected benefits over the actuarial accrued liability in respect to
each individual included in an actuarial valuation is allocated on a level basis over the
earnings or service of the individual between the valuation data and assumed exit.
The portion of this actuarial present value which is allocated to the valuation year is
called the normal cost. The actuarial accrued liability is determined using the unit
credit actuarial cost method (GASB Statement No. 45, 2004, para. B-3).
Autocorrelation. Correlation between members of series of observation ordered in time (as
in time series data) or space (as in cross-sectional data) (Gujarati & Porter, 2009, p
413).
Current financial resources measurement focus. Measurement focus where the aim of a
set of financial statements is to report the near-term (current) inflows, outflows, and
balances of expendable financial resources (Gauthier, 2005, p. 684).
Economic resources measurement focus. Measurement focus where the aim of a set of
financial statements is to report all inflows, outflows, and balances affecting or
reflecting an entity’s net assets (Gauthier, 2005, p. 686).
Entry age actuarial cost method. A method under which the actuarial present value of the
projected benefits of each individual included in the actuarial valuation is allocated on
a level basis over the earnings or service of the entry age and the assumed exit age(s).
The portion of this actuarial present value allocated to a valuation year is called the
normal cost. The portion of this actuarial present value not provided for at a
valuation date by the actuarial present value of future normal costs is called the
actuarial accrued liability (GASB Statement No. 45, 2004, para. B-2).
Frozen Attained age actuarial cost method. A method under which the excess of the
actuarial present value of projected benefits of the group included in an actuarial
valuation, over the sum of the actuarial value of assets plus the unfunded frozen
actuarial accrued liability, is allocated on a level basis over the earnings or service of
the group between the valuation data and assumed exit. This allocation is performed
for the group as a whole, not as a sum of individual allocations. The frozen actuarial
accrued liability is determined using the entry age actuarial cost method. The portion
of this actuarial present value allocated to a valuation year is called the normal cost
(GASB Statement No. 45, 2004, para. B-5).

188
Frozen entry age actuarial cost method. A method under which the excess of the actuarial
present value of projected benefits of the group included in the actuarial valuation,
over the sum of the actuarial value of assets plus the unfunded frozen actuarial
accrued liability, is allocated on a level basis over the earnings or service of the group
between the valuation date and assumed exit. This allocation is performed for the
group as a whole, not as a sum of individual allocations. The frozen actuarial accrued
liability is determined using the entry age actuarial cost method. The portion of this
actuarial present value allocated to a valuation year is called the normal cost (GASB
Statement No. 45, 2004, para. B-5).
Funded ratio. The actuarial value of assets expressed as a percentage of the actuarial
accrued liability (GASB Statement No. 45, 2004, para. 40).
Heteroscedasticity. The condition where conditional variance of the Y population varies
with X in a regression. This condition is also known as unequal spread or variance
(Gujarati & Porter, 2009, p. 65).
Implicit rate subsidy. The extent to which retiree healthcare premiums are made equal or
nearly equal to corresponding premiums for a government’s active employees despite
the fact that the cost of providing healthcare for retirees is typically higher than
providing healthcare for active employees (Gauthier, 2008, p. 10).
Internal service fund. A type of proprietary fund that may be used to report any activity
that provides goods or services to other funds, departments, or agencies of the
primary government and its component units, or to other governments, a costreimbursement basis (Gauthier, 2012, p. 1072).
Linkedin. An internet-based social network generally for business people and other
professionals.
Modified accrual basis of accounting. Basis of accounting used in conjunction with the
current financial resources measurement focus that modifies the accrual basis of
accounting in two important ways: 1) revenues are not recognized until they are
measurable and available and 2) expenditures are recognized in the period in which
governments in general normally liquidate the related liability rather than when that
liability is first incurred (if earlier) (Gauthier, 2012, p. 1075).
Normal cost. That portion of the Actuarial Present Value of pension plan benefits and
expenses which is allocated to a valuation year by the actuarial cost method (GASB
Statement No. 45, 2004, para. A-3).
Parameters. The set of requirements for calculating actuarially determined OPEB
information included in financial reports (GASB Statement No. 45, 2004, para. 40).
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Projected unit credit actuarial cost method. A method under which the projected benefits
of each individual included in an actuarial valuation are allocated by a consistent
formula to valuation years. The actuarial present value of benefits allocated to a
valuation year is called the normal cost. The actuarial present value of benefits
allocated to all periods prior to a valuation year is called the actuarial accrued liability
(GASB Statement No. 45, 2004, para. B-1).
Property Tax Extension Limitation Law. In Illinois, a law designed to limit the increases
in property tax extensions (total taxes billed) for non-home rule taxing districts (POI62, 2012).
Public employee retirement system. A state or local government entity entrusted with
administering one or more pension plans. A PERS also may administer other types of
employee benefits plans, including postemployment healthcare plans and deferred
compensation plans. A PERS also may be an employer that provides or participates
in a pension plan or participates in a pension plan or other types of employee benefit
plans for employees of the system (GASB Statement No. 45, 2004, para. 40).
Other post-employment benefits. Post-employment benefits other than pension benefits.
Other post-employment benefits include post-employment healthcare benefits,
regardless of the type of plan that provides them, and all post-employment benefits
provided separately from a pension plan, excluding benefits defined as termination
offers and benefits (GASB Statement No. 45, 2004, para. 40).
Tax and expenditure limitation. A constitutional or statutory limitation on the fiscal
autonomy of a unit of local government imposed by a state government (ACIR, 1995,
p. iii).
Unfunded actuarial accrued liability. The excess of the actuarial accrued liability over
the actuarial value of assets (GASB Statement No. 45, 2004, para. A-6).
Unrestricted net assets. That portion of net assets that is neither restricted nor invested in
capital assets (net of related debt) (Gauthier, 2005, p. 716).
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CITY OF AURORA, ILLINOIS
INDEX TO NOTES TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
December 31, 2013

Footnote
Number

Description

Page
Number(s)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Summary of Significant Accounting Policies
Property Taxes
Cash and Investments
Capital Assets
Long-Term Debt
Revenue Bonds
Deferred Compensation Plan
Industrial and Mortgage Revenue Bonds
Defined Benefit Pension Plans
Risk Management
Contingent Liabilities
Development Assistance
Individual Fund Disclosures
Intergovernmental Agreement
Other Postemployment Benefits
Component Unit - Aurora Public Library

21-30
30
31-34
34-36
36-42
43
43
44
44-62
63-64
65
65
65-67
68-69
69-72
72-77
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15.

OTHER POSTEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
Plan Description
In addition to providing the pension benefits described, the City provides
postemployment health care and life insurance benefits (OPEB) for retired employees
through a single-employer defined benefit plan. The benefits, benefit levels, employee
contributions and employer contributions are governed by the City and can be amended
by the City through its personnel manual and union contracts. The OPEB plan issues a
separate report that includes required supplementary information and trend
information. This report can be obtained from the Treasurer of the plan at 44 E.
Downer Place, Aurora, IL 60507-2067. The activity of the plan is reported in the City’s
Retiree Health Insurance Trust Fund.
Benefits Provided
The City provides postemployment health care and life insurance benefits to its
retirees. To be eligible for benefits, an employee must qualify for retirement under one
of the City’s retirement plans. Elected officials are eligible for benefits if they qualify
for retirement through IMRF.
All health care benefits are provided through the City’s self-insured health plan. The
benefit levels are the same as those afforded to active employees. Benefits include
general inpatient and outpatient medical services; mental, nervous and substance abuse
care; vision care; dental care; and prescriptions. Upon a retiree reaching age 65 years of
age, Medicare becomes the primary insurer and the City’s plan becomes secondary.
Until a retiree reaches age 65, $5,000 of life insurance coverage is provided at no cost.
Membership
At December 31, 2013, membership consisted of:
Retirees and Beneficiaries Currently Receiving
Benefits
Terminated Employees Entitled
to Benefits but not yet Receiving Them
Active Employees
TOTAL
Participating Employers

475
817
1,292
1

APPENDIX B
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204
CITY OF AURORA, ILLINOIS
SCHEDULE OF FUNDING PROGRESS
OTHER POSTEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT PLAN
December 31, 2013

Actuarial
Valuation
Date
12/31

(1)
Actuarial
Value of
Assets

(2)
Actuarial
Accrued
Liability
(AAL)
Entry-Age
Normal

2008

$ 18,831,066

$ 157,770,027

2009

22,378,004

173,681,516

12.88%

2010

24,193,191

172,968,000

2011

24,199,774

2012
2013

(3)
Funded
Ratio
(1) / (2)

(4)
Unfunded
Actuarial
Accrued
Liability
(UAAL)
(2) - (1)

11.94% $ 138,938,961

(5)
Covered
Payroll

UAAL
as a
Percentage
of Covered
Payroll
(4) / (5)

$ 72,246,059

192.31%

151,303,512

72,367,412

209.08%

13.99%

148,774,809

64,712,359

229.90%

165,242,261

14.65%

141,042,487

65,237,549

216.20%

26,735,905

197,518,139

13.54%

170,782,234

72,083,003

236.92%

30,403,650

206,806,028

14.70%

176,402,378

67,057,641

263.06%
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CITY OF AURORA, ILLINOIS
SCHEDULE OF EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTIONS
OTHER POSTEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT PLAN
December 31, 2013

Employer
Contributions

Annual
Required
Contribution
(ARC)

Percentage
Contributed

$

6,810,269

$ 13,052,085

52.18%

2009

6,911,969

11,951,819

57.83%

2010

4,548,786

12,361,724

36.80%

2011

4,580,046

11,773,685

38.90%

2012

5,380,735

11,182,621

48.12%

2013

6,116,378

13,251,599

46.16%

Year
Ended
12/31
2008
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SURVEY ON
POST-EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS OTHER THAN PENSIONS (OPEB)

Name of Municipal Government: ____________________________ State: _________
Name of Survey Respondent: _______________________ Position:
________________________
Respondent’s Telephone Number: _________________ E-Mail Address:
__________________
If you have questions concerning how to complete this survey, please contact Brian Caputo
at (630) 675-0624 or caputob@sbcglobal.net. Please return the completed survey in the
enclosed envelope by September 30, 2013. Your participation in this survey is voluntary,
but greatly appreciated.
1. What is the ending date of your municipality’s fiscal year? __________
2. How many OPEB plans does your municipality sponsor for the benefit of its retirees?

(Check the appropriate block.)
None _____

One _____

Multiple _____

Comments:
_________________________________________________________________
 If your municipality does not sponsor an OPEB plan, you need not complete the
remainder of the survey. However, please return the survey in the enclosed envelope.
If your municipality sponsors multiple OPEB plans, please complete this survey with
respect to the OPEB plan that covers the largest portion of the municipality’s retirees
who were non-sworn employees during their years of active service (i.e., not former
police officers or former firefighters).
3. Has your municipality implemented GASB Statement No. 45 (Accounting and

Financial Reporting by Employers for Postemployment Benefits Other Than Pensions)?
Yes ____ No ____
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 If your municipality has not implemented GASB Statement No. 45, you need not
complete the remainder of the survey. However, please return the survey in the
enclosed envelope.
 If your municipality has implemented GASB Statement No. 45, what was the date of
the initial actuarial valuation of your municipality’s net OPEB obligation? (Note:
This date will probably be at the beginning of the fiscal year for which your
municipality’s first annual required contribution was calculated.) _____
4. Did your municipality change its vehicle for setting aside money for its OPEB obligation

from the general fund or an internal service fund to an irrevocable trust fund/vehicle
during the fiscal years of your municipality that ended between 2002 and 2011?
Yes ____ No ____
If yes, indicate the ending date of the fiscal year during which the change was made:
______
If yes, indicate the amount of the transfer from the general fund or internal service fund
to the irrevocable trust fund/vehicle: ____________________
Comments:
_________________________________________________________________
5. Please indicate with a check mark (√) the types of benefits that were provided by your

municipality’s OPEB plan during the fiscal years indicated below. (Note: For example,
for a municipality with a fiscal year ending on April 30, “2002” below refers to the fiscal
year ended on April 30, 2002.)
Fiscal
Year
Ended In
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Retiree

Medical
Retiree's
Spouse

Other
Dependents

Retiree

Dental
Retiree's
Spouse

Other
Dependents

Specify Other
Types of Benefits
OPEB Offered
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 Is your municipality’s OPEB plan a defined benefit plan, defined contribution plan, or
both?
________________________
 Has your municipality changed its OPEB plan from a defined benefit to a defined
contribution plan or vice versa since the 2002 fiscal year?
Yes ____ No ____
If yes, please describe the change below and indicate when the change occurred.
_________________________________________________________________
6. If your municipality is located in Illinois, please indicate with a check mark (√) whether

your municipality had home-rule authority during the fiscal years indicated below.
Fiscal
Year
Ended In

Home
Rule

Not
Home
Rule

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Comments:
_________________________________________________________________
7. Please indicate with a check mark (√) the form of government under which your

municipality operated during the fiscal years indicated below. (The acronym “CAO”
below refers to the chief administrative officer.)
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Form of Government
Fiscal
Year
Ended In

Mayor
was CAO;
No Formal
Manager

CouncilManager;
Manager
was CAO

Other (Describe)

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Comments:
_________________________________________________________________
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8. Please indicate with a check mark (√) the percentage of your workforce that was

unionized during the fiscal years indicated below. If your response to question #2 was
“multiple plans,” please respond to this question with respect to the union composition of
the workforce covered by the OPEB plan for the largest portion of the municipality’s
non-sworn employees (i.e., not police officers or firefighters).
Fiscal
Year
Ended In

0% to 25%

26% to 50%

51% to 75%

76% to 100%

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Comments:
_________________________________________________________________

Questions 9 through 11 below pertain to your municipality’s manager. For the purpose of
responding to these questions, consider the highest ranking full-time, appointed
administrative official in your government with overall responsibility for managing the
government’s day-to-day operations. If your municipality does not have such a position, skip
now to question 12.
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9. Please indicate the total number of years of full-time government service of your

municipality’s manager at the beginning of each of the fiscal years indicated below.
Experience in all prior professional positions in federal, state, and local government
should be counted. If your municipality changed managers between the 2002 and 2011
fiscal years, indicate the total number of years of full-time service of the manager who
was in place during the majority of the fiscal year concerned.
Fiscal
Year
Ended In

Total Years of
Government
Service

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Comments:
_________________________________________________________________
10. Please indicate the total number of years your manager had served as the manager of

your municipality at the beginning of each of the fiscal years indicated below. If your
municipality changed managers between the 2002 and 2011 fiscal years, indicate the
tenure of the manager who was in place during the majority of the fiscal year concerned.
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Fiscal
Year
Ended In

Years of
Service as
Your Manager

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Comments:
_________________________________________________________________
11. Please indicate with a check mark (√) the fiscal years that began with the manager of

your municipality holding a Master of Public Administration (MPA) Degree. If your
municipality changed managers between the 2002 and 2011 fiscal years, indicate the
MPA status of the manager who was in place during the majority of the fiscal year
concerned.
Fiscal
Year
Ended In

Years
Holding an
MPA

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Comments:
_________________________________________________________________
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Questions 12 through 16 below refer to your municipality’s chief financial officer (CFO).
For the purpose of responding to these questions, consider your municipal CFO to be the
highest ranking official in your government with specific responsibility for the government’s
overall financial administration.

12. Please indicate the total number of years of full-time government service of the CFO of

your municipality at the beginning of each of the fiscal years indicated below.
Experience in all prior professional positions in federal, state, and local government
should be counted. If your municipality changed CFOs between the 2002 and 2011 fiscal
years, indicate the total number of years of full-time service of the CFO who was in place
during the majority of the fiscal year concerned.
Fiscal
Year
Ended In

Total Years of
Government
Service

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Comments:
_________________________________________________________________
13. Please indicate the total number of years your CFO had served as the CFO of your

municipality at the beginning of each of the fiscal years indicated below. If your
municipality changed CFOs between the 2002 and 2011 fiscal years, indicate the tenure
of the CFO who was in place during the majority of the fiscal year concerned.
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Fiscal
Year
Ended In

Years of
Service as
Your CFO

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Comments:
_________________________________________________________________
14. Please indicate with a check mark (√) the fiscal years that began with the CFO of your

municipality holding a Master of Public Administration (MPA) Degree, Master of
Business Administration (MBA) Degree, or comparable graduate degree
emphasizing the study of management and/or finance. If your municipality changed
CFOs between the 2002 and 2011 fiscal years, indicate the MPA/MBA/Etc status of the
CFO who was in place during the majority of the fiscal year concerned.
Fiscal
Year
Ended In

Years
Holding an
MPA/MBA/Etc

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Comments:
_________________________________________________________________
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15. Please indicate with a check mark (√) the fiscal years that began with the CFO of your

municipality holding a bachelor’s degree in a business- or finance-related field. If
your municipality changed CFOs between the 2002 and 2011 fiscal years, indicate the
degree status of the CFO who was in place during the majority of the fiscal year
concerned.
Fiscal
Year
Ended In

Years with
Business/Finance
Bachelor's Degree

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Comments:
_________________________________________________________________
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16. Please indicate with a check mark (√) the fiscal years that began with the CFO of your

municipality holding a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) designation. For the
purpose of responding to this question, count both a licensed CPA and a registered CPA
as CPAs. If your municipality changed CFOs between the 2002 and 2011 fiscal years,
indicate the CPA status of the CFO who was in place during the majority of the fiscal
year concerned.
Fiscal
Year
Ended In

Years
Holding an
CPA

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Comments:
_________________________________________________________________
17. Please indicate the percentage of the annual required contribution (ARC) that your

municipality contributed to its OPEB plan for financial reporting purposes for each of
fiscal years indicated below. (Note that paragraph 13g of GASB Statement No. 45
specifies that contributions in excess of payments for current claims may only be counted
as employer contributions for financial reporting purposes if those contributions are made
to an irrevocable OPEB trust fund/vehicle.)
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Fiscal
Year
Ended In
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Percentage
of the ARC
Contributed
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%

Comments:
_________________________________________________________________
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18. Please indicate the funded ratio and unfunded actuarial accrued liability (UAAL) of

your OPEB plan at the end of the fiscal years indicated below.
Fiscal
Year
Ended In

Funded
Ratio

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

UAAL
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

Comments:
_________________________________________________________________
19. Please indicate with a check mark (√) the OPEB funding mechanisms that your

municipality used during the fiscal years indicated below.
Fiscal
Year
Ended In

Sec. 115
Governmental
Trust

Sec. 501(c)(9)
VEBA

Sec. 401(h)
Medical
Subaccount

Pay-asYou-Go*

Other (Specify)

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

*”Pay-as-you-go” refers to payments for OPEB not made to a prefunding mechanism.
For example, OPEB plans operated through your municipality’s general fund or an
internal service fund would constitute “pay-as-you-go.”

220
Comments:
_________________________________________________________________

20. Please indicate actuarial cost method used in the actuarial valuations for your

municipality’s OPEB plan for the fiscal years indicated below. Examples of actuarial
cost methods are entry age, frozen entry age, attained age, frozen attained age, projected
unit credit, and aggregate.
Fiscal
Year
Ended In

Actuarial Cost Method

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Comments:
_________________________________________________________________
21. Please indicate the assumed rates of investment return and healthcare cost inflation in

the actuarial valuations for your municipality’s OPEB plan for the fiscal years indicated
below.
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Fiscal
Year
Ended In
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Assumed
Rate of
Investment
Return
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%

Assumed
Rate of
Healthcare
Cost
Inflation
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%

Comments:
_________________________________________________________________
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22. Does this OPEB plan provide medical insurance coverage for both retirees and active

employees?
Yes ____ No ____
 If you answered “Yes” immediately above, are the premium rates assigned to the
various types of coverage (e.g., single, family, etc.) the same for both retirees and
active employees? (For the purpose of responding to this question, disregard the
portion of the premiums that active employees or retirees actually pay. Consider only
the underlying total premium.)
Yes ____ No ____
Comments:
_________________________________________________________________
(Note: This question seeks to ascertain whether your municipality’s OPEB plan has an
“implicit rate subsidy.”)
23. Please indicate the percentage of the applicable premium paid by single retirees and

retiree couples for medical insurance coverage during the fiscal years indicated below.
(Disregard other types of coverage such as retiree + child.)
Fiscal
Year
Ended In
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

% of Premium Paid By
Single
Retiree +
Retiree
Spouse
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%

%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%

Comments:
_________________________________________________________________
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24. Please indicate the annual deductible amount paid by single retirees and retiree couples

in connection with medical insurance coverage during the fiscal years indicated below.
(Disregard other types of coverage such as retiree + child.)
Fiscal
Year
Ended In
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Annual Deductible
Single
Retiree +
Retiree
Spouse
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

Comments:
_________________________________________________________________

25. Please indicate the co-pay for a medical office visit under your OPEB plan during the

fiscal years indicated below.
Fiscal
Year
Ended In
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Office
Visit
Co-Pay
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

Comments:
_________________________________________________________________
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26. Please indicate with a check mark (√) the fiscal years during which your municipality

took steps to redesign your municipality’s retiree medical plan by significantly
reducing the level of benefits offered in some way.
Check
Fiscal if Significant
Year
Reduction
Ended In
Made

Briefly Describe the Nature of the Reduction

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

27. During what fiscal year did your CFO initially learn about methods of managing your

municipality’s OPEB obligation? ______
 From what information source did your CFO initially learn about methods of
managing your municipality’s OPEB obligation? Check (√) all that apply below.
Government Finance Officers Association (national) publication _____
Government Finance Officers Association (national) training event _____
State-level GFOA publication (your state) _____
State-level GFOA training event (your state) _____
State-level GFOA publication (neighboring state) _____
State-level GFOA training event (neighboring state) _____
American Institute of CPAs publication _____
American Institute of CPAs training event _____
State-level CPA society publication (your state) _____
State-level CPA society training event (your state) _____
State-level CPA society publication (neighboring state) _____
State-level CPA society training event (neighboring state) _____
International City/County Management Association publication ____
International City/County Management Association training event ______
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State-level public manager’s professional association (your state) publication _____
State-level public manager’s professional association (your state) training event
_____
State-level public manager’s professional association (neighboring state) publication
_____
State-level public manager’s professional association (neighboring state) training
event _____
Other _____ Describe: _______________________________________________

Thank you for your participation in this survey. Please return the survey by September 30,
2013 in the enclosed envelope to:
Brian W. Caputo
Chief Financial Officer/City Treasurer
City of Aurora
44 East Downer Place
Aurora, IL 60507
By returning this survey, you consent to the use of your responses in academic research. The
information you provide will be kept confidential. Your responses, along with those of
others, will be analyzed, summarized, and reported in a doctoral dissertation and possibly
published in professional or academic journals or other publications. In the dissertation or
other related publications, no references will be made to specific municipalities or
individuals.
If you would like a copy of the summarized results of the survey, please check here. ______
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FOLLOW-UP SURVEY ON
POST-EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS OTHER THAN PENSIONS (OPEB)

Name of Municipal Government: ____________________________

State: ____________

Name of Survey Respondent: _______________________ Position:
________________________
Respondent’s Telephone Number: _________________ E-Mail Address:
__________________
If you have questions concerning how to complete this survey, please contact Brian Caputo
at (630) 675-0624 or caputob@sbcglobal.net. Please return the completed survey by June 6,
2014 via e-mail to caputob@sbcglobal.net. Your participation in this survey is voluntary, but
greatly appreciated.

28. Please indicate the total number of years of full-time government service of your

municipality’s mayor at the beginning of each of the fiscal years indicated below.
Experience in all prior full-time positions in federal, state, and local government should
be counted. If your municipality changed mayors between the 2007 and 2011 fiscal
years, indicate the total number of years of full-time service of the mayor who was in
place during the majority of the fiscal year concerned.
Fiscal
Year
Ended In

Total Years of
Government
Service

2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Comments:
_________________________________________________________________
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29. Please indicate the total number of years your mayor had served as the mayor of your

municipality at the beginning of each of the fiscal years indicated below. If your
municipality changed mayors between the 2007 and 2011 fiscal years, indicate the tenure
of the mayor who was in place during the majority of the fiscal year concerned.
Fiscal
Year
Ended In

Years of
Service as
Your Mayor

2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Comments:
_________________________________________________________________
30. Please indicate with a check mark (√) the fiscal years that began with the mayor of your

municipality holding a Master of Public Administration (MPA) Degree. If your
municipality changed mayors between the 2007 and 2011 fiscal years, indicate the MPA
status of the mayor who was in place during the majority of the fiscal year concerned.
Fiscal
Year
Ended In

Years
Holding an
MPA

2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Comments:
_________________________________________________________________
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August 23, 2013

Dear Chief Financial Officer:
The costs and liabilities associated with other postemployment benefits (OPEB) are among
the most significant financial obligations that municipal governments face. During the past
several years, municipal governments have seen rising operating costs, pressing capital
needs, and mounting pension obligations. These issues have made adequate OPEB funding
all the more difficult to achieve. Still, in the face of these financial challenges, the question
remains: what structural, managerial, and financial factors contribute to better funding of
OPEB obligations?
As the CFO of the City of Aurora in Illinois, I have been keenly aware of my municipality’s
OPEB obligation and challenges to satisfying it. This awareness has motivated my desire to
conduct doctoral research in OPEB plan funding. I would like your assistance in my attempt
to answer the question of what contributes to better OPEB plan funding. Understanding the
factors that lead to better funding of OPEB plans may give us information that we can use to
improve the financial position of our municipalities.
My study focuses on municipalities located in Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin. I am analyzing
data from a total of 75 municipalities in these states. Some of the data can be obtained from
recent Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFRs). However, other data necessary
for the study are not available in CAFRs. Consequently, I would like your assistance in
completing the enclosed survey.
You will note that the survey requests information about a variety of characteristics about
your municipality, its management, and its OPEB plan. While most of the records that
contain this information in your government may reside in the finance department, some of
the records may be held in the human resources department or another administrative
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department. The survey may be most efficiently completed by assigning a member of your
staff to consolidate information provided by yours and other departments of the municipal
government.
It is worthwhile to note that the value of this research project is recognized by our
professional associations. The Illinois Government Finance Officers Association, the
Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Iowa, and the Wisconsin Government Finance
Officers Association have graciously endorsed this research project. (Letters from these
organizations endorsing the project are enclosed.) I have pledged to the organizations that I
will report on my findings at a conference or similar training event in each of their states.
The information that you provide will be analyzed in conjunction with that furnished by other
finance officers in Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin in an effort to draw general conclusions
about the factors that contribute to successful OPEB plan funding. In my dissertation and
any related publications, only anonymous and summary information will be reported. No
individual municipalities or survey respondents will be named.
Please return the completed survey to me at the address shown at the end of the survey
instrument by September 30, 2013. If you have questions concerning this matter, please
contact me at caputob@sbcglobal.net or (630) 675-0624 or Professor Kurt Thurmaier at
kthur@niu.edu or (815) 753-0311.
Thank you for time and attention to the survey.
Sincerely,

Brian W. Caputo
Ph.D. Candidate
Northern Illinois University
Enclosures
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233

June 6, 2013
Brian Caputo
Ph.D. Candidate, Northern Illinois University
27 Breckenridge Drive
Aurora, IL 60504
Dear Brian:
Please be advised that the Illinois Government Finance Officers Association (IGFOA)
heartily endorses your survey on Post-Employment Benefits Other than Pensions (OPEB)
and authorizes the use of the IGFOA name and logo in conducting this survey.
We look forward to the outcome of your dissertation project. Your ongoing contributions to
the IGFOA and professional public finance are very much appreciated.
Sincerely,

Marianne Shank
Executive Director

APPENDIX G
WISCONSIN GOVERNMENT FINANCE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
ENDORSEMENT OF PRIMARY SURVEY
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July 29, 2013
Brian Caputo
Ph.D. Candidate Northern Illinois University
[address]
[city, state, ZIP]

Mr. Caputo,
On behalf of the WGFOA Board, I wish to inform you that WGFOA endorses the survey you
are conducting on Post-Employment Benefits Other than Pensions (OPEB). WGFOA
approves the use of the WGFOA name and logo in this survey and requests that you include
this endorsement letter in the survey document that is sent out.
As we discussed recently, WGFOA looks forward to receiving the results of your survey
when completed to share with our members and possible presentation at a future WGFOA
conference. We wish you the best as you complete your dissertation.
Respectfully,
Keith R. Strey, CPA
WGFOA President
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INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC
AFFAIRS
100 IPA
124 Grand Avenue Court
Iowa City, IA 52242-2005
319.335.7586
Fax
319.335.4401
Email: jeff-schott@uiowa.edu

August 7, 2013
Brian Caputo
Ph.D. Candidate Northern Illinois University
27 Breckenridge Drive
Aurora, IL 60504
Mr. Caputo,
The Institute of Public Affairs (IPA) of the University of Iowa endorses the survey you are
conducting on Post-Employment Benefits Other than Pensions (OPEB) and authorizes the
use of the IPA name in conducting this survey.
As we discussed, we would be very interested in receiving the results of your survey and
would like to be able to share the results of your research with local government
professionals in Iowa.
Best wishes as you move forward with your research.
Sincerely,
Jeff Schott
Director

APPENDIX I
VARIABLES CONSIDERED IN THE STUDY

Variables Considered in the Study
Variable
Description

Variable
Type

UAALratio

UAAL/
Unrestricted Net Assets of Governmental Activities

Interval

X

ARCratio

Percent of ARC Contributed

Interval

X

CEOgovyrs

CEO Total Government Service (Years)

Interval

X

X

CEOjobyrs

CEO Service in Position with Municipality (Years)

Interval

X

X

CEOmpa

CEO with Master of Public Administration Degree

Nominal

X

X

CFOgovyrs

CFO Total Government Service (Years)

Interval

X

X

CFOjobyrs

CFO Service in Position with Municipality (Years)

Interval

X

X

CFOproindex

CFO Professional Index

Interval

X

STiowa

Iowa

Nominal

X

X

STwis

Wisconsin

Nominal

X

X

STill

Illinois

Nominal

X

X

RECESS

Recession

Nominal

AVpercap

Assessed Value Per Capita

Interval

ILhome

Illinois Home-Rule Community

Nominal

TELindex

Tax and Expenditure Limitation Index

Interval

See Chapter 3

SStax

State-Shared Sales Tax Rate

Interval

See Chapter 3

Variable

Data Source
Survey

CAFR

Data Calculated?
Other

Yes

No

X
X

X

See Chapter 3
X

X
X

X

X
X
X
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Appendix I
Variables Considered in the Study
(continued)

Variable

Variable
Description

Variable
Type

Data Source

LOtax

Local-Option Sales Tax Rate

Interval

FORMmayor

Form of Government: Mayor-Council

Nominal

X

X

FORMmgr

Form of Government: Council-Manager

Nominal

X

X

FORMblend

Form of Government: Blended

Nominal

X

X

UNIONden

Union Density

Ordinal

X

X

ISFtrans

Transfer to Internal Service Fund/
Unrestricted Net Assets of Governmental Activities

Interval

X

NAvEXP

Unrestricted Net Assets of Governmental Activities/
Expenses of Governmental Activities

GOvAV

Survey

CAFR

Data Calculated?
Other

Yes

See Chapter 3

No
X

X

X

Interval

X

X

General Obligation Debt (Principal) Outstanding/
Assessed Value of Real Estate

Interval

X

X

FBvRev

General Fund Balance/
Governmental Fund Revenues

Interval

X

X

DSvRev

GO Debt Service Payments/
Governmental Fund Revenues

Interval

X

X

ACTreturn

Actuarial Assumption:
Annual Rate of Return on Plan Investments

Interval

X

X

X

ACTinflate

Actuarial Assumption:
Annual Rate of Inflation in Healthcare Costs

Interval

X

X

X
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Appendix I
Variables Considered in the Study
(continued)
Variable
Name

Variable
Description

Variable
Type

Data Source
Survey

TRUST115

Irrevocable Section 115 Trust Established

Nominal

X

X

TRUST501

Irrevocable Section 501 Trust Established

Nominal

X

X

TRUST401

Irrevocable Section 401h Trust Established

Nominal

X

X

PLANredes

OPEB Plan Redesign

Ordinal

X

X

IMPLICIT

Implicit Rate Subsidy

Nominal

X

X

MEDPLANindex

Medical Plan Generosity Index

Interval

X

ACMentry

Actuarial Cost Method: Entry Age

Nominal

X

X

X

ACMfrozen

Actuarial Cost Method: Frozen Age

Nominal

X

X

X

ACMattain

Actuarial Cost Method: Attained Age

Nominal

X

X

X

ACMfrozattain

Actuarial Cost Method: Frozen Attained Age

Nominal

X

X

X

ACMpuc

Actuarial Cost Method: Projected Unit Credit

Nominal

X

X

X

ACMagg

Actuarial Cost Method: Aggregate

Nominal

X

X

X

ACMamm

Actuarial Cost Method:
Alternative Measurement Method

Nominal

X

X

X

COUNTER

Annual Counter

Interval

CAFR

Data Calculated?
Other

Yes

No

X

X

X
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APPENDIX J
CONSTRUCTION OF TAX AND EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS
FOR THE STUDY – ILLINOIS

Construction of Tax and Expenditure Limitation Indices for the Study
Illinois
General Restriction

Specific Restriction

Classification

Possible
Points

Overall Property Tax Rate Limit

7

Type

20022011
Possible
Points

Assigned
Points

Reference/Remarks

0
Limit <= 2%

2

0

Limit > 2%

1

0

Specific Property Tax Rate Limit

6

6

65 ILCS 5/8-3-1

Property Tax Revenue (Levy) Limit

5

5

35 ILCS 200/18-185
35 ILCS 200/18-185

Assessment Increase Limit

Limit <= 5% or inflation, whichever is less

3

3

Limit <= 5%

2

0

Limit > 5%

1

0

4

0
No approved increase

4

0

Limit <= 5% or CPI, whichever is less

3

0

Limit <= 5%

2

0

Limit > 5%

1

0
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Appendix J
Construction of Tax and Expenditure Limitation Indices for the Study
Illinois (continued)
General Restriction

Specific Restriction

Classification

Possible
Points

General Revenue Limit

3

General Expenditure Limit

Type

20022011
Possible
Points

Assigned
Points

Reference/Remarks

0
No new tax or rate increase

4

0

Limit = inflation and/or population growth

3

0

Limit <= 5%

2

0

5% < Limit < 10%

1

0

2

0
Limit = inflation and/or population growth

4

0

Limit = change in per capita income

3

0

Limit <= 5%

2

0

5% < Limit < 10%

1

0

Full Disclosure

1

1

Constitutional Limits

1

0

35 ILCS 200/18-55

Overrides/Exceptions
Debt Service

-1

-1

65 ILCS 5/8-3-1

Home Rule

-1 each

-2

35 ILCS 200/18-185
65 ILCS 5/8-3-1

Other

-1

-1

65 ILCS 5/8-3-1
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Appendix J
Construction of Tax and Expenditure Limitation Indices for the Study
Illinois (continued)
General Restriction
Classification

Specific Restriction
Possible
Points

20022011

Type

Possible
Points

Assigned
Points

No approved overrides

4

0

Super majority

2

0

Simple majority

1

0

Simple majority referendum

1 each

2

Reference/Remarks

Methods of Override

Illinois Total

35 ILCS 200/18-185
65 ILCS 5/8-3-1

13
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APPENDIX K
CONSTRUCTION OF TAX AND EXPENDITURE
LIMITATIONS FOR THE STUDY – IOWA

Appendix K
Construction of Tax and Expenditure Limitation Indices for the Study
Iowa
General Restriction

Specific Restriction

Classification

Possible
Points

Overall Property Tax Rate Limit

7

Type

20022011
Possible
Points

Assigned
Points
0

Limit <= 2%

2

0

Limit > 2%

1

0

Specific Property Tax Rate Limit

6

6

Property Tax Revenue (Levy) Limit

5

0

Assessment Increase Limit

Reference/Remarks

Limit <= 5% or inflation, whichever is less

3

0

Limit <= 5%

2

0

Limit > 5%

1

0

4

4
No approved increases

4

0

Limit <= 5% or CPI, whichever is less

3

0

Limit <= 5%

2

2

Limit > 5%

1

0

IA Code Sec. 384.1

IA Code Sec. 441.21

IA Code Sec. 441.21
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Appendix K
Construction of Tax and Expenditure Limitation Indices for the Study
Iowa (continued)
General Restriction

Specific Restriction

Classification

Possible
Points

General Revenue Limit

3

General Expenditure Limit

Type

20022011
Possible
Points

Assigned
Points

Reference/Remarks

0
No new tax or rate increase

4

0

Limit = inflation and/or population growth

3

0

Limit <= 5%

2

0

5% < Limit < 10%

1

0

2

0
Limit = inflation and/or population growth

4

0

Limit = change in per capita income

3

0

Limit <= 5%

2

0

5% < Limit < 10%

1

0

Full Disclosure

1

0

Constitutional Limits

1

0

Overrides/Exceptions
Debt Service

-1

-1

Home Rule

-1 each

0

Other

-1

-1

IA Const. Art. XI, Sec.
2; IA Code Sec. 384.4

IA Code Sec. 410.1
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Appendix K
Construction of Tax and Expenditure Limitation Indices for the Study
Iowa (continued)
General Restriction
Classification

Specific Restriction
Possible
Points

20022011

Type

Possible
Points

Assigned
Points

No approved overrides

4

0

Super majority

2

0

Simple majority

1

0

Simple majority referendum

1 each

1

Reference/Remarks

Methods of Override

Iowa Total

IA Code Sec. 384.12

11
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APPENDIX L
CONSTRUCTION OF TAX AND EXPENDITURE
LIMITATIONS FOR THE STUDY – WISCONSIN

Construction of Tax and Expenditure Limitation Indices for the Study
Wisconsin
General Restriction

Specific Restriction

Classification

Possible
Points

Overall Property Tax Rate Limit

7

Type

20022005
Possible
Points

20062011

Assigned Points
0

0

Limit <= 2%

2

0

0

Limit > 2%

1

0

0

Reference/Remarks

Specific Property Tax Rate Limit

6

0

0

Property Tax Revenue (Levy) Limit

5

0

5

WI Code Sec.
66.0602(2)
WI Code Sec.
66.0602(2)

Assessment Increase Limit

Limit <= 5% or inflation, whichever is less

3

0

3

Limit <= 5%

2

0

0

Limit > 5%

1

0

0

0

0

4
No approved increases

4

0

0

Limit <= 5% or CPI, whichever is less

3

0

0

Limit <= 5%

2

0

0

Limit > 5%

1

0

0
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Appendix L
Construction of Tax and Expenditure Limitation Indices for the Study
Wisconsin (continued)
General Restriction

Specific Restriction

Classification

Possible
Points

General Revenue Limit

3

General Expenditure Limit

Type

20022005
Possible
Points

20062011

Assigned Points
0

0

No new tax or rate increase

4

0

0

Limit = inflation and/or population growth

3

0

0

Limit <= 5%

2

0

0

5% < Limit < 10%

1

0

0

0

0

2
Limit = inflation and/or population growth

4

0

0

Limit = change in per capita income

3

0

0

Limit <= 5%

2

0

0

5% < Limit < 10%

1

0

0

Full Disclosure

1

0

0

Constitutional Limits

1

0

0

Reference/Remarks
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Appendix L
Construction of Tax and Expenditure Limitation Indices for the Study
Wisconsin (continued)
General Restriction
Classification

Specific Restriction
Possible
Points

20022005

20062011

Type

Possible
Points

Assigned Points

Reference/Remarks

Debt Service

-1

0

-1

WI Code Sec.
66.0602(3)(d)2

Home Rule

-1 each

0

0

Other

-1

0

-1

No approved overrides

4

0

0

Super majority

2

0

0

Simple majority

1

0

0

Simple majority referendum

1 each

0

1

0

7

Overrides/Exceptions

WI Code Sec.
66.0602(3)(b)/(c)

Methods of Override

Wisconsin Total

WI Code Sec.
66.0602(4)(a)

253

APPENDIX M
COMMUNICATION TO CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICERS
ON THE APPLICABILITY OF GASB STATEMENT NO. 45
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On Friday, August 30, 2013 8:57 AM, Brian Caputo [e-mail address] wrote:
Municipal CFOs:
By now, you should have received a survey on other postemployment benefits (OPEB)
related to doctoral dissertation research I am conducting.
I have received several inquiries asking whether the entire survey should be completed if a
municipality funds its OPEB obligations on a pay-as-you-go basis or if the retirees of a
municipality pay all or nearly all of the applicable insurance premium (potentially involving
an implicit rate subsidy). The answer in both cases is yes. It would be helpful if the entire
survey is completed because, under the provisions of GASB Statement No. 45, municipalities
in these situations are considered to be operating OPEB plans. Also, the survey attempts to
gather a variety of other data about your municipality and its management that will be used in
the research project.
Thank you for your attention to the survey. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you would
like to discuss the survey further.

Brian Caputo
Northern Illinois University
[phone number]

